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Some events in our lives are things that we do, what philosophers call exercises of 
agency. Other events are things that simply happen to us. Distinct forms of normative 
assessment are appropriate to each of these categories;  if something good happens to me I 
am fortunate, for instance, while if I do something good I may as a result be worthy of praise.  
 Into which of these categories does the mental attitude of belief fall? Much of our 
everyday practice of epistemic evaluation, as well as the philosophical literature, treat beliefs 
implicitly or explicitly as exercises of agency. On the other hand, beliefs seemingly fail to 
meet widely accepted criteria for identifying exercises of agency developed with cases of 
ordinary physical action in mind. For instance, a belief is not (it seems) under the believer’s 
direct voluntary control; one cannot simply adopt a belief at will. The result is a mismatch 
between theory and application, one that threatens both our understanding of the nature of 
agency and the propriety of our epistemic assessments.     
 In this dissertation I aim to resolve this apparent conflict by offering a unified account 
of the nature of belief, of agency, and of some of the normative standards governing belief.  
On this account, beliefs are subject to just the same sort of voluntary control as more typical 
examples of exercises of agency.  Such control, I argue, is a matter of the belief’s being 
adopted as an agent’s means to some end. The limits to agents’ discretion over  belief result 
from the fact that only attitudes directed at certain particular ends constitute beliefs; but this, 
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I claim, is a limit on agents’ discretion over even paradigmatic exercises of agency.  I further 
argue that this view of beliefs as essentially means to agents’ ends allows us to make sense of 
much of the normativity of belief as a special case of  the instrumental normativity familiar 
from the practical sphere;  we can for instance understand the  rationality of belief as a matter 
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Some events in human life are things that we do: in philosophical terminology, they 
are exercises of our agency. Other events are things that simply happen to us: we are the 
passive objects of forces outside ourselves. Paradigmatic examples of the first sort include 
simple, voluntary physical actions. I exercise my agency when I cook dinner, tell a joke, 
shoot a basketball. I am passive when I am given an award, or fired from a job, or contract an 
illness.  
Exercises of agency have in common several philosophically important normative 
features. We can carry them on the basis of reasons. We can perform them in a manner that 
displays skill or competence. We are generally (in the absence of excusing conditions) 
responsible for them: if I tell a joke or shoot a basketball when I shouldn’t, I can 
appropriately be held to account for doing so. We can be subject to ethical obligations to 
perform them (or refrain from doing so) under specific circumstances. According to a 
prominent tradition due in large part to the influence of G.E.M. Anscombe, when we engage 
in such actions we can have practical knowledge of what we are doing without any need for 
observation.  
As with anything in philosophy, each of these specific claims about the normative 
features of agency can be, and has been, the subject of dispute. On the whole, however, they 
are highly plausible and reflect commonplace realities of our lives. By contrast, while we can 
readily recognize paradigmatic exercises of agency and the key normative features that they
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possess, it is far more difficult to pin down precisely in what the difference between an 
exercise of my agency and an event in which I am passive consists, or what it is about 
exercises of agency that makes them the bearers of these normative features.  
This difficulty becomes pressing when we move from the sphere of paradigmatic, 
easily recognizable exercises of agency to more difficult cases. For instance, how is the 
distinction between agency and passivity to be applied within the confines of the human 
mind? Which if any of my thoughts, my attitudes, my states of mind are properly considered 
things that I do? An overly grudging answer here deems us to be mere passive observers in 
our own mental lives, but to too readily attribute agency in our mental lives is to disregard 
the striking differences between the contents of the mind, and the simple physical actions that 
provide our paradigmatic examples of agency on the other.  
Many epistemologists and philosophers of mind have found it useful to attribute some 
or all of the normative features of agency to what I’ll term doxastic phenomena within the 
mind, a term meant to pick out a class of mental states and events including at least belief, 
inference, and judgment. In doing so, they take themselves both to be reflecting ordinary, 
everyday practices of epistemic assessment, and engaging in philosophical theory-building 
with rich theoretical payoff. Such philosophers have, for instance, presumed or argued that 
we are responsible for some doxastic phenomena,1 that we can engage in doxastic 
phenomena for reasons,2 that we can do so more or less skillfully,3 that our doxastic 
 
1 Pettit & Smith (2006), Burge (2000), Hieronymi (2008, 2009), McHugh (2013). 
2 Scanlon (1998), Moser (1989), Longino (1978), Leite (2004), Lord (2018).  
3 Sosa (2007, 2015), Miracchi (2015), Sylvan (2017), Greco (2010). 
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phenomena are subject to obligations akin to those of ethics,4 and that we can know our own 
doxastic phenomena without any need for observation. 5 In short: they have found it useful to 
treat doxastic phenomena like actions. My purpose in this dissertation is to defend the idea 
that they have, by and large, been right in doing so.  
The project of treating doxastic phenomena like actions is worth defending because, 
despite its considerable payoff, it is – on its face – dubious. For one thing, a widely-held view 
holds that what exercises of agency have in common, what makes them the bearers of the 
various normative features mentioned above, is that they are in a particular way under the 
agent’s control. Pre-theoretically, it is simply up to the agent whether or not to shoot the 
basketball, whether or not to tell the joke. Doxastic phenomena rarely, if ever, seem to be 
subject to this sort of control. I can’t believe, or judge, or infer something simply because I 
want to. If a billionaire offers me a fortune in exchange for coming to believe that seven is 
not a prime number, I can try all kinds of measures to try to earn the reward: I can seek out 
hypnotists, say, or radical mathematicians. What I can’t do is simply decide to believe in 
order to earn the cash, in the way that I could simply decide to shoot the basketball if offered 
a reward for doing so.  
Rather, it often seems that my doxastic phenomena are forced on me. I see the rain, 
and immediately find myself believing that it is raining. I consider whether the suspect 
committed the crime, notice that all the testimony has gone against him, and immediately 
infer that he did. As a result, doxastic phenomena may seem more closely to resemble events 
in which my role is passive – being fired, contracting an illness – or at least functions of my 
 
4 Descartes (1985), Locke (1979), Chisholm (1966a, 1966b).  
5 Moran (2012), Boyle (2009), C. Peacocke (1996), A. Peacocke (2017). 
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mind and body that fall below the threshold of agency – growth of my hair, the experience of 
terror as the roller-coaster I’m riding picks up speed – than they do actions.  
If, then, we are to hold onto the idea that doxastic phenomena are exercises of 
agency,  that our practices of assessing them in the same manner as we assess exercises of 
agency are not misguided, we need a deeper understanding of the doxastic phenomena, on 
the one hand, and of what makes something an exercise of agency, on the other. And we need 
these understandings to reveal that the gulf between action and the doxastic is at least 
narrower than it seems, if not altogether illusory. I will proceed in the chapters that follow by 
attempting to arrive at just such understandings.  
As a way into the project, I’ll begin in Chapter 1, “Epistemic Constitutivism and the 
Problem of Discerning Attitudes,” by investigating epistemic constitutivism, an approach that 
explicitly borrows from the constitutivist literature in metaethics to attempt to account for the 
normative features of doxastic phenomena, by treating engaging in such phenomena as akin 
to ordinary actions like playing games. Epistemic constitutivism holds, at a first 
approximation, that belief is subject to the epistemic norms because being subject to those 
norms is in the essence of belief – just as the rules of chess are part of the essence of the 
game – and so to be subject to them is just part of what it is that makes a mental state count 
as a belief. I fend off a significant prima facie concern about epistemic constitutivism, that it 
falls prey to an analog of what has come to be known in the metaethics literature as the 
shmagency problem. I argue that even if that problem does count decisively against 
constitutivism in metaethics, it does not do so in the epistemic case. The problem suggests 
that we may not have all-things-considered reason to believe rather than adopt some other 
attitude, and so may not provide a complete explanation of why we are subject to the 
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epistemic norms. Epistemic constitutivists, though, need not be in the business of explaining 
why, in an unrestricted sense, we have reason to conform to the epistemic norms; they may 
limit themselves to explaining why we have reason to conform to these norms when we are 
believing. 
I then argue that a related problem, what I call the problem of discerning attitudes, is 
more pressing in the epistemic case. Ordinary agents are in a position to attain a considerable 
degree of knowledge concerning the content of the epistemic norms to which they are subject. 
Indeed, some epistemic norms are such that they can apply to our beliefs only when we are in 
a position to know that they apply. But if epistemic constitutivism is correct that the epistemic 
norms apply in virtue of the essence of belief, and if the shmagency challenge is correct that 
there could be other states much like beliefs that we might adopt instead but that are not 
essentially subject to the same norms, this raises the question of how we could possess the 
degree of knowledge that we do of the norms to which our own states are subject.   
I offer a roadmap to answering that question by suggesting that a satisfactory version 
of epistemic constitutivism will be one on which any essential features of doxastic attitudes 
that ground their normative characteristics, are also features to which agents have sufficient 
access to make use of them in telling different sorts of attitudes apart.  
On my view, the standards for rational belief derive from the constitutive goal of belief: 
beliefs are constitutively directed toward the goal of achieving knowledge. Beliefs, in turn, are 
directed towards this goal in virtue of being the means by which the agent tries to pursue her 
own goal of achieving knowledge. If this is correct – if a belief is a belief, and subject to the 
rational standards on belief, in virtue of the way it is employed by the agent in pursuit of a goal 
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–  then we can account for how an agent may be in a position to know that a state of hers is a 
belief rather than a state of some other sort. She need only be aware of what she is trying to do.  
The sort of epistemic constitutivism described in the previous paragraph, however, only 
makes more urgent the puzzle of how phenomena like beliefs, apparently outside of the agent’s 
direct voluntary control, could be the means by which an agent pursues any goal at all. This is 
the problem that I take up in Chapter 2, “Belief as Voluntary Action.” There, as the title 
suggests, I’ll argue that beliefs are in fact voluntary actions, in virtue of being under agents’ 
voluntary control. The difficulty is to explain why, if my beliefs are under my voluntary control, 
they seem not to be up to me or to respond to my will. I develop accounts of the nature of belief 
and of voluntary control on which beliefs qualify as voluntary for just the same reason that 
paradigmatic physical actions do: because they are performed in virtue of being means that we 
settle on in pursuing our ends. I account for the experienced constraint on beliefs by 
distinguishing between acts, which may be done for the sake of any end, and actions, which 
consist of an act done for the sake of a particular end. I argue that paradigmatic examples of 
voluntary actions (as opposed to acts) are frequently subject to such constraint, and that this 
constraint is sufficient to account for my inability to (for instance) believe that seven is not a 
prime in order to receive a monetary reward. Since the limits on our ability to believe at will 
are of a kind with limits on our ability to perform other clearly voluntary actions at will, they 
do not prevent beliefs from constituting exercises of our agency.  I apply this account of 
voluntary control to explain why beliefs share many of the normative features of physical 
action, and are quite distinct from the sorts of mental and physical events in which we are mere 
passive observers.  
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In Chapter 3, “Believing Skillfully and Believing for Good Reason,” I apply the 
account of belief developed in the previous chapters to investigate the nature of the 
normative constraints to which beliefs in particular are subject. I argue that epistemic 
rationality is a particular form of skill, and that to believe rationally just is to believe 
skillfully. Once we come to regard believing as acting, this is a natural suggestion, and one 
that builds on virtue theoretic accounts of knowledge, such as that of Ernest Sosa, that 
crucially appeal to the notion of skillful belief. The identification of rationality with skill is 
both parsimonious and demystifying, suggesting that rather than positing a distinct category 
of rational standards we can understand these as instances of the commonplace phenomenon 
of standards of skill. However, the suggestion that rationality is skill faces a significant prima 
facie challenge: it is widely and plausibly held that believing rationally is, at least often, a 
matter of believing for good reason. And yet, in general, doing things skillfully and doing 
them for good reason are quite distinct – one can, for instance, run for president skillfully 
without running for good reason, and vice versa. Such cases raise the worry that skill and 
rationality are orthogonal, with the latter but not the former having to do with the reasons for 
which one acts. In order to maintain, in a non-ad hoc manner, my identification of rational 
belief with skillful belief, I must explain why believing skillfully should just be a matter of 
believing for good reason, even though the two come apart in many other cases.  
I provide such an explanation by developing an account of skill on which to act 
skillfully simpliciter ordinarily requires displaying two different aspects of skill. Ordinarily, I 
claim, to Φ skillfully requires appropriately settling on means by which to Φ, and then 
skillfully carrying out those means. Appropriately settling on means I take to be a matter of 
settling on particular means for good reason. In general, then, acting skillfully will involve, 
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but not be limited to, selecting means for good reason (for instance, running for president 
skillfully will involve, but not be limited to, selecting one’s campaign strategy on the basis of 
good reasons). In the special case of basic actions, however – actions that are not carried out 
by means of any further actions – the skill of the action clearly cannot depend either on how 
one selects means by which to carry it out (since there are none) or on the skillfulness of 
those means (likewise). Instead, I argue, the skillfulness of basic actions turns out to be just a 
matter of their standing as appropriate means to further ends, which is to say the goodness of 
the reasons for which they were settled on as means to those ends. I then argue that belief is 
an example of such a basic action: when we believe, we simply believe, rather than believing 
by means of doing anything else. And so this general account of skill yields the verdict that 
to believe – or carry out any other basic action – skillfully is simply to do so for good reason, 
good reason being reason which renders the belief an appropriate means of pursuing the goal 
of knowledge. In this way, the standards for rational belief fall out of the constitutive goal of 
belief, as suggested in my discussion of epistemic constitutivism. As a result, there is no 
conflict between treating rationality as skill, as I do, and holding that to believe rationally is 
to believe for good reason. Chapters 2 and 3 together make up the core argument of the 
dissertation.  
Finally, in Chapter 4 I consider and reply to three objections arising from my 
treatment of epistemic rationality as a form of instrumental rationality. The first objection 
states that epistemic rationality cannot be instrumental because we possess epistemic reasons 
even in the absence of epistemic goals. The second objections states that such 
instrumentalism entails, implausibly, the existence of pragmatic reasons for belief. And the 
third objection states that instrumentalism entails, again implausibly, that we have epistemic 
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reason to trade off our beliefs against each other, sacrificing knowledge of some propositions 
in order to gain greater knowledge elsewhere. I argue that, given my account of the structure 
of belief and the nature of epistemic goals, this objections misfire against my particular form 
of instrumentalism.  
The overall suggestion of the dissertation, then, is that to believe is to voluntarily 
perform an action (and so to exercise agency), subject to the same freedom and the same 
limitations as many more ordinary sorts of actions. As a result, we can make considerable 
progress in understanding epistemic normativity by applying normative apparatus already 
developed for other sorts of action to the case of belief.
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CHAPTER 1: EPISTEMIC CONSTITUTIVISM AND THE PROBLEM OF DISCERNING 
ATTITUDES 
 
Q: Why are beliefs subject to the epistemic norms? 
A: Because being subject to the epistemic norms is (part of) what makes an attitude a 
belief.   
 
When confronted with Q, it is tempting to respond with something like A. This is a 
temptation that a number of epistemologists have indulged.6 In this chapter, I consider how 
good of a response A is to Q. More precisely, I consider what else must be said in order to 
make A into a good response. For it is my view that while A has much to be said for it, many 
ways of filling out the story at which it gestures fail to deliver on its promise. In particular, I 
will argue 1) that many elaborations of A threaten to undermine the ability of ordinary agents 
to know that they believe, and 2) that such knowledge is an essential presupposition of the 
epistemic norms that A aims to explain and vindicate.  
Let’s take a step back, and consider how Q arises in the first place. Epistemologists 
attempt to elucidate the conditions that beliefs must satisfy in order to be successful qua 
 
6 For particularly explicit defenses of this sort of strategy, see Nolfi (2015), Shah & Velleman (2005), 
Wedgwood (2002, 2007), and Zangwill (2005). Many more authors have attributed essential norms or 
normative features to beliefs and are plausibly understood as doing so at least in part for the reasons 
discussed here; examples include Alston (1988), Boghossian (2008), Brandom (2001), Littlejohn 
(2012), Plantinga (1993), Whiting (2010), Williams (1973), and Velleman (2000). 
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beliefs, and that we must satisfy in order to be successful qua believers, by proposing an 
defending putative epistemic norms.7 They may argue, for instance, that one should always 
believe the truth, or that one should accept the testimony of trustworthy experts, or that one 
should never believe contradictions. (For present purposes I remain neutral about which such 
norms are correct.)  In addition to asking which such norms are true, we can also ask why 
those norms are true; that is, we can ask Q. Suppose we agree (say) that agents should always 
attempt to believe the truth, and that success relative to this aim is the appropriate standard 
for judging how one is doing as a believer. What makes this standard an appropriate one, 
rather than some other standard or no standard at all?  
I will call the strategy for answering this question that is roughly captured in A above 
epistemic constitutivism (EC), in recognition of its resemblance to constitutivist views in 
metaethics.8 EC claims that some normative feature or features makes up part of the very 
essence of belief, and that the epistemic norms posited by the correct normative 
epistemological theory either are identical to, or derive from, those features. So, for instance, 
an advocate of EC might claim that beliefs essentially have the feature of aiming at the truth, 
and that substantive epistemic norms derive from this aim. Or instead they might claim that 
 
7 I do not mean to suggest that beliefs are the only states to which epistemic norms apply. Plausibly 
such norms also apply to states of disbelief, of suspension of judgment, and of partial belief or 
credence, among others. In what follows I will focus on belief for simplicity’s sake, but I intend the 
argument to apply to these other doxastic attitudes as well. 
8 A similar view is sometimes referred to as ‘normativism’ about belief (e.g., Wedgwood 2002, 
McHugh & Whiting 2014, Nolfi 2015). I find the terminology of ‘epistemic constitutivism’ helpful 
for emphasizing, first, that I am not discussing the mere claim that the essence of belief includes 
normative features, but rather the use of that claim as part of a strategy for responding to Q, and 
second, that the same issues can arise for (putative) doxastic attitudes other than belief. Coté-
Bouchard (2016) similarly uses ‘epistemic constitutivism,’ but he has in mind what I will distinguish 
below as ambitious epistemic constitutivism in particular, so my usage is broader.  
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beliefs are essentially and directly subject to epistemic norms: for example, that part of what 
makes a state a belief is that it ought only to be held on the basis of adequate evidence.   
Part of the appeal of EC is that it holds out a promise of an account of epistemic 
normativity that is itself epistemically mundane. By that I mean that it promises to explain 
why the epistemic norms hold, in a way that demystifies how we could have as much 
knowledge as we do of the content of those norms. In fact, I argue, EC’s ability to make good 
on this promise is far from obvious. Below, I will try to clarify both the promise and the 
difficulties facing it, but the short version is this. It is relatively easy for an EC-er to make 
sense of either the fact that we know that beliefs by their very nature are subject to the 
epistemic norms, or the fact that we know that particular mental states of ours are beliefs 
rather than states of some other sort. It is much more difficult for the EC-er to explain both 
these facts at once. By adopting EC and so securing knowledge of the former sort, the EC-er 
thereby places in jeopardy our claim to knowledge of the latter sort. And only with both 
together can the EC-er explain how we could know of the norms governing our actual mental 
states. I will call this threat to EC’s epistemic promise the ‘problem of discerning attitudes.’   
In my view, it is possible to offer a version of EC that avoids this problem. I hope 
below to go some way towards showing what such an account must look like.  
I will proceed as follows. In Section I, I clarify the EC strategy and its principle 
advantages. In Section II, I discuss the relationship between EC and metaethical 
constitutivism, distinguish between ambitious and modest forms of EC, and argue that 
prominent criticisms of metaethical constitutivism, such as the ‘shmagency objection’ due to 
David Enoch, leave at least modest EC unscathed. In Section III I make the core point of the 
paper: that EC threatens to undermine our ability to know the epistemic norms to which we 
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are subject, and that such an ability is a crucial presupposition of our actual epistemic 
assessments. In Section IV I describe what EC must do in order to avoid that problem and 
deliver on its promise: to preview that conclusion, I will argue that the epistemic norms must 
drive from the constitutive ends or goals of doxastic attitudes, to which (as I will argue in 
Chapter 2) agents possess privileged access.  
   
I. The Promise of Epistemic Constitutivism 
It is more common for epistemologists and philosophers to attribute essential 
normative features to belief than for them to give explicit arguments in defense of those 
attributions or of the EC strategy in particular. While I don’t want to suggest that all those 
philosophers have shared precisely the same reasons for doing so, I think it is fair to ask: 
what’s the point of making such attributions? What’s the philosophical pay-off for doing so? 
And to those questions, EC provides a compelling answer.9  
Any attempt to explain why some putative norms apply to us – and to thereby 
vindicate those norms – must address two questions. I will distinguish these as the 
metaphysical question and the epistemic question. Each plays an important role in the 
motivation for EC, though the latter will be particularly pertinent here.  
The metaphysical question asks what metaphysics we must posit in order to explain 
the norms in question. A good answer is one that posits only highly plausible pieces of 
metaphysics; a worse answer is one that posits implausible metaphysics, such as the 
 
9 For a survey of some other possible motivations for the attribution of essential normative features, 
see McHugh & Whiting (2014). 
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existence of highly unusual types of entities to which we are not otherwise committed. There 
is of course a great deal to be said about what makes a piece of metaphysics plausible or 
implausible, and much of it lies beyond the scope of this paper. Still, I will indicate below 
why EC might be taken to do well by this metric.   
The epistemic question asks, of the norms in question, how we could have such 
knowledge of them as we do, were our explanation of their basis correct. Recall that we are 
considering an attempt to explain, and thereby vindicate, some norms that we do take to 
apply to us. Such an explanation comes at high cost if it renders mysterious how we could be 
sufficiently aware of those norms to demand an explanation in the first place. A barely 
adequate answer to the epistemic question allows at least that our knowledge of the norms is 
possible, while a better answer renders that knowledge plausible and comprehensible. 
Note that the epistemic question does not presuppose that we have perfect, or even 
very extensive, knowledge of the norms; it supposes only that we know something, and asks 
how such knowledge as we have might come about. In the case of the epistemic norms, then, 
we can happily grant that our knowledge of those norms allows for many contentious cases 
and unclear details. It is reasonable, however, to suppose that we have some idea of what the 
epistemic norms demand. It would be quite surprising (if not flat-out incoherent) were it to 
turn out that the real epistemic norms required us to aim to hold as many false beliefs as 
possible, frequently contradict ourselves, reason according to counter-induction, and so forth. 
Given that we know enough of the content of the epistemic norms to render those 
possibilities surprising, our account of the basis of the epistemic norms must answer for that 
knowledge.    
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We can put ourselves in a good position to answer the metaphysical and epistemic 
questions by locating the grounds of epistemic norms in phenomena with which typical 
agents are well-acquainted, such as the medium-sized physical objects that make up much of 
our environment; the difficulty, of course, is to say how such objects can explain the 
epistemic norms in the first place. On the other hand, we can provide an easy explanation of 
the norms by appealing to something like Platonic normative facts. If such facts existed, they 
would seem good candidates to explain why we are subject to epistemic norms, but appealing 
to them puts us in a difficult position for addressing the metaphysical and epistemic 
questions, for rendering the existence of such facts plausible and accounting for our 
knowledge of them. One strand of Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’ can be read as 
arguing that no one account of morality can both adequately explain the basis for the moral 
norms, and also address the metaphysical and epistemic questions; as a result, Mackie argues, 
moral claims must be given up as false.10 Of course, in the epistemic case, it is open to us to 
follow in Mackie’s footsteps and become epistemic error theorists. Such a conclusion would 
be radically revisionary of our ordinary understanding of our epistemic position. Assuming 
we wish to avoid such revision, assuming that we are committed to the existence of epistemic 
norms of which we have some degree of knowledge, then it is a criterion of adequacy on an 
account of the epistemic norms that it leaves room for viable answers to both questions, and a 
particular advantage of an account if actually provides such answers. 
Epistemic constitutivism seeks to explain the epistemic norms in a way that provides 
strong answers to both questions. A representative EC-er, recall, claims that part of what it is 
 
10 Mackie (1977), particularly Part 1, s. 9. 
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for a state to be a belief that p is for it to be the case that the state is subject to some norm: 
say, that one ought to hold it only if p is true. There is then no mystery as to why, given that 
one is a believer, one is subject to the norm of believing only the truth. This norm, the EC-er 
takes it, comes with the territory of belief; it is one of the rules of the believing game. If a 
believer asks why she should believe the truth, we simply remind her that what she is doing 
is believing, just as we would remind a chess player who asks why she shouldn’t move her 
rook diagonally that she is playing chess. (Note that an EC-er need not claim that all 
epistemic norms are part of the essence of belief, any more than all chess-norms are to be 
found in the rulebook. Some norms may instead derive from the essential norms: for 
instance, a norm of believing on the basis of evidence might derive from an essential norm of 
aiming to believe the truth.) 
Once the EC-er draws this analogy between belief and commonplace games, they can 
appeal to the same analogy to address the metaphysical and epistemic questions. Once we 
allow that the norm against moving rooks diagonally is built into the essence of chess, is part 
of what makes it the game that it is, and that there is nothing particularly troubling or 
metaphysically extraordinary about this fact, then we address the metaphysical question for 
EC by simply saying that the same goes for belief. Since the same form of explanation is 
used in each case, we may reasonably suppose that the two are on equal metaphysical 
footing. 
  Much the same goes for the epistemic question. If the epistemic norms are, or derive 
from, features of our own attitudes, then they seem to lie within a domain with which we are 
familiar and about which we are often able to achieve at least partial knowledge. It is not 
mysterious how people familiar with chess come to know chess-norms, and so it is not 
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mysterious (the EC-er claims) how people familiar with belief come to know belief-norms. 
Of course, working out the epistemic norms may sometimes be difficult, and we may 
sometimes be ignorant of the particulars, as a chess player may fail to know the precise 
conditions under which a game results in stalemate. The claim is not that our knowledge of 
the epistemic norms is perfect or comes easily. What is supposed to come easily is the 
explanation of how such knowledge of the epistemic norms as we do have is possible; and 
here, the EC-er says, we find no challenge akin to explaining knowledge of, for instance, a 
Platonic realm of moral facts.  
EC is appealing, then, because it purports to domesticate epistemic normativity. 
Despite the surface-level abstruseness of attributing essential normative features to mental 
states, the goal is to be able to offer replies to the epistemic and metaphysical questions that 
are utterly mundane. We turn next to the question of how well EC succeeds. First, I will 
consider a well-known challenge to EC’s ability to explain the epistemic norms at all; 
afterwards, I will consider a novel problem for EC’s ability to answer the epistemic question. 
 
II. The Shmagency Objection 
EC bears obvious similarities to constitutivist views in metaethics, which attempt to 
answer questions about moral norms in manners similar to those described in the previous 
section, typically by appeal to the nature of agency or of action.11 Metaethical constitutivism, 
 
11 For some prominent developments of metaethical constitutivism, see Korsgaard (1996, 2009), 
Smith (2013, 2015), Velleman (1996, 2009).   
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however, is subject to an influential criticism forcefully presented by David Enoch.12 I cannot 
hope here to resolve the important debate between metaethical constitutivists and their 
critics, but I do hope to show that at least some forms of EC can escape Enoch-style 
challenges.  
Enoch aims to cut across the diversity of constitutivist views and reveal a 
shortcoming common to all. Constitutivism cannot, he claims, settle on its own the 
fundamental question of what we have reason to do; put another way, despite appearances it 
cannot offer a complete answer to the normative question. At most, studying the nature of 
agency will reveal what it takes to be a successful agent, and so what we have reason to do if 
we have reason to be agents at all. But features of agency cannot, on their own, settle whether 
or not we have reason to be agents in the first place. Why not instead be shmagents, where a 
shmagent is much like an agent but subject to different norms? By analogy: features of chess 
may reveal what it takes to play chess correctly, but will never suffice to settle the question 
of whether we have reason to play chess rather than some other game, shmess.13 Thus if 
constitutivists hope to derive all of normativity from the constitutive features of agency, 
Enoch contends, they are doomed to failure.  
Although my focus here is on epistemic constitutivism, the challenge remains salient. 
 
12 Enoch (2006, 2011). Related challenges have more recently been raised concerning epistemic 
norms in particular; see Papineau (2013) and Coté-Bouchard (2016).  
13 Enoch takes the example from Velleman (1996), where it is used instead to make a point in support 
of constitutivism: roughly, that since in playing chess at all one is committed to the goal of winning 
the game, that goal can yield reasons to make particular moves independent of any desire to win on 
the part of the agent.  
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For one thing, constitutivists often take belief to be an essential part of agency. 14 If that is 
correct, then one way of being a shmagent is to shmelieve rather than believe, where a 
shmelief is much like a belief, but not subject to exactly the same set of norms. So, the 
argument might go, if we have no reason to be agents rather than shmagents, then we have no 
reason to believe rather than shmelieve, and so no reason to follow the belief norms rather 
than the shmelief norms. Furthermore, as the example of shmess above demonstrates, 
shmagency-style objections can be raised concerning our reasons for engaging in any 
activity, once a constitutivist account of the norms ‘internal’ to the activity has been offered; 
Enoch’s focus is on agency not because his challenge is uniquely applicable there, but rather 
because that is where it has the greatest force against metaethical constitutivists. So in 
particular, we can raise a shmagency-style objection against any attempt to derive epistemic 
normativity from the features constitutive of belief. Whatever progress the epistemic 
constitutivist may make in showing that 𝜑-ing is the correct way to believe, the Enochian 
objector can always demand reasons for believing rather than shmelieving, and insist that the 
EC-er cannot answer the demand.15 If Enoch’s strategy succeeds, then any total account of 
why one ought to 𝜑 cannot be a purely constitutivist account. 
Unsurprisingly, Enoch’s challenge has met with significant resistance from 
 
14 See, e.g., Smith (2015).  
15 Of course, the question of whether we have reason to believe may not be entirely distinct from that 
of whether we have reason to be agents. One might think that belief is in fact partly constitutive of 
agency, in which case the question of why one ought to believe just is the question of why one ought 
to be an agent. Or, one might take agency and belief to be wholly distinct, but still hope that reasons 
for believing will fall out of the constitutive features of agency rather than of belief. Here I mean only 
to point out that shmagency-style objections can be raised for cases other than that of agency; how 
concerning those objections will be to a constitutivist depends on the ambitions of her particular 
constitutivist project.  
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constitutivists. Typical responses claim that the demand for reasons to be an agent misfires, 
whether because the question (‘What reasons do we have for being an agent rather than a 
shmagent?’) is unintelligible, because there could not be anything that is remotely similar to 
agency and yet subject to different norms, or because agency is inescapable, and so we do not 
need positive reasons for being agents.16 While I sympathize with this resistance, my present 
purpose is not to assess its success. Instead, I want to point out that Enoch’s objection, even 
if correct, leaves significant room for broadly constitutivist work on epistemic normativity.  
Even if Enoch is right that constitutivism cannot deliver all of normativity, this does 
not show that it delivers none of normativity. (Enoch, to his credit, is explicit on this point, 
though it has perhaps been underappreciated in reception of his work.17) Consider again 
Enoch’s example of chess. Granting for the moment that constitutive features of chess do not 
suffice to give us reason to play chess rather than shmess, study of such features may still 
reveal many interesting truths concerning what it takes to play chess well, or correctly, or 
successfully. The possibility of playing shmess threatens the attempt to derive ultima facie 
reasons to sacrifice one’s pawn from the nature of chess alone, but does not threaten the 
possibility of deriving the fact that in certain circumstances sacrificing a pawn is an excellent 
chess move. 
 
16 See, e.g., Ferrero (2009), Korsgaard (2009), Silverstein (2015), Velleman (2009).  
17 Enoch (2006), p. 192: “Perhaps a case can be made that some desires, capacities, or aims are 
constitutive of agency. And perhaps this even makes them reason supported -- if, that is, there is an 
independent reason to be agents. Perhaps, in other words, thinking about what is constitutive of 
agency can do some work in our normative theory. But it cannot do the fundamental work it was 
supposed to do.”  
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Without a rebuttal to Enoch’s shmagency problem in hand, therefore, EC-ers lack the 
ability to give a certain kind of account of epistemic norms: one that explains fully not only 
why we are subject to being evaluated as believing well or badly on the basis of the epistemic 
norms, but also why we should care about believing well. This is sometimes termed the 
question of why the epistemic norms are ‘genuinely normative’ for us. We can call the 
attempt to give such an account by drawing on the essence of belief the ambitious project of 
EC. However, there remains room for a more modest EC. The modest project is the project 
of appealing to the essence of belief to explain why these epistemic norms rather than others 
apply to us, why they are the standards for evaluating our beliefs qua beliefs.  
Modest EC has value independent of ambitious EC. First, while modest EC may not 
on its own explain the ‘genuinely normative’ nature of the epistemic norms, it still gives an 
account of the norms that allows for such an explanation. Even if reasons to believe at all are 
not to be located in the constitutive features of belief, such reasons may well be found 
elsewhere: perhaps reasons of the ‘robust realist’ sort favored by Enoch. If we have such 
independent reasons to believe, then we should care about what it takes to believe well. The 
correct story about the reasons to believe can combine with a constitutivist story of what it 
takes to believe well, in order to make up a more complete account of epistemic normativity. 
Second, even if there are no reasons to believe rather than shmelieve, so long as we are 
engaged in believing we might still want to know what it takes to believe well, correctly, or 
successfully. Such knowledge may not yield ultima facie reasons to believe in certain ways, 
but our evaluative concerns are not restricted to determining what we have ultimate facie 
reason to do; modest EC can tell us why we are doing well or badly by the standards of what 
is in fact a central project of many of our lives, even if we would not err were we to give up 
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that project. And finally, we may hold out hope that a rebuttal to the shmagency challenge is 
still in the offing, and that ambitious EC will ultimately succeed: that either the constitutive 
features of belief can deliver reasons for believing rather than shmelieving, or that it can be 
shown that no such reasons are needed. In that case again modest EC will provide an 
important part of the ultimate story of ambitious EC. 18 
In sum, Enoch’s ‘shmagency’ problem is a real challenge that must be confronted by 
any view that seeks to derive, purely from premises concerning the constitutive features of 
phenomena such as agency or belief, conclusions about what we have reason to do. But not 
all constitutivist projects have such ambitions, and so not all are threatened by the problem. 
We should not respond to the admitted power of Enoch’s argument by abandoning projects 
that are merely in the vicinity of his target.  
 
III. The Problem of Discerning Attitudes 
a. Introducing the problem 
EC, at least of the modest variety, can avoid Enoch’s shmagency objection. However, 
there is a distinct challenge confronting the ability of even modest EC’s to handle the 
epistemic question. (Recall, the epistemic question asks for an explanation of the extent to 
which we are aware of the content of epistemic norms.) Although this challenge need not be 
 
18 Could one also defend modest metaethical constitutivism directly against the shmagency objection? 
In principle, I see no reason why not, but the project does strike me as more promising in the 
epistemic case. In either case one might engage in the modest project temporarily, in the hopes of 
eventually rebutting the shmagency objection. But in the metaethical case, relying on reasons to be an 
agent that are not derived from the essence of agency seems to give up much of the motivation for 
being a constitutivist in the first place, since most constitutivists hold that reasons in general, and not 
just moral reasons, depend ultimately on the nature of agency. EC-ers, on the other hand, are unlikely 
to hold that reasons in general depend ultimately on the nature of belief.  
  23 
framed in Enoch’s terms, doing so can allow us to more easily grasp the new problem and its 
relation to the old. Enoch’s problem, as applied to epistemology, asks: why should we be 
believers rather than shmelievers? He thinks constitutivists lack an answer to this question, 
and so fail to adequately explain the basis of moral norms. The new problem I wish to 
consider asks instead: if EC is right, how could we know we’re believers, and not already 
shmelievers? How can we tell the difference between these attitudes, from the inside? If EC-
ers can’t answer this question, I suggest, then they also cannot answer the epistemic question, 
and EC loses much of its appeal.  
According to an EC-er, normative properties make up part of the essence of belief, so 
any mental state lacking some of those normative properties would not be a belief at all. At 
best, it would be a shmelief, an attitude that 1) bears considerable (at least superficial) 
similarities to belief but 2) the essence of which differs from that of belief in at least one 
normative respect. (Presumably any such state will also differ from belief in some non-
normative respect, but I leave open whether that difference can always be found in the 
essences of the states.) If epistemic norms are built directly into the essence of belief, then 
shmeliefs are propositional attitudes that are not subject to precisely the same norms as 
beliefs. If the norms are instead derived from a constitutive aim of belief, then shmeliefs are 
propositional attitudes that lack that constitutive aim (or that have additional essential 
normative features not shared by belief).  
The worry, in short, is this. We have some attitudes that we take to be beliefs, and 
want an explanation both of why those attitudes are subject to the belief-norms, and of how 
we know that they are. If we accept EC, then from the fact that these attitudes are beliefs it 
follows that they are subject to the belief-norms; for if they weren’t, they wouldn’t be beliefs 
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at all. But this on its own does not explain our knowledge of the content of the norms 
governing our actual doxastic attitudes. For what if some types of shmelief are sufficiently 
similar to beliefs that ordinary believers lack the ability to tell the difference between the two 
– sufficiently similar that things seem the same from the agent’s point of view whether they 
are believing that p or shmelieving that p? (Note that I am not assuming that any shmeliefs 
actually are, or could be, so similar to beliefs! I will argue below that they are not; for the 
moment, I am trying to show why that point is in need of argument.) Were that the case, then 
plausibly there would be many situations in which, despite in fact believing rather than 
shmelieving, we would not know that we believed, since we could not rule out a relevant 
alternative.19 Then EC alone could not account for our knowledge, imperfect though it is, that 
our attitudes are subject to the belief-norms; that conclusion follows only on the assumption 
that those attitudes are beliefs, an assumption that we are not entitled to if for all we can tell 
we might have shmeliefs, subject to their (by definition) different norms, instead.20 Compare: 
the fact that I am playing chess explains why I am subject to chess rules, but it only explains 
my knowledge that I am subject to those rules on the assumption that I know I am playing 
 
19 Of course, there are at least some circumstances in which we might still know that we believe; for 
instance, when we have access to extraordinary testimony concerning the natures of one’s attitudes. 
While it is an interesting question precisely how often knowledge that we believe could survive the 
sort of inability to distinguish that I discuss here, my main argument in III.c below will turn not on 
the claim that this inability prevents us from knowing that we believe, but that it renders permissible a 
failure to believe that we believe. The permissibility of not believing that p is at least arguably 
compatible with it’s being the case that, if one were to believe that p, that belief would constitute 
knowledge. 
20 We might try to dodge the problem by taking the reference of ‘belief’ to be fixed such that it picks 
out whichever such attitude ordinary agents in fact have. Then there is no need to worry that we don’t 
have beliefs. But – even assuming there is a unique such attitude – this move merely shifts the point 
at which the problem arises. If we use ‘belief’ such that we are guaranteed to have ‘beliefs,’ then the 
question is how we can be sure, in drawing conclusions about the norm-fixing nature of beliefs, that 
the nature we’re considering isn’t actually possessed by shmeliefs instead.   
  25 
chess rather than some other game. If I can’t tell the difference between playing chess and 
playing checkers, then the fact that I am playing chess can’t explain how I know that my goal 
is to achieve checkmate. 
The difficulty is that, in order to increase the explanatory power of the fact that some 
attitude is a belief, EC imposes a thick notion of beliefhood, thereby introducing more 
challenging criteria for confirming that a given state is a belief. This imposes no particular 
difficulty when we’re in search of knowledge de dicto concerning beliefs. But the knowledge 
that the EC-er must account for in order to answer the epistemic question is instead 
knowledge de re about our beliefs; it is knowledge about the norms that apply to these very 
states. Once the shmelief hypothesis has been raised, more needs to be said to explain how 
we could have normative knowledge of the right sort.21  
To formalize ever so slightly, EC appears to answer the epistemic question by 
inviting inferences like the following:  
(1) My attitude towards p is belief 
(2) If my attitude towards p is a belief, then it is (essentially) subject to belief-
norms (EC) 
 
(C) My attitude towards p is subject to belief-norms  
 
21 Dretske (2003) makes an analogous point regarding the question of how one can know that one is 
conscious. In responding to the suggestion that, because one’s pains are essentially such that one is 
conscious of them, one may infer from the fact that one is in pain that one is conscious, Dretske 
points out that the attribution of this essential feature to pain may (in the absence of an independent 
basis for knowing that one is conscious) equally well be used to call into question whether the state 
one is in is really a state of pain.  
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Assuming that EC is correct, then given (1), (C) follows. But of course, (2) supports 
the inference to (C) only if one is entitled to adopt (1) as a premise; and we can imagine a 
skeptic about the application of the belief-norms choosing to apply modus tollens in place of 
ponens, using (2) to reject (1). For all EC says my attitude could fail to be subject to belief-
norms, so long as it also fails to be a belief.  If I am to know whether the belief-norms in fact 
apply to my attitude, I must know which direction to run the inference.  
 
b. Case studies 
Before deepening the discussion of the problem of discerning attitudes as an objection 
to EC in general, I want to briefly illustrate the problem by considering how it applies to 
three recent implementations of EC, due to Ralph Wedgwood, Nick Zangwill, and Kate 
Nolfi. The point here is not to demonstrate conclusively that these authors lack the resources 
ultimately to respond to the problem, but simply to show the prima facie difficulties that call 
for such a response.  
Wedgwood argues that all epistemic norms either are or derive from ‘primitive’ truths 
about the nature of belief “that cannot be any further explained.”22 On this view, there are no 
further facts about beliefs to which one can point to explain why they are subject to the 
epistemic norms; anything that is not subject simply does not count as a belief. The new 
problem of shmagency then asks: are we to think that ordinary believers have some way of 
picking up on these primitive normative facts about their attitudes? If so, we are owed an 
account of how such insight is possible. If not, then we are owed an alternative story of how 
 
22 Wedgwood (2002), p. 270. 
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believers could know that they believe, rather than holding shmeliefs to which the primitive 
normative truths of belief do not apply. Without this, Wedgwood’s view does not answer the 
epistemic question. 
Zangwill declines to offer any particular account of the essence of belief. Instead, he 
simply insists that it is a constraint on the adequacy of such an account that “whatever is 
proposed can explain how normative properties essentially flow from it.”23 I suggest that the 
problem of discerning attitudes imposes an additional constraint on the adequacy of such an 
account: it must explain how the normative properties are, to an extent, knowable by ordinary 
believers. The challenge for EC is to offer an account that can satisfy both criteria at once; 
that is, that can explain the epistemic norms while adequately answering the epistemic 
question. Zangwill has not yet done this, and so his defense of EC is (as he would surely 
acknowledge) incomplete. 
 Nolfi argues that “what makes belief the kind of mental attitude that it is, is just that 
beliefs are supposed to fulfill a distinctive proper function.”24 It is in the essence of belief to 
have this function and the epistemic norms derive from the function of belief. Thus, if she is 
to respond to the problem of discerning attitudes, Nolfi bears the burden of explaining how 
ordinary believers could know what the function of their attitudes is: how, that is, such 
believers can tell that they don’t have shmeliefs, with different essential functions, instead. If 
such functions are determined by evolutionary forces, then she must explain how ordinary 
 
23 Zangwill (2005), p. 7.  
24 Nolfi (2015), p. 197. 
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believers know what those evolutionary forces have determined; if by the will of a conscious 
designer, then she must explain how ordinary believers could know that designer’s intent.25 
  
c. The significance of the problem 
Let us return to considering the problem of discerning attitudes as an objection to EC 
generally. In response to the problem, EC-ers should of course insist that we do know that we 
have beliefs rather than shmeliefs, and can use that knowledge to explain our knowledge of 
the epistemic norms. In fact, this is exactly what I myself want to insist on. But the right to 
take this line does not come for free. The price of earning it is the topic that I will take up in 
Section IV below. But first I want to consider the significance of the problem. If we were not 
able to hit on a compelling reply to the problem of discerning attitudes, if EC entailed that we 
were not able to know whether our attitudes are subject to belief-norms or shmelief-norms, 
would this count decisively against EC?  
For a start, the result would certainly be a disturbing one.  If we accepted EC then, no 
matter how much progress epistemologists might make in understanding the norms applying 
to beliefs, that knowledge would do little to reassure us that we are, in our cognitive lives, 
getting things right; for after all, if we were unknowing shmelievers all along, then living up 
to the standards of belief would be no particular mark of success and often a mark of failure 
independent of any Enoch-style worries about our reasons to believe. (Whether we have 
 
25 Importantly, it would not suffice to explain how, on such a view, knowledge of the function of 
belief is in principle attainable. The epistemic question asks for an explanation of widespread 
knowledge that has already in fact been obtained; an account on which epistemologists or 
evolutionary psychologists could come to know the function of belief through diligent research will 
not do. See further discussion on p. 24 below. 
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reason to play chess or play shmess, it would be a bad result to learn that all this time we’ve 
been playing shmess by chess rules.) What’s more, all the difficult philosophical work 
devoted to discovering the normative requirements on belief would turn out to be remarkably 
arbitrary. If we might, for all we know, be shmelievers rather than believers, why have we 
not devoted equal energy to working out the normative requirements on shmeliefs?  
Granted, EC-ers are by no means alone in facing challenges when it comes to 
explaining the possibility of our knowledge of the epistemic norms, for EC is not alone in 
facing the burden of answering the epistemic question. That question confronts accounts of 
epistemic normativity generally, and difficulties in answering it are endemic to many flavors 
of realism. However, one of the apparent selling points of EC is its ability to dodge such 
worries. Just as Enoch’s original shmagency objection calls into question constitutivism’s 
apparent strength in explaining why we are subject to the norms we are, the new problem 
calls into question constitutivism’s apparent strength in accounting for our knowledge of 
those norms; that is, its strength in answering the epistemic question. If this epistemic 
question turned out to be just as daunting for constitutivism as for non-naturalist realism (for 
instance), the motivation for adopting EC would suffer a significant blow.  
In fact, though, I want to argue that the significance of the problem of discerning 
attitudes runs deeper than the mere loss of a dialectical strength for EC. While the inability to 
explain how we could know the content of the epistemic norms would be a setback for EC, 
on its own it might not be a decisive one. EC-ers could simply concede that we don’t know 
the content of the epistemic norms, but continue to endorse EC for independent reasons. 
After all, norms need not in general be known in order to apply to us. Consider norms 
imposed by law or etiquette. I only learned recently that I am under a legal obligation to 
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remove my recycling barrel from the curb no later than 6 pm on collection days. My previous 
ignorance of that norm did not prevent me from being subject to it. So, might we not deny 
that EC is criticizable for failing to explain our knowledge of the epistemic norms, on the 
grounds that there is no such knowledge to be explained? 
I want to argue that we are not in that predicament; that we do know that we believe 
rather than shmelieve, and so do know (to some extent) the content of the epistemic norms. 
And I will argue that this follows from facts about the actual epistemic norms to which we 
are subject. The dialectic is tricky here, so before launching into the argument it’s worth 
clarifying what the argument is and is not meant to show. I am not going to try to prove, 
starting from the assumption that we are subject to epistemic norms of a particular sort, that 
we are subject to those very norms; that would be viciously circular. Rather, I’m going to try 
to prove, starting from the assumption that we are subject to epistemic norms of a particular 
sort, that we can tell the difference between belief and shmelief, and so have some 
knowledge of the content of the norms. This won’t amount to a conclusive argument that we 
do have such knowledge, for it doesn’t rule out the skeptical scenario in which we shmelieve 
rather than believe. What it does show is that only in the skeptical scenario do we lack 
knowledge of the norms. The EC-er can’t give up on our knowledge of the norms without 
giving up the norms themselves. And so, the only way for EC to vindicate the epistemic 
norms to which we take ourselves to be subject is to explain how, in the face of the problem 
of discerning attitudes, we can tell the difference between beliefs and shmeliefs.    
The argument turns on the claim, which I will defend below, that among the 
epistemic norms to which we are subject are rational requirements, which are special in the 
following way: they are requirements that are discoverable through reasoning, in a manner to 
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be elaborated below. In brief, although we may often be ignorant of these requirements, any 
such ignorance constitutes a failure to engage in sufficiently skillful reasoning.26 This is in 
contrast to legal requirements governing my recycling bins, which I can be ignorant of 
without any failure to reason or failure in reasoning. 
The overall argument goes as follows. Let S pick out some agent who believes that p, 
let c pick out S’s circumstances, including her evidence, and let Φ pick out something that, 
according to EC, S is rationally required to do in c if she believes that p but not if she 
shmelieves that p. (That is, the rational requirement to Φ derives from the essence of belief 
but not that of shmelief.) I adopt the assumption from standard deontic logic that S is 
required to Φ iff S is not permitted not to Φ. 
(1) If in c S can’t tell the difference between beliefs and shmeliefs, then in c S is 
rationally permitted upon consideration not to believe, of her attitude towards p, 
that it is a belief rather than a shmelief 
(2) If in c S is rationally permitted upon consideration not to believe, of her attitude 
towards p, that it is a belief rather than a shmelief, then it is not the case that 
sufficiently skillful reasoning by S in c would result in a belief that S ought to Φ27 
 
26 In my thinking about this claim, I owe a considerable debt to Titelbaum (2015). Titelbaum argues 
persuasively that we may never be rationally mistaken about the rational requirements to which we 
are subject. However, in two respects my claim is stronger than anything Titelbaum is committed to. 
First, Titelbaum leaves open the possibility of a rational lack of true belief (as opposed to rational 
false belief) about the rational requirements; second, he is wary of applying his arguments to cases of 
the sort, at issue here, where one is uncertain of whether one’s attitudes satisfy normatively relevant 
descriptions. 
27 By ‘sufficiently skillful reasoning’ here I mean, roughly, reasoning skillful to such a degree that no 
further increase in skill would have resulted in a different verdict. More precisely: S engages in 
sufficiently skillful reasoning about whether p iff S’s attitude(s) about p resulting from that reasoning 
are identical to the of attitudes about p that would result if S were to reason about whether in the most 
skillful way possible in c. So it is possible to engage in sufficiently skillful reasoning about whether p 
without engaging in maximally skillful reasoning (for instance, by failing to properly consider a piece 
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(3) If S is rationally required to Φ in c, then sufficiently skillful reasoning by S in c 
would result in a belief that S ought to Φ 
(4) If in c S can’t tell the difference between beliefs and shmeliefs, then in c S is not 
rationally required to Φ [from 1, 2, and 3] 
(5) If in c S believes that p, then in c S is rationally required to Φ 
(6) S believes that p in c 
(7) S is rationally required to Φ in c [from 5 and 6] 
 
(C)  S can tell the difference between beliefs and shmeliefs in c [from 4 and 7] 
 
From (4) onwards, each line is either a premise stipulated in the description of the 
case, or obtained by sentential logic; I hope these will be uncontroversial. The thought behind 
(1) is that, in general, it is at least rationally permissible not to believe in a manner that goes 
beyond one’s evidence, and that (in many circumstances), to believe that one believes rather 
than shmelieves without being able to tell the difference would be to go beyond one’s 
evidence. (For instance, one might rationally suspend judgment instead.) Granted, the fact 
that one need not believe beyond one’s evidence does not establish that (1) is true for every 
set of circumstances c; I don’t want to rule out the possibility of agents who can’t tell the 
difference between beliefs and shmeliefs but who have independent evidence (e.g., 
testimonial evidence) decisively supporting the conclusion that they believe. But such cases 
 
of evidence that does not, in the final reckoning, bear on the proper attitude to adopt towards p) but 
when one does so, any flaws in one’s conclusions could not have been corrected simply by reasoning 
more skillfully. 
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are not ordinary. I think it is highly plausible that (1) is true of the circumstances of most 
actual human beings. And if it turned out that the only circumstances in which rational 
requirements apply are those in which (1) is false, that would not amount to a vindication of 
our ordinary understanding of the epistemic norms, barring a compelling case that a great 
many of us have such sources of evidence about the natures of our attitudes. So the argument 
given here does not establish its conclusion for all circumstances c, but need not do so to 
support the broader point that an inability to tell the difference between beliefs and shmeliefs 
undermines the existence of rational requirements as we ordinarily understand them. 
Much the same restriction applies to (2); there are surely possible circumstances in 
which it is false (for instance, cases in which one has received reliable testimony about what 
one ought to do) but I see no reason to suppose that nearly enough such cases are actual to 
threaten the force of the argument. In ordinary circumstances, if one’s evidence (at least) 
permits suspending judgment about whether one believes or shmelieves, and if one ought to 
Φ only if one believes rather than shmelieves, then failing to come to believe that one ought 
to Φ does not amount to any failure that could be avoided through more skillful reasoning. 
On the contrary, some ways of reasoning that result in suspending judgment about whether 
one ought to Φ manifest at least as much skill as any alternatives. If this conclusion were 
false, the mistake would be attributable to poor evidence rather than poor reasoning. 
The main point in need of defense, then, is (3). Why think that belief really does 
impose a rational requirements of a sort that wound render (3) correct? 
The basic thought here is that a rational requirement just is a requirement to respond 
to one’s situation in the way that a sufficiently skilled reasoner, upon consideration, would 
come to realize that she ought to respond to it. And so, when we are subject to rational 
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requirements, it is, in principle, possible to figure out via sufficiently good reasoning what it 
is that one ought to do. (I do not claim that these are the only requirements that the term 
‘rational requirement’ is ever reasonably used to refer to, though I hope to persuade you that 
I am picking up on one important use of that term. If you prefer, you are free to treat this as a 
stipulative definition.) The result is that, although we often fail to satisfy rational 
requirements (for instance, because we fail to consider how we ought to respond to our 
situation, or because we fail to reason well enough to figure out what is required of us, or 
because although we do come to a correct belief about what is required of us we lack the 
motivation to follow through), we cannot be in a position in which we are condemned to 
rational failure simply because we have insufficient or misleading evidence – that is, because 
we are in a situation where reasoning, no matter how skillful, can’t help. The requirements of 
rationality are in that way sensitive to our evidential situations. 
Consider a case in which you must decide between placing bet 1 or bet 2. You desire 
to win, and bet 1 will in fact win, while bet 2 will lose; hence it would objectively be in your 
interests to place bet 1. However, you lack any particular evidence supporting the claim that 
bet 1 will win. In that case, although you would benefit greatly from placing bet 1, you are 
not rationally required to do so. This is because there is no path by which you could figure 
out through sufficiently skilled reasoning, from the evidence you have, that placing bet 1 is 
the thing to do. Failing to place bet 1 is a failure of a sort, but it is not a failure to conform to 
a rational requirement on you.  
In contrast, consider a second case where you choose between bets 3 and 4. Again, 
you desire to win, and bet 3 will in fact win. This time, however, your evidence strongly 
supports the claim that bet 3 will win, but you fail – perhaps because of the complicated 
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calculations involved, perhaps because you suffer from something like the gambler’s fallacy, 
perhaps because you simply make an impulsive choice without considering which bet is in 
your best interest – to correctly reason your way to the belief that bet 3 will win. In this case, 
your failure to place bet 3 is a rational failure, a failure to satisfy a rational requirement to 
which you were subject. That’s because there was a path, through sufficiently good 
reasoning, from your evidential situation to the true belief that you ought to place bet 3.     
These two cases share an important feature: in each case, you fail to reason your way 
to a true belief about which bet you should place. What, then, explains the crucial difference 
between the two cases, the fact that only in the latter are you under a rational requirement to 
place a particular bet? The explanation is that in the latter case you could have worked out 
what to do if you had only managed to reason more skillfully, while in the former case reason 
alone could not have helped you; you were not in a position to work out that bet 1 was the 
thing to do, short of the world cooperating by providing you with additional evidence. The 
moral I draw from these cases is that such susceptibility to reasoning is a necessary condition 
on rational requirements.28 More precisely, in any situation where you are rationally required 
to Φ, reasoning sufficiently well about your situation would result in belief that you ought to 
Φ; if you fail to believe that you are required to Φ, then you have either not considered the 
question, or reasoned in an insufficiently skillful manner. When the fact that you ought to Φ 
is not susceptible to reasoning in this way, when even the most skillful reasoning possible 
might result in suspending judgment about whether you ought to Φ, or even in the belief that 
you ought not Φ, then you are not rationally required to Φ (whatever else may be said in 
 
28 But only a necessary condition; I am not claiming that there is always a rational requirement to do 
as sufficiently skilled reasoning would dictate.   
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favor of Φ-ing). But this is just what (3) says. 
Let me reiterate that I am not arguing that all epistemic norms are rational 
requirements! I am happy to allow that there are plenty of epistemic norms that do not 
behave in the manner I’ve just described. What’s crucial is that at least some of the epistemic 
norms to which we ordinarily take ourselves to be subject work like this, and that EC – in the 
absence of a response to the problem of discerning attitudes – implies that there could not be 
any such norms. If you agree with me about the plausibility of the existence of some such 
epistemic norms, then you should agree that EC as developed so far is highly revisionary. It 
cannot play the role of a purely metanormative theory, limiting itself to explaining the 
grounds of the epistemic norms, for it is forced into making positive and surprising 
pronouncements about the content of those norms. If you are not persuaded that some of our 
epistemic norms are rational requirements, then you may set aside this particular problem, 
though I hope you will still concede that EC would be better off if it could explain the 
knowledge we have of the contents of the epistemic norms. In the next section, I turn to the 
question of how EC can do just that.  
 
IV. Avoiding the New Problem  
All our difficulties with EC have stemmed from the suggestion that perhaps believers 
cannot tell whether they believe or shmelieve. The solution, predictably, begins with denying 
that suggestion, and insisting that believers can tell that they believe rather than shmelieve. 
The challenging part will be to explain how EC-ers can earn the right to that denial, rather 
than merely clinging to it as dogma. 
 I did not, in section III, argue that we lack the ability to tell whether we’re subject to 
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belief-norms or shmelief-norms; instead, I suggested that we would be threatened by such a 
possibility if there were a sort of shmelief sufficiently similar to belief. Sufficiently similar in 
what way? Armed with a particular account of the means by which rational agents gain 
knowledge of their own mental states, we might hope to give a precise answer of what sorts 
of similarities could defeat those means. As it is, remaining neutral for the moment between 
such accounts, I think the best we can say is: sufficiently similar in that they do not differ in 
any regard that rational agents could make use of in order to distinguish them. 
A natural response to the problem of discerning attitudes is to object: “But don’t 
rational agents, in fact, typically have access to many of the facts about what they believe? 
Regardless of what mechanisms we appeal to in accounting for that knowledge, once we 
grant that such knowledge exists, it rules out the worry about shmeliefs. After all, a particular 
attitude cannot be both a belief and a shmelief, so if you know that you believe that p, then 
you can easily determine that this attitude of yours is not a shmelief.” Skepticism averted?  
Not yet. Let us grant that typical rational agents do have considerable access to facts 
about their own attitudes, including their beliefs. Clearly such access has its limits; I do not 
have access to all of the facts about any belief of mine. Suppose I do know that my attitude 
towards p is a belief; still, I probably do not know, about that attitude, whether it’s the same 
attitude towards p as Amulya’s, whether it’s held in a universe containing an even number of 
stars, whether its instantiation depends on the firing of this very collection of neurons.  
We could individuate attitude-types on any of these bases. With respect to some ways 
of individuating, rational agents plausibly are capable of determining what attitudes they 
have: we can, indeed, individuate attitude-types precisely on the basis of the ability of 
rational agents to tell them apart. For instance, we could individuate types of propositional 
  38 
attitudes such that attitude A and attitude B are of distinct types iff a suitably specified 
rational agent can discern a difference between having A towards p and having B towards p. 
Call this way of individuating the attitudes Access Individuation. With respect to other ways 
of individuating attitude-types, rational agents clearly often lack the capacity to determine the 
type of a given attitude. While I could intelligibly ask about the features of just those 
attitudes that I share with Amulya, clearly I couldn’t determine which of my attitudes are of 
this sort just by using whatever means I employ to come by my knowledge of what it is that I 
believe; nor is my inability to do so a rational failing on my part. 
A particularly relevant way of individuating, for present purposes, is the way that 
divides up attitude-types on the basis of the norms to which they are subject. Call this way of 
individuating Norm Individuation. Norm Individuation will always sort belief and any 
shmelief-like attitude into different types; indeed, this is the individuation that both Enoch’s 
shmagency objection and my problem of discerning attitudes implicitly adopt when they use 
‘shmelief’ to pick out attitudes subject to different norms than beliefs despite non-normative 
similarities, implying that being subject to different norms suffices for two attitudes to be of 
different types.  
The question behind the problem of discerning attitudes, the question of whether 
believers can tell beliefs and shmeliefs apart, really amounts to this: is Norm Individuation a 
way of individuating on which rational agents have the capacity to determine the type of a 
given attitude that they hold, or not? If attitudes A and B are of distinct types by the lights of 
Norm Individuation, can a rational agent tell the difference between having A towards p and 
having B towards p? If the answer is yes, then the threat of the problem of discerning 
attitudes is averted. Although we might in particular cases be mistaken about whether we 
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have a belief or a shmelief, we are in a position to correct that mistake by applying our 
relevant capacities. If the answer is no, then while we may still have access to considerable 
information about our attitudes, we do not really have access to what we believe (so long as, 
as is supposed by the shmelief objection, belief is an attitude type that results from Norm 
Individuation). Instead, we may have access to such facts as that we [either believe or 
shmelieve that p], which, if we have never considered the possibility of shmelief, we might 
naturally report by saying that we believe that p. 
I suggest, then, that the best way for epistemic constitutivists to avert the problem of 
discerning attitudes is to insist that, wherever Norm Individuation draws a boundary between 
attitude types, so also does Access Individuation. That is, if two attitudes are subject to 
different norms, then the constitutivist had better say we can tell them apart; if two attitudes 
are such that we can’t tell them apart, the constitutivist had better say that they’re subject to 
the same norms.29  
Expressed in such a general form, this is closer to a solution-schema for the problem 
of discerning attitudes than an actual solution. For without a story about which boundaries 
Access Individuation actually draws, nothing I have said settles the question of where Norm 
Individuation may draw its boundaries. When coupled with a substantial account of agents’ 
knowledge of their own mental states, however, my suggestion takes on a new character as a 
 
29 This suggestion might be developed into the claim that Norm Individuation coincides exactly with 
Access Individuation, but such a strong claim is not required for present purposes. We can avoid the 
new problem of shmagency even if we allow that Access Individuation may draw distinctions 
between attitude types where Norm Individuation does not – that is, that it may be possible to 
distinguish between propositional attitudes with the same contents and that are subject to the same 
norms. Consider, for instance, the distinction between recently formed beliefs and longstanding 
beliefs.  
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substantial constraint on acceptable constitutivist accounts of belief; it serves as a function 
from accounts of such knowledge to viable accounts of the nature of belief. (Even in the 
absence of a substantial general account of self-knowledge, we may of course be confident 
about the verdict that the correct such account would yield in particular cases.)  
A few caveats are in order, to make precise the strength of the needed restriction on 
viable elaborations of EC. I have said that rational agents must be able to ‘tell the difference’ 
between attitudes subject to different norms, but at least on one way of hearing this phrase, 
one may ‘tell the difference’ between two things simply by noticing that there is a difference, 
without being able to tell which is which. I may be able, in this sense, to tell the difference 
between the sound of an oboe and a clarinet without thereby being able to tell that what I am 
hearing is an oboe. To avoid the problem of discerning attitudes, EC-ers must say not just 
that rational agents can tell that there is a difference between beliefs and shmeliefs, but that 
they can use that difference to determine that they believe rather than shmelieve (though they 
need not make explicit use of these concepts in exercising their ability). And so, it is not 
enough if Norm Individuation is restricted to drawing boundaries between two attitudes when 
rational agents can tell that the two are different; if must draw these boundaries in such a way 
that agents can tell on which side of the boundary their attitude falls. (The weaker restriction 
would help protect against the possibility of agents who are ordinarily believers failing to 
notice the occasional aberrant shmelief, but would have no force against the possibility that 
we are global shmelievers rather than believers.) If it’s right that rational agents have the 
capacity to tell that they have beliefs rather than shmeliefs, the best explanation for that fact 
is that the essential normative differences between attitudes are grounded in the facts that 
rational agents can make use of in distinguishing them.  
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A second caveat: it may be that believers cannot tell the difference between belief and 
every sort of shmelief. I have argued 1) that to maintain EC’s dialectical advantages, EC-ers 
must insist that believers have some knowledge of the content of the epistemic norms, which 
they would not if they could unknowingly instead have shmeliefs that are subject to very 
different norms, and 2) that believers must be able to tell that their attitudes are of types 
subject to the rational requirements on belief. As far as I can tell, EC is not threatened by the 
possibility that there are some forms of shmelief that believers cannot distinguish, as long as 
the norms on such shmeliefs differ only slightly from those on belief, and only in regards 
other than the rational requirements to which they are subject.30 The likelihood of this 
possibility depends on one’s preferred form of EC; it is more likely if one thinks that all 
epistemic norms are primitive components of the essence of belief than if one thinks that the 
norms derive from a small number of essential normative features.  
Note, finally, that it is not enough for an EC-er to argue that epistemic norms derive 
from features that could in principle be used by agents to tell the difference between beliefs 
and shmeliefs. EC must explain how is that we do have knowledge of the epistemic norms, 
not just how we could. An account that ties the epistemic norms to features of belief that 
(say) we could detect only with the aid of an MRI machine, or of a nuanced understanding of 
human evolutionary history, could account for the fact that we might someday learn to 
distinguish beliefs from shmeliefs, but could not account for the fact that we have evidently 
been doing so all along.  
The moral of our story can cut two ways depending on how one comes to it. For 
 
30 One might choose to categorize such minor differences as distinguishing among types of belief, 
rather than between belief and shmelief.  
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epistemic constitutivists, the lesson is: whatever facts about beliefs you think we can make 
use of in determining that we believe, those had better be the facts from which you attempt to 
derive the norms to which beliefs are subject. For those who think that our self-knowledge is 
too limited for the facts on which it draws to do the work needed, the lesson is instead that 
constitutivism cannot escape the problem of discerning attitudes: if epistemic norms derived 
from the nature of belief, then we would have to resign ourselves to skepticism about, and 
revision of, the epistemic norms. I am of the former view, but the threat of the latter is one 
that EC-ers must confront clear-eyed. 
To conclude, I want to go a bit beyond the solution-schema that I’ve indicated so far 
by briefly sketching a story an EC-er might give of the grounds of epistemic norms that fits 
the schema and, on many of the most plausible accounts of self-knowledge, avoids problem 
of discerning attitudes. I will build on this sketch in the following chapters, and for the 
moment my goal is not to persuade you that this particular view is correct or comes at 
acceptable theoretical costs. For now it is meant as a proof of concept, to establish that EC 
can be developed in ways that avoids the problem of discerning attitudes, and to advertise 
what will come later. 
I propose that the fact of a mental state’s being a belief that p is partly constituted by 
that state’s being a means by which the agent pursues the goal or end of knowing whether p. 
Moreover, as I will argue, for an agent to pursue a goal by some particular means, it is 
necessary that she herself represents those means as the means by which she pursues the 
goal. In order, then, to believe that p, and the agent must regard the attitude in question as a 
means by which she attempts to know whether p, and the attitude must actually be the means 
by which she pursues such an attempt in virtue of her so representing it.  
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In other words, beliefs are necessarily directed at the end of knowledge, and are so 
because their agents whose beliefs they are must take them to be. The epistemic norms are 
then to be explained by the status of beliefs as attempts to know; epistemic evaluation of the 
belief is a matter of evaluating its successes and failures, of various sorts, in pursuing this 
end. If this turns out to be viable as an account of epistemic normativity – if my argument in 
the following chapters succeeds – then it is one particularly well positioned to avoid the 
problem of discerning attitudes. For the facts in virtue of which epistemic norms apply to 
beliefs – the facts that, on Norm Individuation, distinguish beliefs from any possible 
shmeliefs – are facts about how the agent herself represents her state.31 But facts about how 
the agent herself represents things are, I suggest, facts to which the agent will have access, 
and will be in a position to make use of, on any plausible account of self-knowledge. Indeed, 
how we represent things is paradigmatically accessible to us. And so, on this story of the 
grounds of epistemic norms, the boundaries drawn by Norm Individuation are a subset of 




I have considered two important challenges for epistemic constitutivism: Enoch’s 
shmagency objection, which asks why we should believe rather than shmelieve, and the 
problem of discerning attitudes, which asks how, if EC is correct, we could know that we 
 
31 Of course, knowledge that one represents a state as one’s attempt to get at the truth is not the same 
as knowledge that that state is one’s belief. A more detailed development of the account sketched here 
must explain how the former entitles the agent to the latter. However, any account on which the 
belief-norms depend on the agent’s own representation of her belief rules out the specific sort of error 
discussed in the present paper, where an agent lacks any evidence distinguishing beliefs from 
normatively distinct attitudes. In other words, I have not said enough to explain how, on this account, 
one knows that one believes, but I have said enough to show that the difficulties in knowing that one 
believes on such an account do not stem from a lack of evidence to distinguish belief from shmelief.   
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believe rather than shmelieve. Enoch’s objection leaves modest forms of EC untouched, so 
EC remains an appealing strategy for explaining epistemic normativity. However, the 
problem of discerning attitudes shows that, if EC is to succeed in vindicating our knowledge 
of the epistemic norms, it must respect constraints on our self-knowledge. The burden is on 
advocates of EC, considering problems of metanormativity and self-knowledge in parallel, to 
establish that their preferred implementations of the strategy can do so. I will now turn to 
developing more fully the form of EC that I believe passes this test. 
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CHAPTER 2: BELIEF AS VOLUNTARY ACTION 
 
“A judgment is a cognitive mental act of affirming a proposition.” (Shah & 
Velleman 2005, p. 503) 
 
“I want to suggest that my beliefs are in important respects analogous to my 
actions themselves, rather than to objects on which I act.” (Boyle 2011, p. 121) 
 
“Judging … is something for which we are, in principle, responsible — 
something we freely do, as opposed to something that merely happens in our 
lives” (McDowell 1998, p. 6) 
 
“[Inference] is a person-level, conscious, voluntary mental action.” (Boghossian 
2014, p. 2) 
 
 
“The man who changes his mind, in response to evidence of the truth of a 
proposition, does not act upon himself; nor does he bring about an effect.” 
(Hampshire 1965, p. 100) 
 
“Those who take it, perhaps very unreflectively, that much of most or their 
thinking is a matter of action are, I believe, deluded.” (Strawson 2003, p. 231) 
 
Humans actions are a diverse bunch: we cook dinner, tell jokes, observe experiments, 
jump out of airplanes. Despite their diversity, such actions share a number of philosophically 
interesting features. We can perform our actions on the basis of reasons. We can perform 
them more or less skillfully. We are generally (in the absence of excusing conditions) 
responsible for them: if I tell a joke or hit a tennis ball when I shouldn’t, I can be held to 
account for doing so. We can be subject to ethical obligations to perform them (or refrain 
from doing so) under specific circumstances. According to a prominent tradition due in large 
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part to the influence G.E.M. Anscombe, when we act we can have practical knowledge of 
what we are doing, without any need for observation.32  
In contrast, other behaviors of agents lack these distinguishing features. My hair 
grows, but I am not responsible for its growth; my pupils dilate in the light, but not skillfully 
or unskillfully. What, then, distinguishes the class of actions from the mere behaviors? What 
demarcates the sphere of agency? Some philosophers reply that actions must be performed 
(or performable) “at will,” or “voluntarily,” or “intentionally.” To the extent that there is a 
consensus answer, it is that actions are set apart by some distinct form of control that the 
agent exercises over them. In some special way or other, it is up to an agent how to act, but 
not up to her how to grow her hair or dilate her pupils. And from this control springs the 
interesting normative features of action: it would not make sense to hold an agent responsible 
for a behavior, or to inquire into the reasons that provide her basis for engaging in it, unless 
engaging in it is up to her.  
So far so good. But all of this leads us into trouble when we consider the case of 
belief. The problem is this: it is commonplace to treat beliefs like actions – maybe not to call 
them actions, but to implicitly attribute to them action’s normative characteristics.33 This is 
 
32 Anscombe (2000). 
33 Many philosophers are deeply averse to calling beliefs ‘actions.’ For some this is because they do 
not think that beliefs are under the right sort of control; for others it is because beliefs are ongoing 
states or attitudes, while actions are supposed to be dynamic or fleeting. The first of these concerns is 
one of the main subjects of the present paper, and I am persuaded by Boyle (2011) that the second 
concern is misplaced: a soldier’s standing at attention is both an action and an ongoing state. I myself 
do consider beliefs to be actions, though I’ll mostly try to avoid doing so in particularly jarring ways 
below.  Those who find the terminology unpalatable, though, are free to think of me as arguing that 
instead beliefs fall under a broader genus of ‘exercises of agency,’ including both actions and those 
states that fall under voluntary control and so possess action-like normative features. Or, they may 
take what I say here about beliefs and apply it instead to judgments, the events correlating to and 
intimately connected to belief’s states.  
  47 
so both in our everyday lives and within epistemology and the philosophy of mind, where 
treating beliefs in this way comes with considerable theoretical payoffs.34 It is, however, far 
from clear that beliefs are subject to any of the forms of control that are plausible candidates 
for distinguishing actions. There seems to be a mismatch between our strict criterion of 
action (something like voluntary control, based on the paradigmatic cases of physical 
actions) and our more lenient policy of treating beliefs as action-like. The obvious worry is 
that we’ve been too lenient in letting beliefs into the action club; apply the criterion properly 
and they get kicked out. The slightly less obvious (but no less serious) worry is that beliefs 
are the counterexample that show the inadequacy of our criterion: that we have no proper 
way of distinguishing full-blooded action from mere behavior, and no basis holding each 
other responsible (etc.) only for the former.   
My aim in this paper will be to resist these worries. I will argue that, properly 
understood, beliefs are indeed under our voluntary control. I will identify an account of 
voluntary control on which beliefs (along with more typical examples of voluntary actions) 
qualify as its objects, while such phenomena as the growth of my hair and the dilation of my 
pupils do not. This does not entail that our control over our beliefs is entirely unconstrained; 
but as I will show, many commonplace physical actions, clearly subject to voluntary control 
if anything is, are constrained in just the same way in virtue of being essentially directed at 
 
34 Philosophers have, for instance, presumed or argued that we are responsible for some attitudes 
(e.g., Pettit & Smith (2006), Burge (2000), Hieronymi (2008, 2009), McHugh 2013)), that we can 
engage in doxastic phenomena on the basis of reasons (e.g, Scanlon 1998, Moser 1989, Longino 
1978, Leite 2004, Lord 2018), that we can do so more or less skillfully (e.g., Sosa (2007, 2015), 
Miracchi (2015), Sylvan (2017), Greco (2010)), that our doxastic phenomena are subject to 
obligations akin to those of ethics (e.g., Descartes (1985), Locke (1979), Chisholm (1966a, 1966b)) 
and that we can know our own doxastic phenomena without any need for observation (e.g., Moran 
(2012), Boyle (2009), C. Peacocke (1996), A. Peacocke (2017)). 
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particular ends. The sort of control that distinguishes actions form non-actions applies to 
belief, and so there is no problem with applying the normative apparatus of action to them.  
The questions I engage with here bear clear similarities to the free will debate as it 
impinges on ethics. In that debate, one might ask whether even the most paradigmatically 
intentional action is sufficiently under an agent’s control to render her responsible for it. For 
present purposes, I assume that there are some actions possessing all the normative features I 
described above (subject to deontological obligations, performed on the basis of reasons, 
etc.). My project is to investigate the extent of the class of phenomena with these features, 
not its very existence. So, while I do think that what I say below offers some support to 
broadly compatibilist approaches to the problem of free will, I will not be taking up that 
problem explicitly below.   
I’ll begin by laying out in more detail the cases that a) beliefs must be subject to a 
certain sort of control in order to merit many of the normative judgments commonly made 
concerning them, both within academic philosophy and in everyday life, and b) that beliefs 
are not in fact subject to such control. Then I’ll describe some of the (in my view, 
inadequate) strategies philosophers have appealed to in an attempt to navigate this dilemma. 
Finally, I’ll present an account of the nature of belief, and of the control that agents exert 
over their intentional actions, on which beliefs are subject to just the same sort of control – 
are, in fact, held intentionally.  
 
I. Developing the Challenge 
The conflict between our apparent lack of control over our beliefs and their action-
like normative status is not a novel observation. While Descartes and Locke seem to have 
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taken it for granted that belief is under the control of the agent’s will, by the 19th century 
William James felt the need to argue for the existence of cases in which it is possible to 
decide to believe, by 1970 Bernard Williams argued explicitly that one cannot decide to 
believe, and in 1988 William Alston’s “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic 
Justification” touched off a series of works explicitly arguing that normative features proper 
to action should not be attributed to our beliefs because we lack an appropriate form of 
control over them and to challenge influential work, such as that of Roderick Chisholm, that 
allegedly failed to respect this constraint.35 Here for instance, is Richard Feldman’s 
presentation of Alston’s argument: 
i) If deontological judgments about beliefs are true, then people have voluntary 
control over their beliefs.  
ii) People do not have voluntary control over their beliefs.  
iii) Conclusion: Deontological judgments about beliefs are not true.36  
While Alston and Feldman are concerned with deontological judgments about belief 
in particular, others have offered (with or without endorsing) essentially the same argument 
concerning other action-like normative features of belief, such as responsibility for and 
freedom of beliefs.37  In each case, the author focuses on some particular contested 
normative feature of belief. We can however abstract from these individual differences to 
 
35 See Descartes (1985), Locke (1979), James (2014), Williams (1970), Alston (1988), Chisholm 
(1966a, 1966b).  
36 Feldman (2000). 
37 McCormick (2014), McHugh (2014, 2017), Kruse (2017), Smith (2005).  
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offer a more general schema of the sort of argument in question. Let F stand for some action-
like normative feature sometimes attributed to beliefs. The argument, then, says that 
i) If beliefs possess F, then people have voluntary control over their beliefs.  
ii) People do not have voluntary control over their beliefs.  
iii) Conclusion: Beliefs do not possess F.  
Notice that not all arguments fitting this schema must stand or fall together; it is at 
least conceivable that the version of premise (i) concerning responsibility (say), is true, while 
the version concerning deontological constraints is false. That said, premise (ii) of the 
argument remains the same no matter which feature F is standing in for, and so if (ii) can be 
shown false then all instances of the schema are unsound. This result, while not entailing that 
beliefs possess any particular action-like normative feature, would remove a significant 
systematic barrier to attributing them. By contrast, if premise (ii) is true then beliefs will fail 
to possess any feature requiring voluntary control.  
Why, then, should we find premises (i) and (ii) of the schema plausible? When one 
performs a paradigmatic intentional physical action – when one shoots a basketball, say – 
there is a clear intuitive sense in which it is up to one whether to shoot or not shoot. A 
philosophical analysis of what it is for something to be ‘up to one’ in this sense turns out to 
be tricky; even leaving aside issues of determinism, it is always possible that even in such a 
simple case one’s intention is not born out. One may make up one’s mind to shoot the 
basketball but suffer a muscle spasm and fail to do so, or one may make up one’s mind not to 
shoot but suffer a (rather more dramatic) spasm and make a beautiful shot. Still, difficult 
though it may be to analyze the sort of control at issue, I am perfectly capable of recognizing 
it when I stand with a basketball in my hands.  
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On the other hand, all sorts of features (very broadly construed) of agents are not up 
to them in this way. It isn’t up to me whether my cells undergo mitosis, whether I dream 
when I sleep, whether I have freckles, whether I feel pain when I stub my toe. (Yes, there are 
steps that I might take to encourage myself to dream, to do away with freckles, and so on. 
The difference between such measures and something’s being ‘up to me’ in the sense at issue 
here will be taken up below.) Some of these are things we might say happen to me, while 
others are things that in some weak sense I do; in terminology introduced by Ernest Sosa, 
some are sufferings while others are functionings. None, however, are endeavors, like 
shooting the basketball.38 As a result, it would be inappropriate to hold me responsible for the 
pain I experience, or tell me that I ought to stop undergoing mitosis, or inquire into the 
reasons on the basis of which I have freckles. And crucially, when we remove this same ‘up 
to me’ quality from what would otherwise be a paradigmatic action, such normative 
assessment similarly ceases to be appropriate. If I do fail to shoot the basketball simply 
because I suffer a debilitating muscle spasm, it is no longer appropriate to tell me that I ought 
to have shot it – not just then, anyway.  
 So there is a sort of control, one which we can recognize if not define, that makes the 
difference between full-blown actions possessing all the normative features that entails, and 
mere sufferings or functionings. For simplicity’s sake, let’s call that sort of control – 
whatever it involves – “voluntary control.” Uses of this term vary between philosophers and 
are often vague. While I will consider some specific extant accounts of voluntary control 
below, here my use is stipulative; we’ll flesh out our understanding of voluntary control by 
investigating the phenomena to which it applies.  
 
38 Sosa (2015), ch. 9 (particularly pp. 192-193). 
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 Why then think that beliefs are not subject to voluntary control? Simple enough – 
what I believe doesn’t seem to be up to me in the same way as whether or not to shoot a 
basketball. Some beliefs, notably perceptual beliefs, seem to simply strike me. When I see 
rain outside the window, under normal conditions I seem all at once to believe that it is 
raining. I find myself struck by this belief, much as I am struck by the pain of a stubbed toe. 
Other beliefs, such as those derived through inference, do not strike me in such an immediate 
manner, but are not clearly any more under my control for all their gentler onset. If I 
recognize that I believe P, and that I believe PàQ, then ordinarily I simply must now come 
to believe that Q. In such cases, my resulting belief seems ultimately to be driven, not by my 
discretion, but by whatever forces gave me the premise-beliefs in the first place. As Plantinga 
(1993) puts it, “whether or not I accept it is simply not up to me; but then accepting this 
proposition cannot be a way in which I fulfill my obligation to the truth, or, indeed, any 
obligation….”39  
In his “Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity,” Galen Strawson 
offers a forceful defense of this skeptical viewpoint.40  Unfortunately, he does not explicitly 
tell us how he understands the notion of voluntary control, but his discussion presents an 
effective intuitive case, and considering his position will allow us to progress towards a 
clearer picture of the view of control underlying such resistance.  
Strawson acknowledges that there are some mental actions, including some relevant 
to bringing about beliefs and judgments. We can, he thinks, direct our attention one way or 
another, set our mind at a problem, “[initiate] a kind of actively receptive blanking of the 
 
39 Plantinga (1993a), p. 38 
40 Strawson (2003). 
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mind,” and other such forms of “preparatory, ground-setting, tuning, retuning, [and] 
shepherding,” all of which he counts as actions.41  These sorts of things, presumably, are 
under our voluntary control. But once we are through with all of this “prefatory” and 
“essentially – merely – catalytic”42 action, all that’s left to do is “waiting, seeing if anything 
happens, waiting for content to come to mind, for the ‘natural causality of reason’ to operate 
in one.”43 For all the action involved in putting oneself in a position to judge, he thinks, when 
one actually gets to the point of judging one is passive – struck by the upshots of automatic 
processes that one played no active role in carrying out. When one sets one’s mind upon a 
problem, one thereby launches a metaphorical projectile that carries on, under its own power 
and without interference by the agent, until in landing it issues in belief or fails to do so as 
the case may be. 
What view of voluntary control is Strawson implicitly adopting here? Even he must 
acknowledge that there is some form of control that agents sometimes exercise over their 
own judgments. After all, the various ‘catalytic’ mental actions allowed by Strawson can 
causally impact the judgments the judgments they precede – often in foreseeable ways – just 
as a chemical catalyst predictably affects the ensuing reaction. But Strawson does not seem 
to think that a judgment, foreseeably brought about by means of such catalytic actions, itself 
constitutes an action. So he must take it that, for event E to be under my voluntary control, it 
is not sufficient that I act in a way that I expect to bring about E, and in fact thereby bring 
about E. Voluntary control must amount to more than this.  
 
41 Ibid, p. 232. 
42 Ibid, p. 231. 
43 Ibid, p. 232. 
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Consider again Strawson’s metaphor of mental ballistics. When one launches a 
ballistic projectile, be it a rocket or a basketball, one of course exerts considerable control on 
where, and how, the projectile lands; this sort of control Strawson must surely take to be 
present, often enough anyway, when a thinker entrusts a mental projectile to the ‘natural 
causality of reason,’ as he puts it.44 But where precisely a basketball lands after I shoot it is 
not up to me in the same way as shooting it in the first place is; shooting the ball may be an 
action under my voluntary control while its striking the ground is merely a foreseeable 
consequence. Strawson’s metaphor therefore helps focus our question. In the eyes of the 
skeptic, the boundary of voluntary control lies between the action of shooting the ball and the 
non-action of getting it through the hoop.  
One way of trying to pin down this difference would appeal to the most prominent 
contemporary approach to understanding action: namely, the assorted iterations and 
descendants of the work of Donald Davidson collectively known as the ‘Causal Theory’ of 
action.45 The fundamental claim of the Causal Theory is the following: actions are those 
events caused in the right way by the agent’s mental phenomenon of the right sort. For 
instance, the lifting of my arm (a physical event) might constitute an action of mine because 
it is properly caused by my decision to lift my arm (a mental event). The various 
implementations of the Causal Theory are distinguished by their claims about what sort of 
causation is causation in the right way, and what sort of mental phenomena are phenomena of 
the right sort.  
 
44 Ibid., p. 238. 
45 The classic source of this view is Davidson (1963); prominent later developments include Davidson 
(1973), Mele (1992), and Stout (1996). 
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Suggested mental phenomena have included decisions (events), intentions (states), 
and tryings (processes), among others.46 For simplicity’s sake, I will initially focus on 
versions of the Causal Theory that take decisions to be the mental phenomena in question. 
For the moment, then, the Causal Theory says that in order for an event to be an action, it 
must be caused in the right way by the agent’s decision. Now, on Strawson’s view – and, I 
think, on any plausible view – beliefs are, at least sometimes, caused by the agent’s 
decisions. As we saw, Strawson holds that one can decide to engage in ‘catalytic’ actions, 
such as reflecting on one’s evidence, that ultimately cause a belief to form. If the Causal 
Theory possesses resources with which to distinguish this sort of causation from the 
voluntary control required for action, those resources must be found in the particular sort of 
causation called for by the Causal Theory: that is, in the Causal Theory’s appeal to causation 
in the right way.  
Discussion about the sort of causation that constitutes causation in the right way has 
largely centered on cases of so-called ‘deviant causal chains,’ in which a decision to Φ  
causes in instance of Φ –ing in a roundabout and unexpected manner.47 However, the 
problem of specifying the right sort of causation is not limited to causal chains that are in any 
way deviant. Whenever a decision initiates a series of events standing in relations of cause 
and effect, it can always be asked how many of the links of the chain constitute actions of the 
agent whose decision it is. One implausible extreme would insist that all effects constitute 
actions of the agent, erasing the distinction between actions and their consequences and 
entailing that agents may continue to act long after their deaths. If this extreme view is to be 
 
46 For a development of the ‘tryings’ view in particular, see O’Shaughnessy (1973). 
47 Davidson (1973). 
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rejected, then the causation of an event by a decision can be at most a necessary condition on 
that event’s constituting an action; giving sufficient conditions for action will require further 
specification of which among all the effects constitute actions. A first pass might suggest that 
all and only the events actually decided on constitute actions; that is, one might hold that 
when one decides to Φ, any instance of Φ-ing caused by this decision constitutes an action, 
no matter how short or long the causal chain. But this suggestion seems both over- and 
under-inclusive; plausibly if an instance of Φ-ing is a sufficiently remote consequence even 
of a decision to Φ it does not constitute an action, and plausibly sufficiently direct and 
foreseen consequences of the decision to Φ constitute actions even if they are not instances of 
Φ-ing. (Consider: you lift the gun and decide to pull the trigger, in the full knowledge that 
this will cause the gun to fire. Can the firing of the gun fail to be an action of yours simply 
because you did not decide to fire the gun per se?)  
It is not clear that an adequate specification of just which effects of decisions 
constitute actions has been proposed; certainly, there does not yet exist any consensus view. 
Davidson himself eventually denied that his account needed to provide such sufficient 
conditions for action, suggesting instead that we could rely on simply knowing the right sort 
of causation when we saw it.48 However, influential developers of Davidson’s ideas have 
suggested that actions must not be too far removed from the decision (or other mental 
phenomenon) to which they owe their status; they must be caused by that decision in a fairly 
direct manner, without too many intermediate causal ‘steps.’49  
 
48 Davidson (1985) 
49 Mele (1992), for instance, suggests that action-constituting causation cannot involve any 
intermediate steps. This is an extreme version of the view, however, one which is difficult to 
reconcile with ordinary verdicts regarding which events qualify as actions.  
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Suppose, then, either that we can specify what constitutes a sufficiently direct causal 
chain, or that, like Davidson, we know such chains when we see them. Either way, it seems 
reasonable to read Strawson as concluding that chains connection beliefs with decisions to 
believe do not pass the test. The examples of mental actions acknowledge by Strawson, 
‘catalytic’ mental actions such as focusing one’s attention, plausibly can all be caused quite 
directly by the decisions of the agents whose actions they are. If (under suitable conditions, 
with no excessive distractions present and so on) I decide to focus my attention on the 
question of whether p, the causal chain between my decision and the resulting event of my 
attention’s focusing is a short one. By contrast, it does not seem that a decision to believe that 
p can ever so directly bring about a belief that p. In most cases, beliefs are not caused by any 
such decision at all; hence Strawson’s claim that beliefs are ‘involuntary’ and ‘not due to 
conscious volition.’ At best, one can decide to believe that p and then bring it about that one 
believe that p by engaging in further acts, whether mental or physical; any such causal chain 
connecting decision to belief will include, and so necessarily be longer and more convoluted 
than, the chains connecting the auxiliary decision and actions taken along the way. Strawson 
can acknowledge such causal chains linking decision to belief, but disregard them as not 
challenging his thesis because the causation is not of the correct, sufficiently direct sort. 
Here, then, is one way of developing Strawson’s challenge: actions are, as the Causal 
Theory holds, those events caused in the right way by an agent’s decisions. Some mental 
events are caused in this way, and so constitute mental actions. But even without being able 
to give necessary and sufficient conditions for causation in the right way, we can already tell 
that beiefs, when caused by an agent’s decision at all, are not caused in the right way; the 
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causal chain is too long and too roundabout to suffice. In light of this lack of proper causation 
(the challenge claims), beliefs never constitute actions. Call this the Causal Challenge.  
The Causal Challenge is, I think, the most natural interpretation of Strawson’s 
argument that beliefs are not subject to voluntary control, but it is certainly not the only way 
of making that case. The second possibility that I’ll consider is what I’ll call the Constitutive 
Challenge. According to the Constitutive Challenge, a belief is not an action because one 
does not believe by means of doing anything else. Douglas Lavin borrows from Marx to 
illustrate a closely related point; I hereby borrow the same analogy from Lavin.50 The factory 
supervisor who assigns tasks to workers but does not work himself is, on Marx’s view, 
alienated from the work being done: the supervisor does in some sense control the work 
being done, by giving orders, yet because he hands each task off to another the work is not 
his work. He observes the work getting done, rather than doing it. Of course, the supervisor 
may do various things by means of which he brings it about that the work gets done, such as 
instructing the workers. But bringing the work about is not the same as doing the work. For it 
to be his work, he would have to be down on the factory floor, carrying it out in person. In 
particular, he would have to carry out some more basic tasks (steps in the manufacturing 
process, and so forth) the completion of which constitute, rather than merely cause, the 
work’s getting done.  
Lavin uses this analogy to argue that all actions must be carried out by means of 
further actions of the same agent. He therefore rejects the consensus view among action 
theorists that there exist some ‘basic actions,’ actions that are not done by means of doing 
 
50 Lavin (2013), p. 274. 
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anything else, holding instead that each action is the product of an infinite regress of means.51 
However, one can feel the basic force of the point without following Lavin in rejecting basic 
actions. Even if one allows that some basic actions do exist, and can function to prevent the 
means-end regress from stretching to infinity, still any given action must either be basic or be 
carried out by some means. If an agent neither simply Φ’s, nor Φ’s by any means, then it 
seems that Φ-ing must not be among her actions, but at most an event that she brings about 
and observes, like Marx’s factory supervisor. 
This suggestion of Lavin’s provides another candidate for the sort of voluntary 
control that we’re looking for. If (as Strawson told us) my beliefs are formed through the 
‘natural causality of reason,’ then it does not seem that my beliefs are things simply done by 
me, in the way that one raises an arm (or, perhaps, focuses one’s attention); but neither are 
they done by means of any further action of mine, for the workings of the causality of reason 
are not themselves my actions. And so beliefs appear to be disqualified from counting as 
either basic or non-basic actions, and thereby from counting as actions at all. Instead, Lavin 
might suggest, the relation between the agent who gets herself to judge that p (whether by 
pill, hypnosis, or catalytic mental action) and the belief that p itself is akin to that between 
the supervisor and the products of the factory. The agent supervises the believing, doing 
various things by means of which she brings it about that the belief occurs, and waits to see 
what results, but plays no role in carrying out the believing itself. The agent has not, to strain 
the analogy a bit further, set foot on the factory floor inhabited by her own reasoning 
processes. Setiya (2012), in presenting his own challenge to the possibility of believing 
intentionally, makes clear that he has something nearer to the Constitutive Challenge than to 
 
51 See Danto (1965) for a development and defense of the concept of basic action.  
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the Causal Challenge in mind: “In principle, we could affect our own beliefs through basic 
intentional action. But causing oneself to have a belief is not the same thing as forming it. To 
form a belief intentionally, one must become more confident that p as an instance, not an 
effect, of intentional action.”52 
This idea of voluntary control does indeed present a threat to the practice of 
attributing action-like normative features to belief. While doubtless the factory supervisor is 
responsible in some sense for the work done in the factory, he is not responsible for the work 
in the same direct sense as he is responsible for the orders he issues. He does not have 
practical knowledge of the details of the work done in the factory: although he is an informed 
position to surmise that certain kinds of work are being carried out, given his knowledge of 
the orders he issued, he must inspect the work to ensure that it is being done correctly. He 
cannot carry out the work more or less skillfully. (Of course he may carry out his supervision 
more or less skillfully, but that is a distinct task and a distinct sort of skill.) And so forth.  
The Causal Challenge held that beliefs are not under our voluntary control because 
they do not result from our decisions via a sufficiently direct causal chain. The Constitutive 
Challenge, by contrast, holds that beliefs do not constitute actions because the work of 
producing them is carried out, not by means of further actions of ours, but through the 
workings of reason, understood as distinct from the agent.  
These two challenges are importantly distinct. However, they can be seen as sharing a 
common core if the proponent of the Constitutive Challenge adopts the natural view that 
basic actions, actions that are not carried out by means of further actions, must also be caused 
quite directly by the agent’s decisions to act. Then each challenge holds that all actions either 
 
52 Setiya (2013) p. 154. 
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are, or are importantly related to, basic actions that are caused directly by decisions to act. 
They differ in their accounts of what sort of relation to a basic action allows an event to 
constitute a non-basic action. The Causal Challenge holds that non-basic actions are farther-
downstream effects of the decision to act, caused by way of the basic actions. The 
Constitutive challenge holds that non-basic actions are more complex actions constituted, at 
least in part, by the basic actions by means of which they are carried out.  
The challenge facing the defender of voluntary control over beliefs, then, is this. So 
long as we suppose that there are any actions at all falling under agents’ voluntary control, 
we must accept that there is some criterion distinguishing the actions under such control from 
the functionings, sufferings, and events transpiring in the agent’s environment over which 
she exercises less direct forms of control. The Causal Challenge and the Constitutive 
Challenge offer two prima facie plausible candidates for that criterion, and on each, beliefs 
seem to fail the test: whether they are linked to our basic actions by overly long causal 
chains, or because they are not carried out by means of more basic actions also falling under 
voluntary control.  
 
II. Existing responses 
Philosophical responses to the problem raised in the previous section fall into three 
basic categories. First, one may accept that we lack voluntary control over our beliefs, and so 
conclude that we are not responsible for them, that they are not subject to deontological 
constraints, etc. Second, one may deny that any form of control over our beliefs is required 
for them to possess such normative status. Finally, one may insist that we do possess an 
adequate form of voluntary control over our beliefs. (The divide between the second and 
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third options is not entirely clear-cut, since what counts as a form of ‘control’ is itself 
controversial.)  
Alston (1988) generally chose the first option; while he accepted that there are some 
cases in which we exercise sufficient ‘indirect influence’ over our beliefs to render them the 
appropriate targets of deontological constraints, he holds these cases to be too rare to support 
the scope of our actual practice of subjecting beliefs to such constraints. Instead, he argues, 
the proper form of assessment for most beliefs is a basically reliabilist one, in which an 
agent’s beliefs may be appropriately judged to be more or less justified depending on the 
reliability of the capacities and mechanisms by which they are produced, without reflecting 
successes or failures of the agent per se. Other reliabilists and proper functionalists follow 
him in various elaborations of the project of giving up on an action-like normativity of belief, 
and trying to replace it with a sufficiently satisfying alternative that does not do too much 
violence to our practices of epistemic assessment.53  
Doxastic voluntarists such as Steup (2012, 2017), Ginet (2001), and Weatherson 
(2008) each argue that we have quite a robust form of voluntary control over our beliefs, but 
one that can only manifest itself under very specific circumstances. Steup, for instance, holds 
that we are able to believe whatever we decide to believe (his conception of voluntary 
control), but that we cannot decide to believe anything that goes against the evidence. As a 
result, our ability to exercise control over our beliefs only makes itself known in cases where 
there’s more than one conclusion available that conforms to the evidence. The rarity of such 
cases explains why it is not obvious that we can decide what to believe, while the (supposed) 
 
53 See for instance Goldman (2008), Plantinga (1993b). 
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existence of such cases demonstrates that voluntary control is there, waiting to be used, and 
so sufficient to ground responsibility and the other action-like normative features of belief.  
Perhaps the most popular sort of response to the problem is that which insists that 
beliefs do possess at least some action-like normative features, while denying that these 
features depend on voluntary control (at least over the beliefs themselves). Smith (2005) and 
Owens (2000) defend versions of the view that we are responsible for our beliefs because 
they reflect our values and commitments. Hieronymi (2009), similarly, claims that beliefs 
and other attitudes embody our answers to questions; while she categorizes this relation to 
our beliefs as a form of control (‘evaluative control,’) it is one distinct from the ‘managerial 
control’ that is more similar to our paradigmatic examples of voluntary control and that 
Hieronymi agrees we exercise over our beliefs only in relatively minor and indirect ways. 
Feldman (2000) argues that the ‘oughts’ applied to beliefs are ‘role oughts,’ oughts that serve 
to indicate what we would like if we were good occupiers of the role ‘believer’ and do not 
require control. (For instance, believers ought to believe in accordance with the evidence just 
as teachers ought to explain things clearly, whether or not they are capable of doing so.) 
McHugh (2017) suggests that while beliefs are not subject to voluntary control, they are 
subject to a more fundamental form of control, the same as that which we exercise over our 
intentions, and from which the normative force of voluntary control is derived.54 Chrisman 
(2018) argues that while believing per se is not under our voluntary control, engaging in 
practices of maintaining our belief systems (e.g., re-examining evidence, seeking out 
conflicts) do fall under our voluntary control and are sufficient to render us responsible for 
 
54 Floweree (2017) may be naturally read as suggesting something similar.  
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the belief system that we maintain. That is to say, Chrisman is roughly in agreement with 
Alston about the extent of our control over our beliefs, but not about its significance.  
I cannot here do justice to this rich and diverse body of work; I can only indicate why, 
although they contain many grains of truth, I do not find in any of them a fully satisfying 
solution to our problem. With the reliabilists and proper-functionalists, I agree that not all 
attitudes properly subject to epistemic assessment are under agents’ voluntary control, and so 
that we are in need of alternative forms of epistemic normativity on which to base this 
assessment; however, treating reliability or proper function as the only basis for the 
normative assessment of nearly all our beliefs represents too great a cost to both our ordinary 
and our philosophical practices to represent anything but a last resort. With the voluntarists, I 
agree that we should not infer, from the fact that agents are not able to simply decide to 
believe against their evidence, to the conclusion that they lack voluntary control over their 
beliefs. That inference stems from what I take to be an impoverished understanding of 
voluntary control. However, the voluntarists lack a fully satisfactory account of voluntary 
control to take its place, and to explain why apparent counterexamples to their view fail. For 
instance, Steup argues that voluntary control does not imply that I should be able to decide to 
believe against the evidence simply because I am offered, say, a monetary reward to do so. 
Such a reward, he claims, gives me no reason to decide to believe. Yet in my view, the nature 
of the control that we exercise over our beliefs must be capable of explaining why a monetary 
reward does not qualify as a reason for making such a decision, since it is precisely this sort 
of asymmetry between belief and action on which the challenge to doxastic voluntarism rests. 
Hieronymi is correct to suggest that beliefs embody our answer to questions, but by strictly 
delineating between ‘evaluative’ and ‘managerial’ control she leaves obscure why we should 
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consider these two quite different phenomena both to be forms of voluntary control (on my 
use of the term), capable of grounding action-like normative features. 
Below, I aim to build on these accounts to offer a fuller view of the nature of belief 
and our voluntary control over it. To succeed, my account will need to reveal deep 
similarities between beliefs and more paradigmatic examples of voluntary actions; will need 
to explain the difference between beliefs (on the one hand) and mere sufferings and 
functionings, not subject to voluntary control, on the other; and, crucially, will need to make 
sense of the limits of our control over our beliefs, why beliefs so often seem simply to ‘strike’ 
us, why we cannot simply decide to believe a falsehood in exchange for an offered monetary 
reward.   
 
III. Belief as Basic Action 
Both the Causal and the Constitutive challenges presented in section II argued that 
beliefs do not stand in the right relation to basic actions (that is, actions not performed by 
means of any further action) to count as under the agent’s voluntary control. According to the 
Causal Challenge, beliefs are not caused by basic actions via a sufficiently direct causal 
chain. According to the Constitutive Challenge, believing is neither a basic action, nor 
carried out by means of any further action of the agent’s. I propose here to argue that beliefs 
are in fact basic actions themselves, which both challenges admit to be under the agent’s 
voluntary control.55  
 
55 As noted above, calling beliefs ‘actions’ strikes many as deeply odd, quite apart from issues of 
control, because beliefs are ongoing states rather than events. I am persuaded by Boyle (2011) that 
this is in itself is no barrier to their constituting actions: a soldier’s standing at attention is both an 
action and an ongoing state. Those who find the terminology unpalatable, though, are free to think of 
me as arguing that beliefs fall under a broader genus of ‘exercises of agency,’ including both actions 
and those states that fall under voluntary control and so possess action-like normative features. Or, 
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Standard examples of basic action include simple physical actions like raising my 
arm. Their status as basic actions is not to be explained by their connection (causal or 
constitutive) to distinct, yet more basic actions. Rather, they are brought about simply and 
immediately by the agent’s mental determination to bring them about: a decision, an 
intention, a movement of the will, what have you. Under appropriate background conditions, 
nothing needs take place (at the personal, agential) level to mediate between the mental 
determination and the action. Of course, my raising of my arm depends on intervening sub-
personal mechanisms, such as the firing of nerve fibers. When these mechanisms fail, the 
determination may also fail to bring about the action. But when the mechanisms cooperate 
and my arm does rise, there is nothing that I do between determining to raise it and actually 
raising it.   
On its face, this seems quite different from how things stand with belief. After all, the 
point of Strawson’s challenge is that when we decide we want to influence our beliefs, we 
have to do so in an extremely convoluted manner: whether we go about it by seeking out and 
reflecting on evidence or by engaging the services of a hypnotist, nothing, it seems could be 
less simple and immediate.  
To begin to resolve this difficulty, consider the context in which a paradigmatic basic 
action, such as raising my arm, takes place. Perhaps it is possible to decide to raise my arm, 
and then to raise it, for no purpose whatsoever. Ordinarily, though, this decision is made in 
order to further my pursuit of some greater goal. Perhaps I am out to catch the notice of a 
friend across the street, or to retrieve a book from a high shelf. I want to get the book, I 
 
they may take what I say here about beliefs and apply it instead to judgments, the events correlating to 
and intimately connected to belief’s states. 
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realize that raising my arm is the best way of doing so, and so the decision is made and the 
arm raised. What makes the raising of my arm my action here is not that I conjured a 
decision out of the blue. Rather, I was already engaged in an endeavor of retrieving the book, 
and the role of the decision was to shape the manner in which I carried out that endeavor. (Of 
course, I might not have literally started trying to retrieve the book until I raised my arm: the 
important ordering is explanatory, not temporal.)  
Notice, now, that my decision would have established similar means-end relations 
even if I did not succeed in retrieving the book – even, indeed, if I did not succeed in raising 
my arm. In that case, the decision could not be appropriately described as determining the 
manner in which, or the means by which, I retrieved the book, since I didn’t retrieve the book 
in any manner. But they would still have determined in just the same way the manner in 
which I attempted to retrieve the book. Making this attempt is itself an action, one that I 
engage in regardless of its success. 
In the first instance, what I really do in deciding to raise my arm is to further 
determine the nature of my attempt to get the book: this decision makes it the case that what I 
am doing is not just trying to get the book, but rather trying to get the book by trying to raise 
my arm. Depending on the extent to which I succeed in my attempt, additional descriptions 
may become apt: for instance, if I succeed to a sufficient degree, then it will be appropriate to 
describe my has having retrieved the book by raising my arm, and not just as attempting to 
do these things. If my efforts are less successful, my actions may merit other descriptions 
instead, as what I accomplished may not align with what I attempted: for instance, my 
unsuccessful attempt to get the book might instead constitute my knocking over the 
bookcase. However, such changes in description of the actions involved make no difference 
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to the means-end structure that was already present in the attempt, successful or not. 
Attempting to raise my arm is no more and no less a means by which I attempt to get the 
book whether or not I actually raise my arm and whether or not I actually get the book. 
The point that decisions serve to determine the means by which we carry out our 
attempts to achieve various goals is significant because all and only actions are capable of 
standing in such means-end relations to other actions of the same agent. Suppose you found 
your arm lifting, seemingly of its own volition; could you then get the book by means of this 
very raising of your arm? I think not. You might exploit your arm’s motion, perhaps stepping 
forward so that your lifting arm knocks the book of the shelf – but then stepping closer, and 
not lifting your arm, would be the means by which you attempt to get the book. Or instead 
you might lift your arm in a way that causes you to end up with the book, not as an action of 
yours, but merely a foreseeable consequence – perhaps lifting your arm is a signal to a friend 
who gets it for you – but then lifting your arms is not a means by which you get the book, 
merely a means by which you bring it about that the book is retrieved. So it seems that the 
fact that some event E1 stands as a means to E2’s end entails that both E1 and E2 are among 
your actions.  
The Constitutive Challenge and the Causal Challenge each have a way of accounting 
for this entailment. The Constitutive Challenge will hold that E1 and E2 are both actions 
because E2 inherits that status from E1 which partly constitutes it – the end is an action 
because it is carried out by means of an action. The Causal Challenge will hold that E1 and 
E2’s being actions is a precondition of their standing in means-end relations, and that 
precondition is satisfied when both events are caused in a sufficiently direct manner by the 
agent’s decisions. What I am suggesting is an inversion of the view presupposed by the 
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Constitutive Challenge. Rather than E1 granting the status of action to the ‘higher-order’ E2, 
E1 inherits the status of action from the higher-order E2 of which, as a result of the decision, 
it is now a constituent.  
So long as we take paradigmatic actions like raising arms to be actions precisely in 
virtue of being decided on – so long as we take decision to be what must constitute voluntary 
control – then there is no particular reason to think that anything not decided on could also 
constitute an action. We might assert that not all actions must be caused by decision, that 
some other causal origins (perhaps origins that more frequently and directly produce beliefs) 
shared decision’s action-constituting power. However, this would be worrisomely ad hoc, for 
we would not have identified any common role played by decision and those other origins in 
virtue of which both are capable of producing actions.  
On the other hand, once we consider the possibility that decisions are a way of 
exercising voluntary control, and constituting actions, simply because they do a particular job 
– a job that I will refer to as ‘settling on means,’ and that consists in establishing means-end 
relations among one’s actions by determining how one will go about carrying out one’s 
projects – then we are in a position to ask whether decisions are the only things that can do 
the job. Sometimes, when one is already set on attempting to bring about some goal like 
turning on the light, one decides how one will pursue this goal, and thereby settles on the 
means that one decides on. But if it is ever the case that we settle on means for carrying out 
our attempts, without deciding on those means, then we have a principled reason for holding 
that whatever determines the means by which those attempts are carried out in those cases, in 
lieu of a decision is doing the same job done by decision and so is similarly capable of 
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bringing about actions. And indeed, I think that there are such ways by which we may settle 
on means for carrying out our attempts without deciding. 
First, one may settle on means in ways that are not sufficiently conscious and 
deliberate to constitute deciding. Having decided to try to shoot an arrow in such a way as to 
hit the bull’s eye, I must make a number of further determinations about the exact means by 
which I will carry out this attempt: I must determine the moment when I will release the 
arrow, the angle at which I will hold the bow, how far back I will pull the string before 
releasing, etc. Each such question of means is, in principle, something I could determine 
through a conscious decision, and when I am a novice archer I may well do so, at least for 
many of them. However, if I am an expert archer, it is probably rare for me to deliberate 
about, e.g., how far (or indeed whether) to pull back the bowstring in order to shoot, and to 
undergo any distinct and conscious mental event that would naturally be described as a 
decision to pull back the string just so far. Nevertheless, the expert does settle on means by 
which to shoot, and those means (pulling the string back to the corner of her mouth) are 
actions of hers by means of which she shoots.  
 (If someone objects that this first form of settling on means is in fact a form of 
decision, and that decisions need not be conscious, I have no great objection; I don’t much 
care what we count as a decision, so long as we agree that the rapid and subconscious 
instances of settling on means here under consideration are still ways of establishing means-
end relations of the sort that entail that their relata are actions.) 
 Second, one may settle on means via an evaluation. Evaluation ordinarily plays a role 
in decision; when one decides, one typically evaluates some of the available means to assess 
their suitability for pursuing one’s end, and then commits to a particular means or collection 
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of means by which one will pursue the end. However, when one decides, one is free to do so 
on the basis of considerations other than one’s evaluation; the evaluation leaves open more 
than one permissible option. One might evaluate a forehand shot as the best way of carrying 
out one’s attempt to win the tennis point, but nevertheless decide to take a backhand instead. 
My claim here is that one may settle on means to an end by evaluating them even in cases 
where, once one has evaluated some means to be the correct way of pursuing one’s end, one 
is no longer able to choose a different means instead. Consider the attempt to answer a ‘yes 
or no’ question honestly. Once one has decided to answer honestly, one can reflect on the 
possible answers – ‘yes’ and ‘no’ – and evaluate them as means for answering honestly. 
Once one recognizes that ‘yes’ is the honest answer, however, one cannot choose to attempt 
to answer honestly by saying ‘no’ instead. One can continue with the attempt to answer 
honestly by saying ‘yes,’ or one can give up this attempt and say ‘no’ to some other purpose. 
The evaluation mandates one’s means, and one can avoid taking those means only by 
abandoning the end.  
 I am claiming, then, that there are at least three distinct ways of settling on means.  
First, we may settle on means by way of conscious, deliberative decision; second, we may 
settle on means by way of processes that do not constitute decisions because they are not 
sufficiently conscious and deliberate; third, we may settle on means by way of evaluations, 
which may or may not be conscious and deliberate but which dictate a unique means by 
which our attempt may be carried out. Any of these processes can equally do the job of 
determining my means and thereby granting the status of action.    
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IV. Acts and Actions 
The preceding discussion suggests a way of understanding how some beliefs might 
constitute actions, under an agent’s voluntary control, despite not being decided on by the 
agent: they might be settled on, via evaluation, as means of carrying out the agent’s projects. 
If you have a goal that you, upon evaluation, take to be served by believing that p, and the 
immediate result of this evaluation is that you believe that p, then on this view the belief that 
p is an action performed under your voluntary control. This criterion serves to distinguish a 
category including both beliefs and paradigmatic physical actions, on the one hand, from 
sufferings and functionings – cell mitosis, feeling the pain of a stubbed toe – on the other. 
Mitosis and pain are not plausibly means that I settle on, in any sense, for carrying out my 
projects.  
So far, though, the account threatens to accord agents with too much control over 
their beliefs. As noted above, beliefs at least often seem not to be up to us. I can’t form the 
belief that seven is even on the basis of offered money, no matter how much I might want to; 
offer me a million dollars to raise my arm and I’ll do so in an instant. And so to render my 
account of voluntary control plausible I must explain the limits of control over belief, how it 
can differ so drastically in practice if it is fundamentally of the same sort as that I exercise 
over simple physical actions.  
It will be helpful here to introduce a distinction found in Korsgaard (2009) between 
an ‘act’ and an ‘action.’ An action, in this terminology, is “an act done for the sake of an 
end.”56 A token action is identical to a token act, but under a different description. For 
 
56 See p. 11. Korsgaard presents the distinction as an elucidation of ideas found in the work of both 
Kant and Aristotle; here I remain neutral on that exegetical claim and put the distinction to my own 
uses.   
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instance, telling a lie is an act, while telling a lie in order to make money is an action; the lie 
is one and the same, but may be described in the more minimal or the more expansive way. 
Since I may tell a lie in service to all kinds of ends, not all lies constitute the same sort of 
action.  
Compared to acts, actions are subject to additional constraints. If upon consideration 
I’m quite certain that telling a lie has no chance of making me any money, then I can still tell 
a lie – but I can’t do so for the sake of making money. Under those circumstances I can 
perform the act but not the action – even though, again, when I do perform the action it is 
identical to the act. To take another example, walking out of the room is an act, while 
storming out in protest is an action. If there’s nothing that I’m protesting against, I can’t 
storm out in protest, though I’m perfectly free to get up and leave.  
Here’s the final major piece of the puzzle, then: beliefs are actions, not (merely) acts. 
They are constrained in just the same sort of way as storming out of the room in protest, or as 
telling a lie in order to make money. All of these actions differ from acts like raising my arm, 
which I can perform for pretty much any reason at any time (although any particular instance 
of raising my arm is also an action, under which description it is constrained).  
What act and what end make up the action of believing? I suggest that the act is 
affirming: roughly, representing something as being true. I can affirm a proposition (even 
within the confines of my mind) without thereby believing it. I can guess it, I can suppose it, 
I can repeat it to myself as a mantra. Affirming constitutes believing only when it is paired 
with a distinctively epistemic end. My preferred candidate is knowing, though I’d prefer not 
to stress this too heavily: as far as I’m concerned there may be a class of actions, each 
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consisting of affirming with some distinct epistemic end, that we refer to collectively as 
‘believing.’57 That caveat aside, my basic picture is this: 
Believing that p = affirming that p for the sake of thereby knowing whether p58 
 Incorporating the material of the previous section: when I set out on the project of 
knowing whether p, and conclude that the best (or only) way of doing so is by affirming that 
p, and then immediately come to affirm that p, that affirmation thereby falls under my 
voluntary control and thereby constitutes an action. Since the affirmation and the belief are 
identical, the belief is naturally an action as well. I cannot affirm for the sake of knowing 
unless I take it to be an appropriate way of pursing my end of knowing, and so I cannot 
affirm for just any old reason, while maintaining the end of thereby knowing. If someone 
offers me money to affirm that p I am entirely free to do so, as free as I am to raise my arm. 
But if someone offers me money to believe that p, I can’t do so unless I evaluate it as an 
 
57 Knowledge as the end of belief has a few advantages over the more traditional choice of truth. 
Intuitively, treating the end of belief as knowledge helps to explain why we tend to view a belief that 
turns out to be true but unjustified as less than fully successful. Sosa (2015) manages to accommodate 
this intuition within a framework where beliefs aim at the truth by deeming apt beliefs (roughly, those 
that are true in virtue of being justified) higher value than those that merely attain the aim of truth, but 
as a result he has to go to awkward lengths to make room for beliefs that are ‘fully apt,’ apt in virtue 
of the competence of the agent in attempting a belief under the circumstances; treating the end of 
belief as knowledge streamlines the treatment of such higher forms of epistemic success. (See also 
footnote 66 in chapter 3 below.) The goal of knowledge serves to distinguish belief from related (but 
distinct) attitudes such as guesses (see Owens (2003)). Finally, the goal of knowledge serves to 
insulate my account from Berker’s (2013) attack on epistemic teleology; see ch. 4 for discussion. All 
that having been said, I want to emphasize that the choice of a particular end here is far less central to 
my account than is that end’s relation to the act of affirming, and that I am entirely open to their being 
some attitudes with the goal simply of truth that are nonetheless deserving of the name ‘belief.’  
58 The ‘thereby’ in this claim is to be read as indicating a constitutive, rather than a causal, relation. 
One may affirm that p for the sake of causing oneself to know whether p, without that affirmation 
itself constituting a belief that p. Consider cases in which one for instance repeats a mantra to induce 
belief, or rehearses several competing hypotheses to see which strikes one as true, or hazards a guess 
in a trivia game in the knowledge that once one affirms some answer (right or wrong) the truth will be 
revealed. By contrast, my suggestion is that when one believes, the end for the sake of which one 
affirms is the end of that very affirmation constituting knowledge whether p.  
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appropriate means of pursuing knowledge whether p (or can get myself to so evaluate it). If I 
affirm, not for the sake of knowing but for the sake of earning money, then the affirmation 
isn’t a belief.  
 This account owes a debt to aspects of Steup’s and Hieronymi’s work, in particular. 
Like Hieronymi, I hold that beliefs embody an agent’s answer to a question, since they are 
agents’ attempts to know the answer to the question whether p. But unlike Hieronymi, I have 
explained how this amounts to just the same sort of control that an agent exercises when she 
raises her arm, shoots a basketball, or performs other actions that are quintessentially up to 
her. My account also provides for Hieronymi’s ‘managerial control’ over beliefs and other 
attitudes: roughly, our ability to manipulate our attitudes by causally manipulating elements 
of our environment. If I find myself with a desire to believe that p – perhaps because it will 
make me happy to do so – I cannot simply decide therefore to believe p, since the resulting 
affirmation would have the end of making me happy rather than of knowing whether p. But I 
can try to manipulate my environment in such a way that I will end up evaluating the 
affirmation that p as a suitable means of knowing whether p, and thereby come to believe it. 
The possibility of this sort of managerial control over beliefs does not contradict the 
possibility of my evaluations immediately and directly resulting in affirmation (=belief) 
under the right circumstances. 
 Like Steup, I hold that under the right circumstances an agent’s decision to believe 
that p can issue in a belief that p: namely, when the agent has the goal of knowing whether p 
and evaluates an affirmation that p as a suitable means of pursuing that goal.  I further agree 
with him that the impossibility of deciding to believe against the evidence, in response to an 
offer of money, does not undermine the possibility of voluntary control over belief. But 
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unlike Steup, I can explain why the offer of money is not a reason for which I can decide to 
believe (not, anyway, in the manner that immediately results in belief, and places the belief 
under my voluntary control): because the sort of decision capable of producing belief is the 
decision to affirm that p for the sake of knowing whether p, a decision made in pursuit of that 
goal and constrained by the agent’s assessment of what will qualify as an appropriate means 
of pursuing that goal: namely, the agent’s assessment of the evidence. (The question of what 
constitutes an appropriate means of pursuing the goal of knowledge will be taken up in more 
depth in the next chapter.)   
 I imagine that this account will strike many readers as over-intellectualizing the 
process of belief formation. It may seem plausible enough in cases where we carefully and 
consciously weigh up the evidence before coming to a judgment about the truth, but are we 
really settling on a means of pursuing an end on each of the thousands of occasions every day 
when we form unreflective perceptual beliefs about our immediate surroundings? When I see 
a blade of grass and immediately form the belief that it is green, do I really launch myself 
into some project of knowing whether the grass is green?  
 I’ll mention to replies to this concern. First, settling on means doesn’t always require 
conscious reflection. When I drive along the highway I doubtless have the goal of keeping 
the car on the road, and adopt innumerable small actions (adjustments of the steering wheel, 
etc.) as means to that end. There is no need for me to stop and reflect on each one, although I 
am able to stop and reflect on any one if I have reason to. It seems perfectly plausible that in 
the epistemic case I can have standing goals of knowing about my surroundings, and 
standing policies of affirming in line with the testimony of my senses as means to achieving 
such knowledge, barring any particular reason to question that testimony.  
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 Second, I am open to the possibility that not everything that we ordinarily refer to as 
‘beliefs’ fits my model. There may be some broadly belief-like attitudes that cannot plausibly 
be construed as under the agent’s voluntary control, or her means of pursuing any goal, even 
in the weak sense just described. In my view it would be deeply revisionary to conclude that 
agents are not responsible (say) for any of their beliefs, or that agents are responsible for so 
few of their beliefs as can be controlled using Alston’s ‘indirect influence,’ Strawson’s 
‘catalytic actions,’ or Hieronymi’s ‘managerial control.’ It is not particularly revisionary to 
admit the possibility that in some cases our control over our beliefs fails, that there are some 
beliefs for which we are not responsible. In Sosa’s terminology, the problem was not to show 
that all beliefs are endeavors, but simply to show that a non-trivial proportion are. In cases of 
belief that fall outside voluntary control I would be happy to apply one of the reliabilist or 
proper functionalist alternatives that have been developed so ably by doxastic involuntarists.  
 
V. Setting Ends 
I have explained how, given that one is engaged in an existing attempt to achieve 
some end or goal, one can exercise voluntary control to add a new action as a means of 
pursuing that end. This leaves a major loose end untied, though. A story about how new 
means are added to existing attempts cannot be our whole story about how those means come 
to constitute actions; we are also in need of a story about how one can come to be engaged in 
an attempt, to be in pursuit of an end, in the first place. To put the point another way, even if 
we accept that adding a means to an attempt makes that means an action, this only raises the 
question of how we can come to be engaged in the sort of thing to which means can be 
added. 
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First, it’s worth pointing out that many instances in which an agent may appear to 
initiate a new attempt ex nihilo may actually be cases of settling on that attempt as a means of 
carrying out some further end still. While an action is an act for the sake of an end, an action 
as a whole may take on the role of an act in a further act-end pair. I may affirm for the sake 
of knowing whether the bus is running for the sake of getting to work on time; I may raise 
my arm for the sake of shooting the basketball for the sake of winning the game. For this 
reason, cases of beginning an attempt that cannot be accommodated by the resources already 
developed in the previous section are less common than they at first may seem.  
Still, this strategy of locating higher-level attempts to serve as ends cannot provide a 
general solution to our problem, which is at its heart a regress problem: if each action is 
carried out in pursuit of some end, we cannot provide a full explanation of where those ends 
come from simply by asserting that they arise as means to yet further ends. Regress problems 
cannot be solved by simply pushing the problem back a few links along the chain. The 
problem is to work out how a satisfactory end of the chain can be found.  
To find an explanation of how ends can arise other than as part of actions settled on 
as means to yet further ends, I want to reflect on some examples of what I will claim are 
constitutively represented actions. First, consider the example of making a chess move. 
Suppose Angela is seated at a chess board, and a chess player is on the other side. Angela 
reaches down and move a pawn from one square to another. Is she making a chess move, or 
merely moving pieces on a chess board – perhaps idly, or as a nervous tick, or to deceive 
observers into thinking she is playing chess? I claim that this question can only be settled by 
appeal to the way in which Angela herself represents her activity.  If she sees the movement 
of the pawn as part her attempt to achieve checkmate, then that movement in fact constitute a 
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chess move; if she does not represent the movement in this or some sufficiently similar way, 
then it does not constitute a chess move.59  
(Note that I am not claiming that Angela’s representing herself as pursuing checkmate 
ensures that she is making a chess move; this representation might be inaccurate, for 
instance, if she does not make any movement at all. I claim only that the representation is a 
necessary condition, one that can make it the case that Angela is making a chess move when 
held under the right background conditions.)  
Nothing outwardly observable about Angela’s behavior can settle the question of 
whether she is making chess moves. If she looks exactly like a chess player, she might be 
skillfully pretending to make chess moves. If on the other hand she moves pieces in ways 
that are very strange for a chess player, regularly moving them in ways that would violate the 
rules of a chess game or vastly decrease her chances of winning, she might just be making 
very poor moves.60 For Angela to be making chess moves, those moves must be subject to 
the normative standards of chess: moving a pawn backwards, for instance, must constitute a 
mistake. Part of what it is to make chess moves is to be such that moving a pawn backwards 
is a mistake. If Angela is only idly toying with the pieces, then there need be nothing 
 
59 ‘Sufficiently similar’ because it is clearly possible, albeit in somewhat unusual circumstances, to 
make a chess move without pursuing checkmate. One can play chess trying to pull off a draw in the 
face of near-certain defeat, or trying to teach the game to a new player. The full range of suitable 
goals is a problem for the philosophy of chess, rather than the more general problems concerning 
action that are the topic of this paper. The essential claim here is that each instance of making a chess 
move counts as such in virtue of its representation by the player as an attempt to achieve some 
suitable goal, of which checkmate is a common and useful example.    
60 This can perhaps only be stretched so far: there’s a blurred line at best between someone who is 
playing really terrible chess and someone who isn’t playing chess at all, just as there’s a blurred line 
between a really terrible house and something that fails so badly at being a house that it’s no house at 
all. Still, there is clearly room in genuine chess-playing for very poor play and rule violations. Cf. 
Korsgaard 2009 p. 29. 
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mistaken about this movement. (This is essentially the point made in Kripke’s reading of 
Wittgenstein on meaning and rule-following.61) And my claim is that nothing can make 
violating a standard of chess (directly) constitute a mistake of Angela’s, per se, unless she 
takes herself to be pursuing chess’s goal of achieving checkmate – a goal constitutively 
governed by the standards of chess, in that to achieve checkmate just is to achieve a certain 
kind of result in a game governed by chess standards. Only by pursuing that goal, which is to 
say only by understanding herself to be pursuing that goal, can Angela subject herself to the 
standards of chess such that in violating them she would thereby make a mistake. If one 
wanted to force Angela to move her pawn backwards, one could do so by manipulating the 
movements of her hands; but if one wants to force Angela to be such that in moving her 
pawn backwards she is making a mistake, one can only do so by forcing her to see what she 
is doing as pursuing chess-goals.  
Or consider the example of asserting. Suppose Jing utters sounds just like those that 
she would use to utter the sentence ‘the just is the advantage of the stronger.’ Is Jing asserting 
that the just is the advantage of the stronger? Is she reading from Plato? Is she parodying the 
views of simplistic political thinkers? Is she merely venting anger in a burst of sound, which 
by pure chance emerges in just such a way as to resemble the sentence in question? My claim 
is that she is asserting only if she represents the sounds she is uttering as being part of her 
attempt to achieve a certain goal that essentially involves the standards of assertion: the goal, 
perhaps, of conveying to others that she believes the content of the assertion. Nothing about 
her outward behavior can settle whether she is asserting (though of course, it can provide 
inductive evidence as to whether she is asserting, given appropriate background knowledge). 
 
61 Kripke (1982). 
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For her to be asserting, she must be such that, if the sounds she utters were inappropriate means 
of conveying her belief, then her uttering of these sounds would constitute a mistake. And my 
claim is that nothing can make such an utterance constitute a mistake of Jing’s unless she takes 
herself to be pursuing the sort of goal proper to assertion. If one wants to force Jing to be such 
that in making these sounds she is thereby making a mistake, one must do so by forcing her to 
assert, and one must do that by forcing herself to see her utterance as her pursuit of the right 
sort of goal.  
I hope I have convinced you, then, that there are at least two cases (asserting and 
playing chess) in which the nature of the particular action in which an agent A is engaged 
depends on what she takes herself to be trying to achieve with that action. Whether Angela’s 
movements constitute playing chess or something different depends on whether she takes 
herself to be trying to achieve check-mate, and whether Jing’s utterances constitute an assertion 
or something different depends on whether she represents herself trying to convey her belief 
in the content asserted. I now want to strengthen that claim. In each of these cases, I claim, in 
order for the agent to be acting at all, she must represent her action as an attempt to achieve 
some goal or other. For instance, if Angela represented her movement as an attempt, not to 
achieve checkmate, but to deceive observers into thinking that she’s playing chess, her 
movement would still constitute something that she does: namely, an attempt at deception. If, 
on the other hand, she did not take her movement to be part of her pursuit of any goal at all, 
then I am suggesting that she would be a mere observer, rather than an agent, of the movements 
of her hands on the chess-board. She would be alienated from the movements of her hands in 
just the way that Lavin suggests the factory supervisor is alienated from the work done on the 
factory floor, and Strawson suggests the thinker is alienated from her judgments. Doing 
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anything at all requires having an end, and having an end requires representing what one does 
as directed at that end.  
Of course, one cannot make just anything into an attempt by representing it as part of 
one’s pursuit of a goal. I cannot, sadly, make the Andromeda Galaxy into an attempt of mine 
no matter how I represent it. What is represented as goal-directed, what thereby becomes one’s 
means, must be an action. On the other hand, to merely stipulate that the object of such a 
representation must be an action would be circular, since we are understanding the 
representation as establishing the means-end relation and participation in the means-end 
relation as constitutive of action. It seems to me that the most promising option here is to hold 
that the objects of such representation must be effects of the very representation in question. 
That is, I suggest that in order for the movement of Angela’s pawn to be rendered into a chess 
move by her representation of it as directed at achieving checkmate, it must be the case that 
this representation of the movement of the pawn causes the movement of the pawn; the thing 
being represented, in order to become Angela’s means, must be linked to her mind in such a 
way that her representations can cause it to match them. In order for Jing’s utterance to be 
rendered into an assertion by her appropriate representation, it must be the case that her 
representation of the utterance causes the utterance.  
If this suggestion is correct, then for an agent’s pursuit of a goal to get up and running 
in the first place, it must be caused by the agent’s representation as goal-directed of the very 
events that make up the pursuit. We have then a special class of representations, the objects of 
which are their own effects, that represent those effects as goal-directed, and in virtue of which 
those effects constitute actions. A name for this class of representations suggests itself: 
‘intentions.’ I see no good reason to deny that the representations that I have been discussing 
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simply are intentions, and will refer to them as such for the remainder of this paper, although 
I will not attempt to argue against alternative accounts of intention; those with principled 
objections may read it as a term of art. Nor will I attempt to give a complete account of intention, 
which would involve – at a minimum – allowing for intentions that do not result in any action, 
and so represent effects that do not in fact occur. I claim only that when actions do occur, they 
are the results of intentions with the features that I have described.   
We have arrived at a way of accounting for the fact that an agent can set an end in the 
first place, as opposed to simply modifying her attempts to achieve existing ends by settling 
on means of pursuing them. An event can constitute an agent’s means of pursuing her end – 
an action – if it is the effect of the agent’s intention to pursue the end by that very means. So 
an agent may come to make an attempt, the sort of thing to which she can add parts by settling 
on means, in any way in which she can come to form the right sort of representation. But since 
the content of such representations already has a means-end structure, since they represent 
events as directed at achieving a goal, one must settle on means in order to form such a 
representation and engage in an attempt in the first place. The various ways of settling on 
means – decision, evaluation, non-deliberative choice – are not just ways of modifying existing 
intentions, they are also the ways of forming intentions in the first place.    
The full account of action that I am proposing, then, is as follows. For an event to be 
an action, it must be one’s means of pursuing an end, an act for the sake of an end. Attempts 
to achieve one’s ends, in turn, are made up of events caused by the agent’s representation of 
those very events as directed at the ends; caused, that is, by the agent’s intentions. Intentions 
are brought into being when agents settle on means for pursuing goals, and the contents of 
intentions are altered when agents settle on further, finer-grained means. Both the initial and 
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any subsequent instances of settling on means can be brought about by decision, by evaluation, 
or by non-deliberative processes; however, it is only because of their role in determining the 
means-end structure represented in the agent’s intentions that her decisions and so forth are 
relevant to determining which events constitute actions.  
Attentive readers might observe that, described in these terms, the Attempt View turns 
out to be just a version of the Causal Theory that treats intentions, rather than decisions, as the 
mental phenomena by which actions must be caused in the right way. This is correct. The 
attempt view as I have developed it is indeed a version of the Causal Theory. That does not 
mean, however, that all this effort has been wasted. The Attempt View is a very particular way 
of developing the Causal Theory, one that does significantly more than merely identify 
intentions as the causes of action, and this way of developing the Causal Theory reveals that 
theory’s capacity to account for, rather than challenge, the status of beliefs as actions.  
 
VI. Applying the Account: The Normative Payoff 
It has not been my primary concern to argue in this paper that beliefs share a particular 
normative feature of action. This has not, for instance, been an argument specifically about 
what it takes to be responsible, or to do something for reasons, or to be subject to deontological 
constraints. Rather, I have abstracted from these individual debates and attempted to 
undermine an objection that bears on attributions of all of these normative features: the 
objection that there is no plausible sort of control that we exercise over both beliefs and 
physical actions but not over mere sufferings and functionings. With that objection dealt with, 
my view that is anyone who wishes to deny the attribution of any of these features to belief 
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bears the burden of saying why precisely we ought to discount both the evidence of our 
ordinary epistemic practices and the theoretical payoffs of treating beliefs as action-like.  
Still, the accounts I have given of belief and of voluntary control do seem to me to lend 
themselves to explaining some particular normative features of belief, and so in closing I want 
to suggest how those explanations might go.  
First, consider the question of how we can possess privileged access to the content of 
our beliefs: roughly, how we can know what we ourselves believe through means different 
from the observational and inferential methods that we use to learn about what others believe. 
If my view is correct, then when an agent forms a belief that p she does so partly in virtue of 
representing herself as affirming that p for the sake of knowing. In other words, her taking 
herself to believe is part of what makes it the case that she does believe. This explains why 
belief, like other voluntary actions, is knowable through the sort of practical knowledge 
theorized by G.E.M. Anscombe or the special first-person authority of Richard Moran.62  
Moreover, since the end as well as the means is represented, this account helps explain why 
agents are generally in a position to know the norms to which their beliefs are subject, as 
described in the previous chapter. When you believe that p, you’re at least in a position to know 
that you’re trying thereby to know whether p, and so to discover that you are subject to any 
norms derivable from the goal of knowing whether p. This explains why we need not be 
concerned with the skeptical scenario in which, although we take ourselves to hold beliefs 
about the world that are subject to epistemic norms, what we in fact hold are different attitudes 
subject to different norms: if we held different attitudes, means to pursuing different goals, 
we’d know about it.  
 
62 Anscombe (2000) 
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Second, the account can explain why beliefs, like other actions, can be based on reasons. 
It is important here to distinguish the concept of a reason from that of the end or goal for the 
sake of which an action is performed.63 I might form the belief that the grass before me is green 
for the sake of the end of knowing what color the grass is, but for the reason that it looks green 
to me.  The role of reasons is to determine which means we adopt in pursuing our goals; 
something is a reason for adopting particular means if it renders those means suitable for 
pursuing the goal. (More on this conception of reasons, along with a discussion of this account 
of belief allows us to understand beliefs are being more or less skillful, in the next chapter.) 
Importantly, reasons play this very same role in determining what to believe and how to act.  
Finally, the account goes some way towards making sense of why we are both 
responsible for our beliefs and subject to deontological constraints concerning them. A full 
discussion of the requirements for these normative features is beyond the scope of this paper; 
still, in addition to the general strategy of appealing to voluntary control to put beliefs on a par 
with actions that are for which we are paradigmatically responsible and that are 
paradigmatically subject to deontological constraints, there is a bit more to say. On the present 
account, when I believe that p I do so because 1) I myself have a goal of knowing whether p, 
2) I take that goal to be well-served by affirming that p, and 3) this assessment of the suitability 
of the means brings about my affirmation that p. What I believe is therefore ‘up to me’ both 
on the levels of setting ends and of selecting means for pursuing those ends, subject only to the 
constraints that impose themselves on any action with act-end structure. If I cannot believe just 
 
63 Hyman (2015) draws a similar distinction between reasons and motives, which correspond at least 
roughly with the ends for the sake of which one acts.  
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anything for just any reason, it is also hardly the case that my beliefs are imposed on me from 
the outside; they reflect what I am trying to do and how I am trying to do it.
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CHAPTER 3: BELIEVING SKILLFULLY AND BELIEVING FOR GOOD REASON 
 
In Chapter 1, I argued that norms of rational belief derive from the constitutive goal 
of belief: namely, the goal of knowing. In Chapter 2, I used the conception of beliefs as 
essentially goal-directed to argue that beliefs are subject to our voluntary control, and for 
normative purposes can be treated as much like actions.  In this chapter, I will investigate the 
nature of the specific rational norms that fall out of belief’s goal. Employing the resources 
afforded by treating beliefs as actions, my starting point for this investigation is applying to 
belief two key forms of normative assessment to which actions in general are subject: 
assessment as skillful or not, and as performed for good reasons or not.  
Believing is something that we can do rationally or irrationally. For a belief to be 
rational is for it to be good, in a particular way; to evaluate someone’s belief as rational is to 
offer a particular sort of praise. But it is not obvious just what kind of goodness the 
rationality of a belief involves, or what kind of praise an evaluation of a belief as rational 
amounts to. Beliefs may, after all, possess other sorts of goodness without being rational: 
they may be true, they may be useful, they may display the good character of the believer.   
In this paper, I defend both of the following two claims:  
a) Rationality is a form of skill; to believe rationally is to believe skillfully. 
b) Rationality is responsiveness to reasons; to believe rationally is to believe for 
good reasons.
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But (a) and (b) together generate a puzzle:  in general, we can do something for good reasons 
without doing it skillfully, and we can do something skillfully without doing it for good 
reasons.  How can this conflict be resolved in the case of belief? 
I resolve the puzzle by an excursus into the philosophy of action.  I argue for a 
particular account of the distinction between basic and non-basic action – a distinction which 
applies to all rationally assessable conditions, actions or otherwise.  I argue that belief falls 
on the basic side of that distinction.  I then show that the gulf between doing something 
skillfully and doing it for good reasons only opens up for non-basic conditions. Since belief 
is basic, there can be no gulf between believing skillfully and believing for good reasons. 
I begin by clarifying and motivating (a), the claim that rationality is a form of skill, 
since this claim is perhaps more surprising than the fairly orthodox (b). I do not claim that 
rationality and skill are identical; certainly, there are forms of skill that are quite distinct from 
rationality. Rationality is just one particular kind of skill, the kind displayed in behaviors like 
believing, as well as some others –  for instance, I can rationally go to the store, and I can 
rationally fear encountering a drunk driver on the way. On my view, to engage in any of 
these behaviors rationally is to manifest skill. But my focus here will be on belief in 
particular.   
Appeals to skill in epistemology have, so far, been largely restricted to the tradition of 
virtue epistemology – and particularly ‘reliabilist’ virtue epistemology – prominently 
developed by Ernest Sosa (e.g, 2007, 2015a, 2015b).64 This work assigns skillful belief a 
 
64 Related forms of virtue epistemology, also making prominent use of the concept of skillful belief, 
are due to Zagzebski (1996), Greco (2010), Pritchard (2012), Morton (2013), and Miracchi (2015), 
among others. For simplicity, I focus here on Sosa’s presentation. For a helpful overview of appeals 
to skill in epistemology, see Pavese (2016). 
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central role, although in service primarily to an account of knowledge rather than of 
rationality. Sosa, for instance, argues (to a first approximation) that knowledge just is belief 
that is true in virtue of being skillful, or (to use his preferred terminology) in virtue of being 
‘adroit.’ An account of rational belief in terms of skill is a natural development of this work, 
and shares many of the same motivations rallied by Sosa in support of his account of 
knowledge. I will survey some of these, as they apply to the case of rationality, below.  
The bulk of this paper, however, is devoted to motivating the rationality-skill 
connection in a different way: through consideration of the puzzle that I raised above. On its 
face, the claim that to believe rationally is to believe skillfully appears to conflict with the 
plausible and widely accepted view (which I share) that to believe rationally is to believe for 
good reason. The appearance of conflict derives from the fact that, when we set aside the 
case of belief and consider more ordinary examples of skillful behavior, doing things 
skillfully and doing them for good reasons seem to be very different matters. (Consider: one 
may run for political office skillfully but for bad reasons, or one may run for good reasons 
but fail to do so skillfully.) If (as I grant) it’s right that believing rationally is believing for 
good reason, and if in general doing things for good reason has little to do with skill, this 
threatens the plausibility of associating rationality with skill.  
This tension reflects a broader tension within contemporary epistemology. The claim 
that believing rationally is a matter of believing for good reason derives from evidentialist, 
and more broadly internalist, approaches to understanding rationality and justification. By 
contrast, appeals to skill, like Sosa’s, are found predominantly within reliabilist and more 
broadly externalist traditions, which stand opposed to evidentialism and internalism. To over-
simplify rather severely, where internalists typically understand the positive epistemic status 
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of a belief as depending on the quality of the evidence possessed by the believer, externalists 
typically understand such status as depending on the manner in which the belief came to be 
formed – and the skillfulness of a belief is more naturally associated with the manner of 
belief-formation than with the quality of evidence.65 It may seem, then, that in trying to 
advance a skill-based view of rationality, without giving up the rationality-reasons 
connection, I am trying to have my cake and eat it too; I’m trying to get the nice bits of an 
essentially externalist skill-based account while still helping myself to the platitudes about 
reasons that properly belong to internalists. 
I do indeed want to have it both ways, but I plan to work hard on persuading you that 
I can do so legitimately. Much of what I do below will be devoted to developing an 
independently plausible account of skill that yields, in a non-ad hoc manner, the result that 
believing skillfully just is believing for good reason. If this is correct, then there is no conflict 
between the virtue-theoretic understanding of rationality in terms of skill and the evidentialist 
understanding of rationality in terms of reasons, for – when applied to the special case of 
belief – they come to the same thing.  
If I can make this account and its treatment of skillful believing plausible, then I will 
have accomplished three valuable objectives. First, I will have defended the skill-based 
account of rationality from a significant objection stemming from its apparent 
incompatibility with the reasons-rationality connection. Second, I will in fact have provided a 
 
65 Canonical statements of internalism and externalism about justification can be found, respectively, 
in Feldman & Conee (1985) and Goldman (1979). One complication in the contemporary debate is 
that while Feldman & Conee required only that the agent of a justified belief possess sufficient 
evidence in support of that belief, it is now common for internalists to claim that (at least) 
doxastically justified beliefs must be based on sufficient evidence; depending on one’s account of the 
basing relation, this may amount to a constraint on acceptable manners of belief-formation.  
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significant additional positive motivation for the account: if believing skillfully and believing 
for good reason are one and the same, then the former stands to inherit the independent 
plausibility of the latter as an analysis of rationality. (Thus, I take the puzzle at the heart of 
this paper, apparently a challenge for skill-based accounts of rationality, in the end to support 
such accounts.) And third, I will have made some progress in reconciling internalist and 
externalist approaches in epistemology, by showing how one can adopt much of the 
machinery of reliabilist virtue epistemology, itself among the most sophisticated forms of 
externalism on offer, within a reasons-based framework. Some progress – I readily concede 
that, even if all I say here is correct, important points of contention remain, but I do think that 
those points are fewer than often imagined.  
  
I. Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology and Rationality as Skill 
While my account of skillful belief differs in some important particulars from Sosa’s, 
a brief overview of Sosa’s virtue epistemology will be helpful for situating my discussion. 
(Readers familiar with the broad strokes and terminology of Sosa’s ‘AAA’ epistemology 
may feel free to skip ahead several paragraphs). Sosa holds that knowledge can be 
understood by applying a pattern common to the evaluation of all performances (a category 
covering things done by agents in a broad sense, including physical actions but also mental 
states like belief). A performance, Sosa holds, may be successful or creditworthy in three 
different senses: it may be accurate (achieving to a sufficient extent a goal specified by the 
nature of the particular performance), adroit (manifesting skill in attempting to achieve the 
goal), and/or apt (accurate in virtue of being adroit). An archer’s shot, for instance, is 
accurate if it hits the bullseye, adroit if skillfully made, and apt if it hits the bullseye in virtue 
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of being skillfully made. A shot that is merely accurate (perhaps made without skill, but 
nevertheless hitting the bullseye due to luck) gets one sort of credit; a shot that is merely 
adroit (perhaps skillfully made, but missing the bullseye due to bad luck) gets another. The 
highest form of credit is reserved for apt performances, such as a shot that hits the bullseye in 
a way that manifests the skill with which it was made.66   
This ‘AAA’ account of the normativity of performances is coupled with an account of 
what it is for a performance to be adroit. An adroit performance is one that manifests a 
competence of the agent, which in turn is a disposition to attain accuracy enough under the 
circumstances. An adroit shot, for instance, would be one that manifests a disposition of the 
archer’s to hit the bullseye a sufficiently high percentage of the time given the present 
distance from the target, wind, lighting conditions, and so forth. On Sosa’s view, to say that a 
performance is adroit, that it is skillful, or that it is competent amounts to the same thing.  
Applying this pattern to epistemology, Sosa holds that knowledge is apt belief: belief 
that is accurate (true) in virtue of being adroit. This allows him to distinguish the sort of 
success involved in knowledge from that involved in mere true belief (accurate but not 
adroit) or in justified false belief (adroit but not accurate, perhaps – but see below). Crucially, 
it also allows him to distinguish the sort of success involved in knowledge from that present 
in Gettier cases. A Gettiered belief is one that is both accurate and adroit, but nevertheless 
fails to be apt: its accuracy is due not to its adroitness, but to luck.  
 
66 Sosa eventually distinguishes among various sorts of aptness, some of which he deems more 
creditworthy than ‘mere’ aptness. For instance, a ‘fully apt’ performance is one the aptness of which 
manifests the competence of the agent in choosing to attempt it under the circumstances. (For 
discussion see Sosa (2015) ch. 3.)While these further variations on aptness add to the subtlety and 
explanatory power of Sosa’s view by allowing him to distinguish among forms of knowledge and 
respond to objections, the details are unnecessary here given that knowledge is not our focus.  
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Once we buy into this overall approach, it is easy to start thinking of Sosa’s adroit 
belief as equivalent to justified or rational belief. Sosa’s writing sometimes suggests this 
equivalence, as when he describes Gettier cases as demonstrating, first and foremost, that “a 
belief can be both true and competently held without amounting to knowledge.”67 It is more 
common to describe such cases as showing that justified true belief does not suffice for 
knowledge; that Sosa makes the substitution without comment suggests that he sees little if 
any difference between justification and competence. 
If this were correct, then Sosa’s account of knowledge could be expressed in three 
parts, as follows: 1) Knowledge is belief that is not just true and justified, but rather true in 
virtue of being justified. 2) Justified belief is adroit belief. 3) Adroit belief is belief that 
manifests a disposition to believe the truth sufficiently often. Sosa himself, however, does not 
explicitly put things this way; he is not particularly interested in giving an account of 
justified or rational belief per se. 
Sosa’s concerns are his own; here, I am interested in providing an explicit account of 
rational belief as such.68 I therefore want to consider what we might stand to gain by 
identifying rational belief with skillful belief. (Having finished with Sosa exegesis, I will 
henceforth generally use the terms ‘skillful’ and ‘successful’ in place of Sosa’s ‘adroit’ and 
‘accurate.’)  
 
67 Sosa (2015b), p. 81. 
68 Sosa, along with Kurt Sylvan, addresses the relationship between his virtue epistemology and 
reasons-centered internalism in Sylvan & Sosa (2018). In short, they argue that although reasons have 
an important role to play, that role is not fundamental, since possession of a reason is grounded in the 
virtue-theoretic notion of competence.  Sylvan & Sosa’s treatment of these issues is highly 
illuminating and contains much that I agree with, but does not on its own resolve the puzzle that 
opens this chapter. 
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First off, there is something to be said for an account of rationality that locates it in 
relation to knowledge. For virtue epistemologists who accept a view of knowledge that 
agrees with Sosa’s at least in its broad outlines, identifying rational belief with skillful belief 
allows them to see these two focal concepts of epistemology as intimately related, rather than 
as two sui generis topics. For those who are not yet committed to virtue epistemology, it is a 
mark in favor of virtue epistemology if it can be shown to have the resources to analyze not 
just knowledge but also rationality, and a mark in favor of the skill-based account of 
rationality if it can be shown to be continuous with one of the most prominent and successful 
approaches to understanding knowledge in the offing.  So the fit between reliabilist virtue 
epistemology and the skill-based account of rationality already provides some motivation for 
accepting the latter.  
Second, rationality and skill exhibit several structural similarities that would be well-
explained if rationality turned out to be a form of skill. The skill of a performance (that is, of 
something that is done by an agent and directed at a goal), in general, bears a particular kind 
of relation to that performance’s success. The relation is not one of entailment in either 
direction. Consider the performance of driving home from the store. This performance is 
successful, to a first approximation, if by one’s driving one gets home safely and in a 
reasonable amount of time. It is possible, however, to drive skillfully but crash anyway, or to 
drive without skill but arrive at home safely. Nevertheless, skill in driving home is not 
unrelated success in driving home. What it takes to drive skillfully is what it takes to 
appropriately pursue the goal that one has in driving – e.g., the goal of getting home safely. 
The same relation holds between the rationality (skill) of one’s belief, and its truth. (I 
will ultimately prefer to treat beliefs as successful only if they constitutes knowledge, as 
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opposed to true belief, but I acknowledge that some beliefs may aim at true belief and 
focusing on such cases simplifies the exposition at this stage.) Again, the relation is not one 
of entailment. I can believe irrationally, in the face of all evidence, and yet happen to believe 
the truth, or I can believe quite rationally and end up believing a falsehood. And yet, what it 
takes to believe rationally is what it takes to appropriately pursue the truth of one’s belief. 
Identifying rational belief as skillful belief, then, allows us to make sense of the limited – but 
crucial – connection between rationality and truth.   
What exactly it takes to skillfully engage in some performance depends on one’s 
circumstances; there is no single appropriate method. Cooking dinner skillfully will involve 
different things depending on what ingredients one has available, how many people one must 
serve, etc. Similarly, believing rationally depends on one’s circumstances, and particularly 
one’s evidential circumstances. Beliefs that are rational in the face of one body of evidence 
may be entirely irrational in the face of another.  
When one fails in some performance despite demonstrating skill – when, perhaps, one 
shoots an arrow straight at the bull’s eye that is blown wide of the target at the last moment 
by a fluke gust of wind – the failure does not reflect on the agent in the same way it would if 
she had not performed skillfully. Bad luck may reduce the creditworthiness of the shot, but it 
does not make one a worse archer. Similarly, if one believes rationally but falsely, on the 
basis of misleading evidence, then the false belief does not reflect on the believer as it would 
if he had believed irrationally. Skill and rationality both pick out a contribution to the success 
of an endeavor for which the agent is particularly accountable. A rational false belief or 
skillful but failed action is an unfortunate result that befalls an agent; an irrational true belief 
or unskilled but successful action is success not fully creditable to the agent.  
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In addition to accounting for such structural similarities between skillful performance 
and rational belief, the skill-based account of rationality is rendered more appealing by some 
meta-normative considerations. The phenomenon of our performances being subject to 
evaluation as skilled or unskilled is an everyday and unmysterious one, while that of our 
beliefs being subject to rational standards can seem more obscure; to treat the latter as an 
instance of the former is to take away much of the mystery, just as treating knowledge as apt 
belief demystifies the special sort of success involved in knowing. Plausibly, little heavy 
metaphysical lifting is needed to explain how performances can be subject to skill 
evaluations, and little heavy epistemological lifting is needed to explain how we can have 
knowledge (in many cases) of what it takes for a performance of ours to be skillful. (Why 
does skillfully running the 100-meter dash require getting a quick start? How can we know 
that it does? Neither of these is a deep question.)  If rationality is an instance of skill, then, it 
may turn out to be surprisingly simple to give an account of how beliefs can be subject to 
rational evaluation, and of how we can come to know what is required for our beliefs to be 
rational. The prospect of an account of rationality on which the normativity of rationality is 
no stranger than that of running races and shooting arrows is an appealing one.69 
Standards of skill may, in addition, apply to a wider range of performances than do 
ethical or broadly deontological constraints. If rational standards on our beliefs took the form 
of rules, then there would arise at least a prima facie challenge that, in order to be properly 
subject to such standards, we must be free to decide what to believe, and so be in a position 
to meet our obligations. The extent of our control over our beliefs, however, is disputed at 
best. In the previous chapter I argued that our beliefs are under our voluntary control, and so 
 
69 The account of epistemic constitutivism I offered in chapter 1 expands on these advantages.  
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satisfy at least an important necessary condition for being subject to such obligations – but 
perhaps not a sufficient one. In contrast, there is no difficulty in assessing someone’s action 
as unskilled even when he was not in a position to simply decide to act skillfully instead. So, 
treating rationality as an instance of skill sidesteps the need to explain how beliefs can be the 
kind of thing with regards to which we are properly subject to rules. 
I have mentioned several advantages of identifying believing rationally with believing 
skillfully: the ability to account for similarities in our evaluative practices, the prospect of 
simplifying the meta-normative task of accounting for rational standards, the removal of the 
worry that being subject to rational standards requires the freedom to choose what to believe, 
and the prospect of locating rationality in relation to a virtue-theoretic understanding of 
knowledge.   While no one of these considerations compels us to identify believing rationally 
with believing skillfully, the sum total paints an appealing picture – if no great obstacles are 
found to stand in its way. 
 
II. Believing Rationally as Believing for Good Reason 
The identification of believing rationally with believing skillfully, then, carries 
several advantages. In this section, I will review the case for a different identification – that 
of believing rationally with believing for good reason – before turning in the following 
section to the tension between the two. 
In many circumstances, believing rationally requires believing for good reason. 
Suppose I believe that Trump will lose the 2020 US presidential election. Is my belief 
rational or irrational? This question cannot be answered without first determining on what 
basis, or for what reason I believe that Trump will lose. Perhaps I have designed elaborate 
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statistical models to predict voting patterns; perhaps I have spoken with experts who have 
done so; perhaps I reasonably expect significant damaging information about Trump to be 
become public in the near future; or, perhaps, I simply know that he has low approval ratings. 
Any of these, in the right circumstances, could be the basis for a rational belief that Trump 
will lose. On the other hand, a belief with the very same content would be irrational if formed 
on the basis of my psychic’s prediction, or mere wishful thinking, or for no reason 
whatsoever. The difference-maker for the rationality of this belief is the reason for which it is 
held. An adequate account of the rationality of belief, then, must preserve and explain this 
feature.  
I do not claim that every rational belief is held on the basis of some particular good 
reason. Perhaps there are beliefs which we are entitled to hold by default, so long as we have 
not been presented with good evidence of their falsehood.70 Beliefs in the veracity of our 
perceptual experiences, in the falsehood of various skeptical scenarios (e.g., belief that I am 
not a brain in a vat), or in obvious logical and mathematical truths plausibly fall into this 
category. Still, even these beliefs would be rendered irrational were I to hold them for 
sufficiently bad reasons: I could not rationally believe that 1+1=2 on the basis that Rabat is 
the capital of Morocco. In addition, many rational beliefs are held on the basis of not one 
single reason, but rather a complex network of reasons offering various and interrelated 
degrees of support. So, although I will say that believing rationally depends on believing for 
good reason, this is to be understood not as the claim that to each rational belief there 
corresponds a good reason to which it stands in the basing relation, but rather that the sum of 
 
70 In Burge (2000)’s terminology, such beliefs are warranted but not justified. 
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reasons for which a given rational belief is held must be sufficiently good, relative to the 
content of the belief and to one’s circumstances.   
It is tempting, furthermore, to think that being held for good reason is not merely a 
necessary condition on rational belief, but is just what rationality amounts to for belief: that 
for a belief to be rational just is for it to be held for sufficiently good reason.71 I will not 
adjudicate this issue here. For simplicity’s sake, I will assume the stronger identity claim in 
what follows, but nothing turns on this; the argument goes through as long as the necessity 
claim holds.  
A final caveat. It is a widely acknowledged point that some reasons for believing that 
p, although ‘good’ in some sense, are of the wrong kind to render a belief held on their basis 
rational. For instance, the fact that I have been offered a large amount of money to believe 
that p does not enhance the rationality of a belief that p held on that basis (if I am even 
psychologically capable of such a belief). Or anyway, it does not enhance the belief’s 
epistemic rationality, its rationality in the sense with which epistemologists are typically 
concerned. In the previous chapter I offered an explanation of why we cannot base beliefs on 
such reasons, and in the next chapter I will clarify why my view does not entail that doing so, 
even if possible, would be epistemically rational. For purposes of this chapter, suffice to say 
that when I describe a belief as being held for good reasons I mean to describe it as held for 
good reasons of the right kind, reasons that in virtue of their goodness are capable of 
 
71 There is a way of using ‘rational belief’ for which this suggestion is clearly incorrect. Sometimes, 
we use ‘rational belief’ to mean something like ‘a rational thing to believe,’ assessing the status of the 
content rather than of any person’s actual belief state. Here I am focusing on the rationality of token 
attitudes of belief, analogous to doxastic rather than propositional justification.  
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rendering the belief epistemically rational. It is this status, of believing for good reasons of 
the right kind, that I mean eventually to argue is equivalent to believing skillfully. 
 
III. Problem: Φ-ing Skillfully Is Not Φ-ing for Good Reason 
In Section I, I motivated the claim that to believe rationally is to believe skillfully. In 
Section II I suggested that to believe rationally is to believe for good reason. I now want to 
call into question whether the claims of these two sections are compatible. The problem is 
that it is not the case, in general, that to Φ skillfully is to Φ for good reason (indeed, Φ-ing for 
good reason is not in general either necessary or sufficient for Φ-ing skillfully). If Φ-ing for 
good reason and Φ-ing skillfully are not identical, then by the transitivity of identity, Φ-ing 
rationally cannot be identical to both. This is some cause to worry that, in the particular case 
of belief, believing for good reason and believing skillfully are not identical, and if that is so 
then believing rationally cannot be identical to both. We must then consider whether one of 
the identifications suggested so far (rational belief = skillful belief, rational belief = belief for 
good reason) was mistaken.  
Even if we maintain that these identifications were correct, they impose an 
explanatory burden: to make sense of why what does not hold true in general, does in the 
case of belief. Meeting this burden threatens to undermine the explanatory advantages of 
identifying rational belief with skillful belief in the first place. If we have to wheel in some 
ad hoc machinery to explain why skillful believing is a matter of believing for good reason, 
then it seems we might as well have appealed to such ad hoc-ery in the first place to explain 
the nature of rationality, and left skill out of the picture. 
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 To see that Φ-ing skillfully is not, in general, the same as Φ-ing for good reason, 
consider the case of baking a cake. I might bake a cake for terrible reasons (perhaps in order 
to postpone an unpleasant but urgent task) and yet do so with great skill, expertly combining 
ingredients to produce a scrumptious result. On the other hand, I might bake a cake for an 
excellent reason (perhaps I intend it as a gift to cheer up a sad friend, knowing that cake 
always makes her happy) and yet do so with a terrible lack of skill, adding salt in place of 
sugar and overbaking until my cake is a blackened wreck. Given that baking skillfully and 
baking for good reason do not covary, clearly the two cannot be identical: to bake skillfully is 
not to bake for good reason, and more generally, the property of performances [being 
skillful] is not identical to the property [being done for good reason].  
 None of this shows that being held for good reason is not what it takes for a belief in 
particular to be skillful. Skill is a determinable, determined in different manners in different 
domains. The requirements for skillful poetry-writing and skillful race-running are very 
different: among other things, the former requires careful word choice, and the latter requires 
moving quickly, although neither careful word choice nor moving quickly is plausibly 
identical to skill, per se. It could be that where poetry-skill involves careful word choice, 
belief-skill involves believing for good reason.  
 Indeed, something close to this is what I will end up saying (although I think the way 
in which the skill of a belief depends on one’s reasons turns out to be importantly different 
from the way in which skill in racing depends on the speed at which one moves, etc). 
However, what I think the cake-baking example shows is that my view faces a heavy 
explanatory burden to avoid being problematically ad hoc. The deeper concern raised by the 
example is not just that there are cases where Φ-ing for good reason fails to guarantee Φ-ing 
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skillfully, and vice versa. Rather, the worry is that evaluation of performances as skillful or 
not, and as done for good reasons or not, are fundamentally distinct forms of evaluation, each 
of considerable interest but orthogonal.  
Moreover, it seems plausible in general to equate rationality with the latter rather than 
the former: when we say that someone’s baking a cake was rational, for instance, this is more 
naturally heard as meaning that they baked the cake for a good reason than that they did so 
skillfully.  The example therefore makes it tempting to embrace, across the board, the 
analysis of rationality in terms of reasons. Meanwhile, in those domains (like cake-baking) 
where we have a decent pre-theoretic grasp on what it takes to perform skillfully, performing 
skillfully seems to be a matter neither of one’s reasons nor of one’s rationality, but something 
quite different. I admit my own grasp on the notion of believing skillfully is decidedly post-
theoretic. This combination of factors – the general chasm between reasons and rationality 
evaluation on the one hand and skill evaluation on the other, and the lack of a pre-theoretic 
grasp of how to carry out skill evaluation of beliefs in particular – renders my convenient 
claim that to believe rationally is to believe skillfully, that these normally distinct dimensions 
of evaluation come together in the case of belief, highly suspect. If I am to back it up, I need 
to do more than show that the claim is consistent with what we know about, e.g., cake-
baking. I need, rather, to provide an explanation of this apparent coincidence, one that 
appeals to the nature of skill (generally) and to the nature of belief to show that it is no 
coincidence after all.    
 Achieving this goal will involve departing from Sosa’s account of skill. Recall that 
Sosa – as a reliabilist virtue epistemologist – is committed to a fundamentally reliabilist 
account of skill: on his view, to believe skillfully is to believe in a way that manifests one’s 
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sufficiently reliable disposition to believe the truth.  Such a view of skill is indeed in tension 
with the view that believing skillfully is believing for good reason, for just as one may 
exercise a reliable disposition to bake successful cakes without baking for good reason, so 
also one may believe in a manner that manifests a reliable disposition to believe the truth 
without believing for a good reason.  If I am to identify believing skillfully with believing for 
good reason, the account of skill to which I appeal cannot be a straightforwardly reliabilist 
one. This is not to deny that agents who believe skillfully exercise reliable dispositions to 
believe the truth in doing so; it is consistent with the account that I will offer that resulting 
from a reliable disposition is a necessary condition on skillful belief. One might hold that a 
reason r, in order to be a good reason for believing that p, must be such that beliefs that p 
held on the basis of r are reliably enough true.72 If this is correct, then reliabilism can get into 
the view of rationality through the back door, as it were. But the reliabilism is not to be found 
in the account of skill itself. As a result, the account that I will develop here allows for some 
easing of the tensions between internalists and externalists, without erasing those tensions 
altogether. I hope to show how internalists can make use of skill-talk and how externalists 
can make use of reasons-talk to theorize about rationality, while conceding that ultimately 
both camps must still address the question of what makes for a good reason.  
 To begin working towards a resolution of our puzzle, I will for a time set aside the 
case of belief, and provide an account (albeit a partial one) of skill generally. I will then, in 
Section VI, apply that account back to belief to show how it resolves the puzzle and supports 
 
72 A more sophisticated version of such a view would generalize to the case where a belief is held on 
the basis of multiple reasons that only jointly render the resulting belief reliably enough true.   
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my three-way identification of believing rationally, believing skillfully, and believing for 
good reason.      
 
IV. The Structure of Skill 
Consider two pianists, Ursula and Naomi. Each sits down at her instrument and 
attempts to improvise a jazz solo; neither, it must be said, meets with a great deal of success. 
Although they manage to play some notes, those notes just don’t amount to good solos. And 
in each case, the lack of success does not come down to some fluky intervening factor: 
Ursula’s piano does not suddenly go out of tune, Naomi is not interrupted by a fire alarm. 
Rather, the lack of success can be traced directly to the character of the musician’s playing. 
Ursula has had a long and successful career as a professional jazz musician, but now suffers 
from severe arthritis. She is as good as ever at thinking up interesting musical ideas, but her 
hands will not allow her to play them fluidly, and she repeatedly hits the wrong key by 
mistake. Naomi is a classically trained musician who has rarely improvised before. Her 
technical playing is impeccable, but she has no sense of how to go about constructing an 
interesting solo, choosing sequences of notes to play that make no musical sense in the 
context of jazz. 
Next consider Justin, a wrestling coach, and Catie, his new pupil. When the two spar, 
neither is very effective. Justin frequently knows just what technique is called for – he was a 
great wrestler in his prime – but he now lacks the strength and speed to pull them off. Catie, a 
novice wrestler but a gifted natural athlete, first holds her own and then eventually pins Justin 
using brute force, but would never have succeeded against an opponent of strength similar to 
her own who also possessed decent training.  
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 I do not think the performance (the playing or the wrestling) of any of these 
characters can really be called skillful. In each case, however, some element of skill is 
manifested. Ursula and Justin approach their tasks in the right way, they come up with good 
plans for succeeding, but they lack the ability to realize their visions. Naomi and Catie 
flawlessly execute their (limited) visions, but lack the insight needed to properly guide their 
abilities.  Let us say that Ursula and Justin demonstrate planning skill, while Naomi and 
Catie demonstrate follow-through skill.73 Planning skill, relative to a performance Φ, is a 
matter of settling on appropriate means for pursuing success in one’s Φ-ing (whether 
consciously or through some other mechanism such as habit or instinct; more on this below). 
Follow-through skill, relative to a performance Φ, is a matter of skillfully carrying out one’s 
chosen means for successful Φ-ing.74 Neither of these aspects of skill is sufficient to render a 
performance skillful simpliciter. A skillful performance simpliciter is one that combines 
these elements: for instance, a skillful piano solo would involve (at least) note selection like 
Ursula’s executed with dexterity like Naomi’s. 
 
73 These terms are imperfect. For one thing, they tend to suggest that one first formulates an explicit 
plan, and then carries it out. In many of the cases I’m interested in, however, one may plausibly settle 
on means and carry them out at the very same time, without an intervening stage at which one has a 
definite plan but hasn’t yet begun to execute it. One need not even ever become consciously aware of 
the means one settles on. By ‘plan’ I mean simply the collection of means that one settles on for 
carrying out one’s end, consciously or not. 
74 Stanley & Krakauer (2013) similarly suggest that motor skill depends on two separable factors: 
‘knowledge of facts’ and ‘motor acuity.’ While much of their discussion is compatible with what I 
say here, I am not committed to the claim that planning skill must derive from knowledge – indeed, 
there is some reason to think that it cannot, if knowledge is to be explained in terms of skill on virtue-
theoretic lines (see Pavese 2016). Moreover, my account is not restricted to motor skill in particular; 
it is crucial that the account is general enough to apply to the case of belief, which is not of course a 
motor activity. 
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 Here then is the basic picture I want to suggest for the structure of skillful 
performance: for any (non-basic75) performance Φ, to Φ skillfully (simpliciter) is to settle on 
appropriate means m1, m2, etc. for pursuing success in one’s Φ-ing, and to carry out m1, m2, etc. 
sufficiently skillfully in the attempt to achieve success in one’s Φ-ing. Put more simply, Φ-
ing skillfully is a matter of arriving at a good plan for Φ-ing and skillfully implementing that 
plan.  
 There are three features of this picture worth explicitly drawing out at this stage. First, 
it clearly does not amount to a reductive definition of skill, or to a test for determining 
whether or not some performance is skillful (since I have not specified what makes the 
planning or follow-through skill of a performance ‘sufficient’). I have given only a statement 
of some of the internal logic of skillful performances.  
Second, the view is consistent with the claim that skillful performances must manifest 
reliable dispositions to succeed (since it may be the case that one only counts as skillfully 
executing a good plan when one manifests a reliable disposition to succeed) but does impose 
requirements on skill beyond merely manifesting such a disposition. If I consistently settle on 
poor plans for Φ-ing, but always succeed nonetheless because others reliably intercede on my 
behalf, then I do not Φ skillfully.  
Third, this claim can be applied iteratively. For the means Ψ by which one attempts to 
perform Φ is itself a performance and, when Φ is skillful, ex hypothesi so is Ψ. This entails 
 
75 ‘Non-basic’ meaning a performance that is carried out by means of some further performance of the 
agent’s. A performance is basic, on the other hand, when one simply does it without there being any 
means by which one does it. While examples are controversial, it may be helpful to think of the lifting 
of a finger. I discuss the case of basic performances in section IV(a), and the basic/non-basic 
distinction as it applies to belief in section VI below. Until then, no need to worry too much about this 
qualification.  
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that in Ψ-ing one demonstrates both planning and follow-through skill. And the means by 
which one Ψ’s will again demonstrate such skills, and so on. So, if the account of skill that I 
am offering here is correct, then a skillful performance depends on a hierarchy of skillful 
performances standing in means-end relations. (If this hierarchical structure raises worries of 
regress, it should. I will address these worries in section IV(a) below.) This hierarchy need 
not come in the form of a single chain of performances. Often enough, one’s plan for Φ-ing 
will involve carrying out several different means to the end of success in Φ-ing, and each 
means constitutes a separate skill-evaluable performance; in some cases, a single means may 
serve several ends.  
So far, I have been describing the structure of skill in cases where a skillful 
performance occurs. But of course, we can also engage in skill-evaluation in cases where 
there is no skillful performance. And in such cases, the formulation given above won’t do. 
For, while sometimes a failure to skillfully pursue success in Φ-ing results in an instance of 
unskilled Φ-ing, sometimes the failure is so drastic that there is no instance of Φ-ing at all. (I 
may fail at skillfully playing chess by playing chess without skill, but I may also fail at 
skillfully playing chess to such a degree that what I do does not even constitute playing chess 
at all.)76 So the general locus of skill evaluation is the attempt, individuated by that which it 
is an attempt to achieve. A performance of Φ-ing is just an attempt at achieving the goal or 
end proper to Φ-ing, with some other conditions met (the precise nature of which need not 
concern us here).  
 
76 See Korsgaard (2009, ch. 2) for a discussion of the relation between the goodness of a thing as an 
instance of a particular type, and its status as a thing of that type at all. I follow Korsgaard in holding 
that some degree of the former is a necessary condition for the latter. 
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(A note on terminology. From here on out, I will mainly discuss skill evaluation as it 
applies to attempts rather than to performances. I will refer to generic attempts as ‘attempts to 
achieve goal G,’ or sometimes, for brevity, ‘attempts to G’; these should be understood as 
interchangeable, though I will try to use the former for clarity in cases where the latter is 
likely to cause confusion. I use G (and H, I, etc.) to stand for goals, as I use Φ and Ψ to stand 
for performances.)  
With these comments in mind, we can revise the earlier picture of the structure of 
skill a bit. To skillfully attempt to achieve goal G is to settle on some appropriate subordinate 
goals H, I,, etc. that one will pursue for the sake of achieving G, and then to skillfully attempt 
to achieve H, I,, etc. The result is a nested hierarchy of attempts: one pursues one’s 
overarching goal by planning and pursuing subordinate goals, and the skillfulness of one’s 
pursuit of each goal is determined by the quality of one’s plan for that goal and the 
skillfulness of one’s pursuit of its subordinate goals. (Again, this structure naturally raises a 
worry of regress, which I will take up below.)  
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Figure 1: The hierarchical structure of skill 
 
This can all be made a bit less abstract with an example. Suppose I’m trying to get to 
class on time. This is an attempt to achieve a goal, and the attempt is evaluable in terms of 
skill. My proposal is that, for the attempt to be skillful, I must settle on some appropriate 
means for achieving my goal: perhaps I will attempt to catch the 10 a.m. bus. Moreover, I 
must skillfully carry out this subordinate attempt, that is, skillfully attempt to catch the bus. 
In turn, to do that, I must settle on means for catching the bus: I will attempt to leave home at 
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9:55, and attempt to walk quickly to the bus stop. Moreover, I must skillfully carry out each 
of these attempts. And so on.  
 
IV (a): Regress and Basic Performance 
 Are all attempts properly subject to each of these dimensions of skill-evaluation? If 
so, we would be faced with the threat of a regress. If we assume that every skillful attempt is 
skillful partly in virtue the skillfulness of further attempts, then to engage in a single skillful 
attempt would implausibly require either an infinite number of attempts, or attempts serving 
(mediated by however many intermediate steps) ultimately as means for themselves.  
Fortunately, we need not make this assumption to maintain the essence of the account offered 
so far. Action theorists widely endorse the claim that some actions are basic, in the sense that 
there are not done by doing anything else; rather, they are things that we just do.77  There are 
two ways in which we might amend our account of skill to allow such basic actions to 
function as regress-stoppers. We might do this by saying that basic actions are attempts – and 
so are capable of being performed skillfully or not – but that the skillfulness of basic actions 
does not depend on the skillfulness of selecting or implementing further means by which 
those basic actions are performed.  Or instead we might say that basic actions themselves are 
not attempts at all and so and are not capable of manifesting skill or the lack thereof, but 
understand the follow-through skill of (non-basic) attempts to be a matter of skillfully 
performing non-basic actions required by one’s plan, and merely performing any basic 
actions required by the plan. Either way, the possibility of skillful non-basic attempts is no 
longer threatened by regress. We pay the price of accepting a slightly less elegant account of 
 
77 E.g., Danto (1965).  
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skill, but I think this price is not so great; after all, our practice of skill evaluation normally 
applies to highly complex attempts, and the account of skill offered here was designed to 
accord with our practice in those cases. It is not surprising that there should be a bit of 
tension in stretching the account to cover cases at the extremes of what could be understood 
as skillful behavior.    
Adjudicating between the two options that I have presented – between basic actions that 
can and cannot themselves be carried out skillfully – requires revisiting the distinction 
between acts and actions introduced in the previous chapter. (To be clear, this adjudication is 
not necessary for purposes of assuring ourselves that the regress can be halted, but it will 
make a difference to what I say about beliefs below.) According to this distinction, an action 
is an act done for the sake of an end. For instance, if I raise my hand for the sake of greeting 
a friend, raising my hand is the act and waving to my friend the action, although they are one 
and the same. Every action therefore has a built-in means-end structure, and on my view, 
every act is identical to some action. Although not every instance of raising my hand has the 
same end, each instance of raising my hand is done for the sake of some end or other.   
So it turns out that on this view, even the most basic action can be more or less skillful in 
the sense that the act can be a more or less skillful way of pursuing its end; depending on 
circumstances, raising my hand may or may not be a good way of greeting my friend, and I 
can raise my hand in different ways that serve as more or less effective greetings. But this is 
consistent with saying that the raising of the hand, considered simply as a raising of the hand 
and not as a wave, cannot be carried out more or less skillfully; it is simply done or not done. 
This stands in contrast with cases where the act is itself carried out by means of some further 
act, carried out for a further end. Consider the case where I drive my car for the sake of 
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getting home. In that case, the act – driving my car – is done for the sake of the end – getting 
home – but is also constituted by a further act or acts – turning the wheel, stepping on the 
accelerator, etc. – done for the sake of driving the car.  Unlike the example of waving, this 
example of driving home is a non-basic action since it is carried out by means of a further 
action. The truth, then, is that even basic actions are subject to one form of skill evaluation – 
that consisting in the fit between act and end – but not to all the dimensions of skill 
evaluation that apply to non-basic actions – such as that involving the skill of the act 
considered as an action in its own right.  
 
IV(b): Internal and Contributory Skill Evaluation 
 We are now in a position to make sense of a certain ambiguity in ordinary skill-talk, 
one which will become pertinent when we turn back to the case of belief. Suppose a 
basketball player makes a three-point shot, and the announcers remark on the skill of her 
shot. This could be taken to mean that the shot itself, an attempt to get the ball in the basket, 
is carried out skillfully; that is, that the player settled on appropriate means for getting the 
ball in the basket, and performed those means skillfully. Or instead, it could be taken to mean 
that the shot displays, and contributes to, the skill of the player’s attempt to achieve the 
higher-level goal of winning the game, for which making this shot is a means. (If the latter 
interpretation seems strained in the basketball case, you might think instead of chess, where it 
is far more natural to understand the claim that a particular move was skillful as evaluating 
the move’s contribution to the attempt to win the game, rather than the particular grace with 
which an individual piece was carried from one square to another.) Call the former an 
evaluation of the shot’s internal skill: skill in carrying out the attempt under evaluation, in 
  114 
pursuing the end constitutive of that attempt. Call the latter an evaluation of contributory 
skill: the contribution of the attempt under evaluation to the skillfulness with which one 
pursues the end of the higher-level attempt for which the attempt under evaluation is a 
means. A shot could display internal but not contributory skill if the player has chosen a very 
poor moment to attempt a three-point shot, and should have passed the ball instead; in that 
case, the attempt to get the ball in the basket may be skillfully made, but not be made in a 
way that contributes to the skill with which she attempts to win the game. On the other hand, 
a shot could display contributory skill but not (or at most, a very slight degree of) internal 
skill if one chooses one’s moment to attempt the shoot perfectly, but then botches the 
execution: one has more skillfully attempted to win the game in virtue of taking a three-point 
shot just then, but one has not skillfully carried out one’s attempt to get the ball in the basket. 
(I leave open the possibility that some small degree of internal skill is required if one is to 
make the shot at all, and that if one fails to even make the shot then one’s attempt does not 
manifest any contributory skill.) 
 We can now distinguish several species within the skill genus. We have planning 
skill, follow-through skill, internal skill, and contributory skill. How does the distinction 
between planning and follow-through skill map onto that between internal and contributory 
skill? While it may seem tempting to simply equate contributory skill with planning skill, and 
internal skill with follow-through skill, to do so would be a mistake. The 
contributory/internal distinction is a distinction between two ways in which we can evaluate 
the skill of a given attempt: in terms of the relation between the means and end that make up 
that attempt, or in terms of the relation between that attempt considered as means and the end 
for the sake of which it is done. On the other hand, the planning/follow-through distinction is 
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a distinction between two determinants of a particular attempt’s status as skillful in itself, that 
is, skillful in the internal sense. For any agent’s attempt to achieve G to display internal skill 
is for the agent to settle on good means for pursuing G and skillfully implement those means. 
That is, the internal skill of the attempt is what I earlier referred to, in making the 
planning/follow-through distinction, as skill simpliciter. By contrast, the contributory skill of 
the attempt to achieve G is the contribution of the attempt to achieve G to the skill (internal, 
simpliciter) of the further attempt to achieve some other goal H for the sake of which one 
attempts to G, and depends on both the internal skill which one attempts to G, and the place 
of one’s attempt to G in one’s skillful plan for attempting to H.  
An (optional) note for the perplexed: the apparent correspondence between internal 
skill and follow-through skill derives from the fact that the internal skill of the lower-level 
attempt to G determines the follow-through skill of the higher-level attempt to H, in the 
simple case where attempting to G is the only means called for by one’s plan for attempting 
to H. (When one’s attempt to win the game calls only for making a particular three-point 
shot, then whether one skillfully follows through on that plan is just a matter of whether one 
skillfully attempts to get the ball in the basket on that shot.) The apparent correspondence 
between contributory skill and planning skill derives from the fact that the contributory skill 
of the lower-level attempt to G is partly determined by the planning skill of the higher-level 
attempt to H: in particular, if one’s attempt to H manifests planning skill in virtue of one’s 
plan for attempting to H calling for an attempt to G, then when one does attempt to G this 
latter attempt must manifest at least some degree of contributory skill. (If one’s skillful plan 
for winning the game calls for making a particular three-point shot, then in attempting at all 
to make that shot, one has contributed at least a bit to the skillfulness of one’s attempt to win 
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the game, though the contribution will certainly be greater if the shot manifests internal skill 
as well.) 
 
Where A attempts to G as the sole means for A’s attempt to H: 
Follow-through skill of attempt to H is a function of:      Internal skill of attempt to G 
Internal skill of attempt to G is a function of:  1) Planning skill of attempt to G,  
2) Follow-through skill of attempt to G 
Contributory skill of attempt to G is a function of:  1) Planning skill of attempt to H,  
2) Internal skill of attempt to G 
 
Figure 2: Relations among varieties of skill 
 
V. Planning skill 
So far, I’ve had little to say about planning skill, beyond the facts that 1) it is one of 
the two determinants of the internal skill of an attempt, and 2) it is manifested when one 
settles on appropriate means for pursuing the attempt’s goal. In this section, I want to argue 
that to settle on appropriate means for pursuing a goal is to settle on those means for good 
reason.  
We paradigmatically settle on means for pursuing our goals by engaging in 
means/end, or instrumental, reasoning. (Granted, there are also cases in which we settle on 
means by habit or instinct. I consider such cases below.)  When engaging in this sort of 
reasoning about an attempt to G, what we are trying to do is come up with a plan that will in 
fact result in achieving G. To devise a good plan, however, is not always to devise a plan that 
in fact results in our achieving G. A good plan can be foiled by bad luck, by the presence of 
unknown complications, or by limitations on one’s own ability to follow through.78 Nor does 
 
78 Of course, a good plan must be sensitive to limitations on one’s follow-through skill. But such 
sensitivity does not always suffice for overcoming those limitations. If a tone-deaf singer hopes for a 
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the fact that we achieve G entail that our plan for achieving G was a good one, for we can 
succeed as well as fail by luck, etc. Skillful planning, then, involves settling not on the means 
that will in fact bring success, but rather on means rendered appropriate as ways of pursuing 
success by the imperfect evidence to which we have access. Selecting a means because of 
one’s recognition of evidence suggesting that it is the most likely way of achieving G, and 
one wants to achieve G, is a clear case of selecting a means for a reason. But evidence about 
efficacy is not the only sort of reason that can be involved in skillful planning. One might 
pass up some means that (given one’s evidence) would likely be efficacious in achieving G, 
on the grounds that taking that means conflicts with a moral restriction, or an aesthetic 
preference, or an ongoing life project. In each case, one’s choice of means is based in part on 
a non-evidential reason for preferring some means over others. And so, planning skill, the 
skill of settling on means for carrying out one’s attempts, is a matter of settling on the means 
one does for good (evidential or non-evidential) reason. (For the moment, I remain neutral on 
whether non-evidential reasons can ever be ‘good’ in the case of belief, but return to that 
question in the next chapter.)  
I noted above that, in some cases, we settle on means for pursuing our ends through 
habit or instinct rather than through explicit reasoning. But this is not a threat to the proposed 
view of the relation between planning skill and reasons unless 1) there are instances of good 
plans carried out solely through habit or instinct, and 2) those are not also instances of doing 
 
career in opera, he must take his tone-deafness into account if he is to arrive at a good plan for 
pursuing this goal; such a plan will include means of compensating for or bypassing his limitation. 
Still, even such a plan may not work out. Making it in the opera without being able to discern pitch 
may just be too difficult. 
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something for good reason. I am inclined to accept 1 but reject 2.79 In order to behave in a 
particular way on a particular occasion out of habit or instinct, I must at least implicitly 
represent my present circumstances as being of a certain sort: relevantly similar to those 
previous cases in which the habit formed, or of the sort to which my instinct applies. It is in 
virtue of my representing my present circumstances as being of the right sort that my 
planning is guided by my habit or instinct. Now, this may often lead to poor planning either 
if the habit or instinct is a bad one, or if I misrepresent my circumstances, and so carry out 
my planning guided by a habit or instinct unsuited to my actual circumstances. Still, in the 
sort of good case described by (1) where my habit- or instinct-guided planning is skillful, it is 
skillful because I not only represent but correctly recognize some feature of my 
circumstances, in recognizing it I invoke a disposition to form plans that are suitable for 
circumstances where that feature is present, and my disposition results in a plan for achieving 
my goal in a manner that is appropriately responsive to my evidence. I see no reason to deny 
that this process amounts to a way of settling on means for good reason, albeit good reason 
not explicitly recognized. 
Suppose I need to obtain some ingredients to cook dinner, and settle on going to the 
nearby grocery store as my means of doing so. One way of so settling would involve 
explicitly reflecting on my evidence for the proposition that the store carries the ingredients 
that I need, but another way involves going to the store because I am in the habit of doing so 
when I need to buy ingredients. My claim is that, in any such habit-based case where my 
 
79 Additionally, if (2) were true, it seems to me this would support rejecting (1), which would still 
suffice for the purposes of my argument. If what I do merely through habit or instinct lacks some sort 
of sophistication needed in order for it to be done for a good reason, then I see no reason to deny that 
the same sophistication is required for skillful planning. 
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settling on going to the store constitutes skillful planning, then the process by which I settle 
on going to the store (tacitly recognizing that this case is sufficiently similar to previous 
cases in which I’ve needed to buy ingredients for dinner, and as a result invoking a 
disposition to go to the store that is responsive to my evidence about the store and its 
suitability for obtaining the ingredients I need) also constitutes settling on that means for 
good reason. 
 
VI. Believing skillfully 
Recall our puzzle. We have good reasons for identifying believing rationally with 
believing skillfully, and for identifying believing rationally with believing for good reason.  
But, in general, it is not the case that to Φ skillfully is to Φ for good reason. Indeed, these 
represent two quite distinct modes of evaluating a performance. We are interested in knowing 
whether a candidate for President is running skillfully, and knowing whether she is running 
for good reason, but we would never take these to be the same thing. How, then, can the two 
come together in the case of belief? To respond to this challenge, we must apply the account 
of skill offered above to the case of belief, and work out what believing skillfully, in 
particular, amounts to. 
In the previous chapter, I argued that believing that p is an action consisting of an act 
– affirming that p – performed for the sake of knowing whether p. (At least, this is the end of 
a particularly important class of beliefs, though I allow that the ordinary language term belief 
may pick out some affirmations with different ends, and even some with no end at all.) When 
I am engaged in an attempt to know whether p,  I must settle on means for achieving this 
goal. I might or might not settle on affirming that p as part of my plan. Suppose I settle on so 
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affirming, and as a result do come believe that p. We can then ask: to what sorts of skill 
evaluation is that belief, as a means implemented to serve the end of knowing, properly 
subject?      
First, is believing that p itself something that can be done out more or less skillfully? 
My answer follows my argument in the previous chapter that belief is a basic action, and the 
discussion of basic action in section IV(a) of this chapter above. I suggest that believing is a 
basic action, in that – although believing consists of affirming for the sake of knowing, and 
so has internal means-end structure – the affirming is not itself carried out by means of any 
further action. As a result, unlike with non-basic actions, the act – the affirmation – is not 
done more or less skillfully. It is simply done.  
Now, there is a clear sense in which one can believe that p by means of some further 
action. One can perfectly well adopt means in the attempt to bring it about that one believes 
that p, and those means may succeed. For instance, one might consult a hypnotist, or one 
might selectively seek out evidence supporting the conclusion that p. However, this is not the 
sense that we must be concerned with here. Compare: I may by some means attempt to bring 
it about that I give a lecture on ancient philosophy (perhaps I petition to teach an appropriate 
course), and I may be some means give a lecture on ancient philosophy (perhaps I discuss 
some aspects of the Meno). There are two attempts here: the attempt consisting of the act 
[petitioning], and the distinct attempt consisting of the act [discussing the Meno]. Each has 
the end of giving the lecture, but only the second, when sufficiently successful, constitutes 
giving the lecture. In ordinary English, we might say either that I give the lecture by means 
of petitioning or that I give it by means of discussing the Meno. Yet this is clearly said in 
quite a different sense in each case. When I say that believing is basic, I mean that although I 
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can do all kinds of things (analogous to petitioning) in trying to bring it about that I believe, I 
can’t do anything for the sake of believing that, if successful, also constitutes my believing. 
The only thing that can constitute believing is affirming, and to do so its end must be 
knowing, not believing. Put another way, although belief essentially are means – means of 
trying to know – they are not themselves carried out by any means.  
As a result, we cannot evaluate a belief for internal skill. The internal skill of an 
action is a matter of planning skill and follow-through skill: of the suitability of the means by 
which we carry out the action, and of the skill with which we perform those means. We 
cannot evaluate either the suitability of the means by which we believe, or the skill with 
which those means are carried outs, because no such means exist.  
 If believing that p cannot manifest greater or lesser internal skill, doesn’t that directly 
undermine the identification of rational belief with skillful belief? No. As a means, believing 
that p may still properly be evaluated with regards to contributory skill. (Recall the examples 
in section IV(b). The contributory skill of the basketball shot or the chess move is the extent 
to which it contributes to the success of one’s attempt to win the game.)  When we evaluate a 
belief as rational, we are evaluating it as contributing to the skill of the attempt for which one 
has settled on believing that p as a means – one’s attempt to know whether p. With internal 
skill out of the picture in the case of belief, the only way in which it makes sense to evaluate 
the skill of a belief is in terms of its contribution to the pursuit of this end. 
What, then, determines the contribution that one’s believing that p makes to the 
skillfulness of the higher-level attempt for which that belief is a means? In general, as I 
argued above, the contributory skill of a given attempt to G is determined by both the internal 
skill of one’s attempt to G, and the planning skill of the higher-level attempt to H for which 
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attempting to G is a means. (For example, the contribution of the basketball shot to the 
skillfulness of one’s attempt to win the game depends both on the skillfulness of one’s 
selecting the shot as a means by which one attempts to win the game, and on the skillfulness 
with which one carries out the shot.) But again, since believing that p is a basic action, and 
not one that can be – internally – carried out in a more or less skillful manner, the internal 
skill component drops out. So long as one does believe that p, the contributory skill of one’s 
believing that p (or of any other basic performance) is entirely determined by the planning 
skill of the higher-level attempt for which that basic action is a means. If one settles on 
affirming that p as a means of knowing whether p, and as a result one believes that p, then 
the contributory skill of one’s belief is entirely determined by the skill with which one settled 
on the affirmation as one’s means. 
  Now for the last piece of the puzzle, recall that according to my account of planning 
skill, to skillfully settle on some means just is to settle on that means for good reason. The 
upshot: one skillfully believes that p – in the sense that one’s affirming that p contributes to 
the skill with which one attempts to know whether p – just when one settles on affirming that 
p for good reason.  
But if this is right, then our puzzle is dissolved. There is no difficulty in identifying 
believing rationally with both believing skillfully and believing for good reason, once we 
accept that believing skillfully (at least, for the only sense of that phrase on which beliefs are 
properly subject to skill evaluation) is believing for good reason.    
We can trace the apparent conflict first to a failure to recognize the essential role of 
reasons in determining the skill of attempts (via the skill of the plan for carrying out those 
attempts), and second to a failure to recognize that the evaluation of some performance as 
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skillful is ambiguous between evaluation of internal and of contributory skill. Once we 
recognize these two features of skill evaluation, along with the fact that belief is a basic 
action, there is no special need to justify identifying skillful belief with belief for good 
reasons. This identity simply falls out of the general nature of skill evaluation, as applied to 
the case of belief.
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CHAPTER 4: INSTRUMENTALISM ABOUT EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY: THREE 
OBJECTIONS 
 
In the previous chapters, I defended the view that a belief is an affirmation of some 
proposition as a means of knowing whether that proposition is true, and that the epistemic 
rationality of a belief is a matter of the appropriateness of the means (affirming) to the end 
(knowing). In other words, I defend a form of the view that the epistemic rationality at least 
of beliefs is in fact a kind of means-end, or instrumental rationality. Call a view that so 
subsumes epistemic rationality under instrumental rationality instrumentalism about 
epistemic rationality; forms of instrumentalism are defended by Foley (1987), Laudan (1990, 
1991), Nozick (1993), Kitcher (1992), Kornblith (1993, 2002) and Giere (1989). 
Instrumentalism, however, has also been the target of forceful criticism. In this paper, I will 
consider and reply to three objections to instrumentalism. The first objection claims that there 
is a mismatch between the epistemic reasons for belief that agents actually possess and the 
epistemic reasons agents would possess if instrumentalism were true. The second claims that 
instrumentalism falsely entails the existence of pragmatic reasons for belief, reasons that can 
compete against and even outweigh one’s distinctively epistemic reasons. The third claims 
that instrumentalism mistakenly allows for tradeoffs among one’s epistemic goals, 
sanctioning (for instance) sacrificing the truth of one belief for the sake of others. In short, 
whatever appeal instrumentalism may hold, the instrumentalist is committed to predictions 
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about epistemic normativity that simply do not align with reality. I will argue that the form of 
instrumentalism I have developed can withstand these objections.  
 
I. Kelly’s Indifference Objection 
According to Kelly (2003), there are cases in which an agent in fact has epistemic 
reasons to hold some belief, although – since the agent lacks any relevant epistemic goal – 
instrumentalism would predict that she also lacks epistemic reasons for the belief. The worry 
is that at least some epistemic reasons, such as reasons to believe in accordance with one’s 
evidence, are categorical: they apply regardless of the circumstances. On the other hand, 
instrumental reasons are hypothetical: they apply only when one happens to have the right 
sort of goal. The sort of case Kelly has in mind is one in which an agent is confronted with 
strong evidence for some completely uninteresting proposition p: say, the proposition that 
Bertrand Russell was left-handed. The agent is indifferent to the truth of p, and so, on Kelly’s 
interpretation of instrumentalism, lacks any goal that will be served by believing that p and 
lacks any instrumental reason to believe that p. Still, he thinks, because the agent has good 
evidence for p, she in fact has good epistemic reason to believe that p. If an agent can have 
epistemic reason for believing that p without having instrumental reason for believing that p, 
then of course epistemic reason cannot be instrumental reason, and so instrumentalism is 
false. Call this the indifference objection.  
The force of the indifference objection depends on the assumption that for an agent to 
have an end or goal, in the sense that yields instrumental reasons, entails the agent’s having a 
preference or desire that that goal be accomplished. (I think Kelly is naturally read as going a 
step further and assuming that having an end or goal just is having the related preference or 
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desire, but his objection does not strictly speaking require this.) The indifference objection 
claims that, if an agent does not care whether or not she believes the truth about p, if she has 
“no preference for having true beliefs to having no beliefs about these subjects; nor, for that 
matter … any preference for having true beliefs to false beliefs,” it follows that she must not 
have the goal of believing that p that would support instrumental reasons for doing so. The 
only reason I can see for accepting this inference is the assumption that to have a goal is, or 
at least entails, having have a preference or desire.   
On my own version of instrumentalism, goals are not preferences or desires. (Of 
course, the point is not to quibble about the term ‘goal’; more fundamentally, I claim that 
preferences and desires are not the things the appropriate pursuit of which constitutes 
epistemic rationality.) Rather, an agent’s goals are the things that she is trying to accomplish, 
whether or not she wants to accomplish them. On reflection, it seems clear that these two can 
come apart. Suppose you’re playing a board game with a friend who you know has had a 
particularly rough day. You think that winning the game might really cheer your friend up, 
and so you hope (and desire, and prefer) that they win. This does not entail that you don’t 
still try to win. You might not want to patronize your fiend by intentionally throwing the 
game. Instead, you play with the goal of winning, while preferring and desiring that your 
friend makes particularly clever moves, or that dice rolls work out in their favor, etc. This is 
not a case where you are conflicted between a desire to win and a desire to lose; the only 
conflict is between a desire to lose and a desire to try to win.80  
 
80 See Velleman (1996).  
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Or consider a reluctant blood donor, heading to a blood drive to donate despite a fear 
of needles. The reluctant donor is genuinely trying to donate; that is her goal. And yet she 
desires, and prefers, that she should fail. It would come as an immense relief to her if she 
were for some reason rejected by the blood drive, told that she is not eligible to donate. On 
one way of describing this case, it may seem that the donor is torn between conflicting 
desires: a desire to give blood and a desire not to give blood. If so, this would be a case 
where the goal of giving blood is accompanied by some desire to give blood, and so would 
not be a counterexample to Kelly’s assumption that goals entail desires. Firstly, though, 
Kelly’s assumption is most plausibly understood as concerning what an agent overall, or on 
balance, desires to do; if even thoroughly outweighed desires will do, it becomes too easy to 
assert that such outweighed desires are also present in the cases of epistemic indifference 
where Kelly must deny them. Moreover, I see no reason why we can’t simply stipulate that 
the case is one where, like in the  board game case, the reluctant donor simply has no desire 
whatsoever to donate.  She may be moved by some other desire – say, a desire not to be seen 
skipping the blood drive. But the desire or preference, if any, need not be a desire or 
preference to achieve the goal that she is in fact pursuing.  
When I say that a believer’s epistemic reasons derive from her goal of knowledge, I 
construe knowledge as a goal in this sense: that which the believer is genuinely trying to 
achieve, even if she is indifferent to her success – indeed, even if she actively desires to fail.  
With this distinction in mind, we have the resources to block Kelly’s indifference 
objection to instrumentalism. The indifference objection fails because it does not establish 
the existence of cases in which an agent has epistemic reasons to believe while lacking any 
relevant cognitive goal, such as the goal of knowing. It reveals only that agents may have 
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epistemic reasons to believe while lacking relevant desires, such as the desire to know: but an 
agent may be trying to know without desiring to do so. This seems like a reasonable verdict 
in cases where the proposition in question is of little interest, but one forms a belief about it 
anyway. Suppose I do receive strong evidence that Russell was left-handed, and as a result I 
come to believe that he was. Because I am not interested in this proposition, I lack any desire 
to believe the truth about it; and yet, the fact that my resulting belief aligns with the available 
evidence, rather than disregarding that evidence to arrive at random at a view about Russell’s 
handedness, suggests that I am trying to get at the truth.  Perhaps this effort arises from only 
a standing, default goal of trying to know about the world around me, rather than from any 
particular fascination with philosophers’ biographical trivia, but this does not prevent it from 
playing the needed role in my sort of instrumentalism.81   
By distinguishing between goals on the one hand, and preferences and desires on the 
other, I have undermined the force of the example cases in which Kelly takes it to be most 
obvious and intuitive that there is a mismatch between epistemic goals and epistemic reasons. 
This does not amount to entirely undermining Kelly’s challenge, since his view is not merely 
that there are epistemic reasons in these cases that the instrumentalist can’t account for. 
Rather, he thinks that epistemic reasons are categorical – they apply unconditionally. And it 
is true that, on my view, epistemic reasons are contingent on the agent’s goals. As long as 
there exist cases in which an agent lacks the relevant epistemic goal, then there will exist 
cases in which that agent also lacks the epistemic reasons. And so as long as I allow for such 
cases, I do contradict the categorical view of epistemic reasons.  
 
81 See further discussion of such standing goals in chapter 2, section IV.  
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One possible response here is to claim that, in fact, no such cases are possible: there 
can never be a case in which an agent is confronted with some evidence but lacks the sort of 
goal needed for the evidence to constitute a reason to believe. A thoroughgoing constitutivist, 
for instance, might hold that having general goals of knowing about one’s surroundings is 
part of what it is to be an agent, and so for agents epistemic reasons apply categorically. This 
is an intriguing possibility, but not one that I wish to commit myself to at present. Instead, I’ll 
limit myself to pointing out that an agent who lacks any goal (in my sense, divorced from 
notions of preference or desire) of knowing about her surroundings would be a very strange 
agent indeed. Cases where an agent lacks merely the desire to know are far more readily 
imagined, and may lead us to prematurely conclude that epistemic reasons are genuinely 
categorical. If I were committed to saying that epistemic reasons fail to manifest whenever an 
agent lacks that desire, it would be a deeply troubling result. Once we separate the claim of 
categoricity from the cases Kelly rallies to support it, the result becomes far less troubling. 
The mere possibility of some sufficiently odd cases in which epistemic reasons are absent is 
not a result that I take to count for or against the plausibility of the view.      
 
II. The Pragmatic Reasons Objection 
If epistemic rationality is fundamentally instrumental, if our reasons for belief derive 
from the fact that doing so allows us to achieve our goals, then this raises the possibility that 
some reasons for belief might derive from goals that are not properly epistemic. We might 
then have pragmatic reasons for belief: reasons to believe, not because doing so will help us 
to know or to get at the truth, but because doing so will make us happier, more successful, 
richer, and so forth. For instance, I might be offered a monetary reward to believe against my 
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evidence; I might be more professionally successful if I benefit from the confidence that 
accompanies believing that I am more talented than I really am; I might be happier if I 
believe that I am more widely beloved than is in fact the case.  
Pragmatic reasons, however, strike many philosophers as ‘the wrong kind’ of reasons 
to serve as reasons for belief. For a start, pragmatic reasons will be rejected by any adherent 
of evidentialism.82 This view is not universal; some have explicitly argued for the existence 
of such pragmatic reasons for belief, and so would view such reasons as a welcome result of 
instrumentalism.83 However, pragmatic reasons for belief are widely enough rejected that 
entailing them would have the effect of damaging the credibility of my view.    
One significant defense that my view has against this charge lies in the fact that, 
given the sort of voluntary control over beliefs that I argued for in chapter 2, it is impossible 
to believe on the basis of pragmatic reasons. A reason on the basis of which one believes 
must be a reason that leads one to evaluate affirming that p as a suitable means for pursuing 
one’s end of knowing that p; since this end is epistemic, any reason that one takes to bear on 
its pursuit must be an epistemic reason as well. To deny that one can believe on the basis of 
pragmatic reasons is not quite the same as to deny that pragmatic reasons for belief exist, but 
it is commonplace to hold that reasons for believing must be reasons on the basis of which 
one could, potentially, believe.84 Adopting this assumption, my account in fact entails that 
there cannot be pragmatic reasons for belief.  
 
82 Such as Chisholm (1966), Conee & Feldman (2004). For discussion of the distinction between 
right- and wrong-kind reasons, see Schroeder (2012). 
83 Defenders of pragmatic reasons for belief include Pascal (1995), McCormick (2014), Rinard 
(2017).  
84 See for instance Kelly (2002), Dancy (2000), Kiesewetter (2017).  
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In all fairness, though, matters are a bit more complicated than that. For while I deny 
that one can believe on the basis of pragmatic reasons, I accept that one’s belief can 
ultimately be motivated by the pursuit of pragmatic ends.85 Although a belief is an 
affirmation for the sake of knowing, one may [affirm for the sake of knowing] all for the sake 
of some further end, epistemic or pragmatic. For instance, suppose that I have been offered a 
substantial fellowship from my university for believing that it is the world’s foremost 
institution of higher education; our deans being the remarkably perceptive sort, merely 
feigning belief won’t work. Recognizing that I cannot simply affirm the university’s 
supremacy for the sake of getting the money – for such an affirmation would not constitute a 
belief – I set out to know whether this university is the best, hoping that my investigation will 
lead me to conclude that it is.  
In such a case, if I do find evidence suggesting that my university is the best, I can 
then form that belief based purely on epistemic reasons. On the other hand, what if the 
evidence I find begins to suggest that some other university is better, and so that any 
affirmation I make in the attempt to know will not constitute the necessary belief? Supposing 
that offered money was my only reason for attempting to know, then it seems that in such a 
case I might perfectly well respond by abandoning the attempt to know, and so failing to 
come to believe despite the evidence that I have gained. As long as I maintain the goal of 
knowing whether my university is the best, I think that I must pursue that goal solely on the 
basis of epistemic reasons, but non-epistemic considerations rather might lead me to abandon 
the project and render the epistemic reasons irrelevant.  
 
85 In the previous chapter I follow Hyman (2015) in distinguishing between the reasons for which one 
acts, and the ends for the sake of which one acts. Briefly, ends specify one’s motivation for acting at 
all, while reasons guide the manner in which one pursues one’s ends. 
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Notice that this form of the pragmatic reasons objection ends up bearing a striking 
similarity to Kelly’s indifference objection: I end up in the situation where I have evidence 
that some other school is better, but have no reason to believe that it is because I lack a 
relevant epistemic goal. I can therefore appeal in the same way as I did above to broad, 
standing goals of generally knowing about the world. Yet I have no principled argument that 
everyone must have such a goal, or must apply it to every case, and so I cannot rule out the 
possibility of an agent who fails to believe despite sufficient evidence to do so. 
In sum then, I can deny the possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief, but cannot 
deny that pragmatic considerations may sometimes effect whether or not I engage in the sort 
of goal-directed activity where epistemic reasons arise. For myself, I don’t find this a 
particularly unsettling end result, but readers must judge for themselves. (Or not, if they 
don’t find it practical to do so.)  
 
III. Trade-offs Among Beliefs 
Berker (2013) argues against any form of epistemic teleology: that is, against any 
view on which epistemic normativity is based on the pursuit of epistemic goals. The 
instrumentalism that I endorse is a particularly glaring example of such epistemic teleology. 
Berker’s basic challenge is that epistemic teleology must sanction unacceptable trade-offs 
when determining what an agent ought to believe. For instance, suppose I have the goal of 
knowing as much about the world as I can; now suppose that unless I form the belief that 
seven is not a prime, my access to Wikipedia will be cut off. Unlike in the previous section, 
the concern is not that the pragmatic value of Wikipedia access will weigh on my belief. 
Rather, it is that the epistemic value that I can obtain by maintaining Wikipedia access will 
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outweigh that of knowing that seven is a prime. Berker thinks, then, that epistemic 
teleologists (and by extension epistemic instrumentalists) are committed to saying that I 
ought to sacrifice the lesser epistemic value for the greater. But this seems wrong: the treat 
regarding Wikipedia does not bear on the truth of the proposition that seven is not a prime, 
and so should not ground an epistemic ‘ought.’  
I have two related replies to make. First, on my view the epistemic goals that ground 
epistemic normativity are not broad goals of knowing as much as possible (or truly believing 
as much as possible, etc.) Rather, the goal of each belief that p is a goal of knowing whether 
that specific proposition, p, obtains. This is not a goal that can be served by sacrificing 
knowledge about p for the sake of earning knowledge about different propositions. Second, 
on my view the end of believing that p is the end of thereby knowing that p, of one’s 
knowledge being constituted by that very affirmation. We might imagine a case in which 
voluntarily forming a false, or a true but unjustified, belief that p would foreseeably result in 
one ultimately knowing whether p. In such a case there is no concern about a tradeoff 
between propsitions, since only the proposition p is at issue. Still, a false or unjustified 
affirmation made in such a case would never itself constitute knowledge that p, and so would 
never be an appropriate means of pursuing the end of belief.  
We might well, in the sorts of cases Berker envisions, have reasons to try to get 
ourselves to believe falsely or to refrain from believing the truth. Suppose that I am trying to 
know whether a great many individual propositions p, q, r …. obtain, solely for the sake of 
knowing as much about the world as I can. If I know that that in exchange for ceasing to 
believe that p I will be rewarded by coming to know whether q, r, and a great many other 
propositions, then I may no longer have any reason to maintain the goal of knowing whether 
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p. In such an (admittedly bizarre) scenario, I may cease trying to know that p and so lose all 
epistemic reason for believing that p. I will not, however, gain an epistemic reason against 
believing that p, since such an epistemic reason would have to be grounded in the goal of 
knowing whether p rather than in the higher-order goal of knowing as much as possible. I 
will simply cease to concern myself with coming to any opinion about p, and so cease being 
subject to epistemic reasons concerning it. This is, as Berker notes, a good reason for not 
attempting to ground categorical epistemic norms in a general desire to know as much as 
possible about the world, but it does not show that epistemic norms, when they apply, 
sanction unacceptable trade-offs.  
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